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The First Free Exercise Case
Walter J. Walsh*

Preface
The general satisfaction given to every religious denomination, by
the decision of this interesting question, is well calculated to dissipate antiquated prejudices, and religious jealousies, and the Reporter feels no common satisfaction in making it public. When this
adjudication shall be compared with the baneful statutes and judgments in Europe, upon similar subjects, the superior equity and wisdom of American jurisprudence and civil probity will be felt, and it
cannot fail to be well received by the enlightened and virtuous of
every community, and will constitute a document of history, precious and instructive to the present and future generations.
WILLIAM SAMPSON, THE CATHOLIC QUESTION IN AMERICA

(1813) (reporting People v. Philips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813)).
With these prophetic words, William Sampson prefaced his report of the
first ever constitutional triumph for religious freedom. That courtroom victory was People v. Philips,' decided by Mayor De Witt Clinton in New York
City's Court of General Sessions in June 1813. Banished civil rights advocate
Sampson argued and won Philips as a major test case on behalf of the exotic
thousands of Irish Catholic refugees recently landed in New York City. A
pioneering human rights lawyer and recorder of political trials, Sampson then
ideologically secured their courtroom victory with his hefty report of the case
published as The Catholic Question in America.2 William Sampson's rare but
Associate Professor, University of Washington School of Law. B.C.L. 1979, National
University of Ireland (University College Dublin); LL.M. 1989, Yale University; S.J.D. 1997,
Harvard University. The author is writing the biography of William Sampson (1764-1836). Research support was generously provided by Harvard Law School's Mark de Wolfe Howe Fund
for Research into Legal History and Civil Liberties, and also by the University of Washington
Law School Foundation. Earlier versions of this Article benefited greatly from presentations at
the New York University legal history colloquium during a year of residence as Samuel I. Golieb
Fellow in Legal History and the University of Washington legal theory colloquium. Thanks to
Morty Horwitz, Bill Nelson, John Reid, Robert Cover, Jack Getman, Julia Cooper Mack, and
Guido Calabresi. Thanks also to Tom Bartlett, Ruth Beardsley, Maxwell Bloomfield, Gerard
Bradley, Marion Casey, Katherine Dickason, Paul Finkelman, Martin Flaherty, Richard Helmholtz, Philip Hamburger, Kurt Lash, Cathy McCauliff, Michael McConnell, Paul O'Higgins,
Mark Tushnet, and Lou Wolcher. John O'Connor, Amanda Beane, and Richard Robinson provided excellent research assistance, as did Nicole Nyman who also brought this Article to fruition. My greatest influence is my muse and intellectual companion, Anita Ramasastry.
1 People v. Philips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813), reported in WILLIAM SAMPSON, THE CATHOLIC QUESTION IN AMERICA (photo. reprint 1974) (1813).
2 WILLIAM SAMPSON, THE CATHOLIC QUESTION IN AMERICA (photo. reprint 1974)
(1813) [hereinafter SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION].
In addition to the facsimile reprint of Sampson's 1813 edition by Da Capo Press in 1974,
other substantially complete reprints include an edition revised to avoid seditious libel prosecution (Dublin 1814), and an edition that was printed but not published (New York 1871). Also,
*
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lately reprinted work is a wonderful early classic of Hibernocentric
postcolonial jurisprudence.
Written in the spirit of Sampson's subversive masterpiece, this
Hibernocentric Essay in postcolonial jurisprudence constructs, deconstructs,
and reconstructs the remarkable history of Philips, the first constitutional victory for religious freedom in American constitutional law. That once-controversial, later-forgotten decision has abruptly returned to its original place at
the historical center of judicial and scholarly free exercise discourse. Almost
two centuries of hindsight reveal that Philips has posed a vexed constitutional
question with an increasingly turbulent history. By the close of the twentieth
century, the jurisprudential legacy of Philips-the free exercise exemptionhad provoked a constitutional struggle between Congress and the Supreme
Court, with two high court rulings and a federal statute all vying for
authority.
This Article delves deeper than other writers on the current historiographical controversy over the Philips free exercise exemption. Those constitutional historians who argue over the postcolonial judicial history of
religious exemptions include Professors Michael McConnell, 3 Gerard Bradley, 4 Mark Tushnet, 5 Kurt Lash, 6 and Amy Gutmann. 7 With the limited ex-

ception of Professor McConnell, all of these scholars fail to comprehend the
historic significance of the first free exercise case, Philips. So too do other
historians, such as Philip Hamburger,8 Ellis West, 9 and Douglas Kmiec, 10 who
ignore postcolonial judicial precedent and instead limit their quest to the elu-

incomplete extracts and abstracts have frequently been culled from Sampson's original 1813 report, but these should not be relied upon by serious scholars. For a full bibliographical history,
see Walter J. Walsh, The Priest-PenitentPrivilege-An HibernocentricEssay in PostcolonialJurisprudence,80 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter Walsh, Priest-PenitentPrivilege].
3 Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understandingof Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1410 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding]; see also Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Free Exercise]; Michael W. McConnell,
Freedom from Persecution or Protection of the Rights of Conscience?: A Critique of Justice
Scalia's HistoricalArguments in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 819 (1998)
[hereinafter McConnell, A Critique]; Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation:A
Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997) [hereinafter McConnell,
Institutions and Interpretation];Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion,
50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2000) [hereinafter McConnell, Singling Out].
4 Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245 (1991).
5 Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse,1993 BYU L. REV. 117, 124-38.
6 Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1106 (1994).
7 Amy Gutmann, Religious Freedom and Civic Responsibility, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
907 (1999).
8 Philip A. Hamburger, A ConstitutionalRight of Religious Exemption: An HistoricalPerspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 917 n.8 (1992).
9 Ellis West, The CaseAgainst a Right to Religion-BasedExemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 591 (1990) [hereinafter West, Religion-Based Exemptions]; Ellis M. West,
The Right to Religion-Based Exemptions in Early America: The Case of Conscientious Objectors
to Conscription,10 J.L. & RELIGION 367 (1993-1994).
10 Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understandingof the Free Exercise Clause and Religious Diversity, 59 UMKC L. REV. 591 (1991).
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sive general assumptions that may have governed eighteenth-century constitution makers.
The constitutional legacy of Philips has ongoing implications for modern
public policy. Recently, this academic controversy over the origins of the
religious exemption split the United States Supreme Court. In City of
Boerne v. Flores,11 concurring Justice Antonin Scalia borrows the historical
methodology of Professor Gerard Bradley.1 2 He describes as "most telling"
the failure of the Floresdissenters-Justices O'Connor, Breyer, and Souter- 13
to cite any antebellum instance of a constitutional free exercise exemption.
Echoing Professor Bradley, Justice Scalia casually dismisses Philips as a "lone
case" and "weak authority" from a "minor court."'1 4 In this Article, I show
the contrary to be true. Led astray by his scholarly guide Professor Bradley,
Justice Scalia utterly fails to apprehend the deeper meaning of Philips as a
signal of early triumph in postcolonial jurisprudence. Decided during the Jeffersonian era, Philips stands as a constitutional landmark in equality theory;
as the first free exercise case; as the origin of the evidentiary priest-penitent
privilege; and as perhaps the earliest instance of group impact litigation.
Hence, the counterhistory that follows thoroughly discredits Justice Scalia's
conclusory and unsophisticated constitutional historiography in Flores.
I discuss overlooked colonial, revolutionary, and postcolonial historical
sources that cast new and surprising light on Philips. Expanding our hermeneutic universe, this Article introduces important materials drawn from the
ethnic experience of the New York Irish diaspora, who were among the earliest immigrant racial minority communities in this country. As perceived by
the Anglocentric Protestant majority, the nineteenth-century Irish Catholic
community in American cities bore racial characteristics markedly similar to
the African-Americans, or to the indigenous American Indians. The history
of Irish Catholics in America is a classic case study in the legal construction
of racial, ethnic, and religious identity, the product of social forces both
within and without their diverse community. In this Article, I will show that
in the young republic, the new United Irish postcolonial minority voice, effectively articulated by their idealistic Protestant advocate William Sampson,
was critically influential in shaping the antebellum American understanding
of religious freedom. By examining the singular ethnic experience of early
Irish immigrants in Jeffersonian New York City, this Article seeks to identify
an historicist postcolonial jurisprudence-a radical legal methodology that
threatens the canonical foundations of dominant majoritarian constitutional
theory.
I now offer you the story of People v. Philips, the first ever constitutional
victory for religious freedom and a great international landmark in
postcolonial jurisprudence. Part I of this Article tells the colonial history of
religious freedom in New York State from a minority perspective, with specific reference to the secrecy of the confessional-the very practice that
11

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
12 Id. at 537 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
13 Id. at 542.
14 Id. at 534.
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would be constitutionally tested in Philips. Part II describes the immediate
social and political issues raised by the influx of Irish Catholic refugees into
New York City in the wake of the failed United Irish Rebellion of 1798. Part
III treats the unfriendly 1811 ruling of the federalist Chief Justice James Kent
in People v. Ruggles15 as representative of the dominant Anglocentric constitutional legacy of imperial Protestant jurisprudence. Part IV recounts the
arguments and decision in Philips, demonstrating the powerful subversive influence of William Sampson's postcolonial United Irish republican rhetoric.
Part V traces the influential subsequent judicial reception of Philips-the
doctrinal origin of both the constitutional free exercise exemption and the
evidentiary priest-penitent privilege. Part VI of this Article describes the
current historiographical controversy over the jurisprudential legacy of
Philips. Part VII directly refutes the vigorous recent effort of Justice Scalia
and his academic ally Professor Gerard Bradley to erase Philips from the
constitutional record of free exercise exemptions. In Part VIII, I conclude
with some brief observations on Philips as an historic moment in the construction of a radical postcolonial jurisprudence.
L

A Minority History of Religious Freedom in the Colony of
New York

In the North American colonies, with few exceptions, Roman Catholics
did not enjoy the guarantees of religious liberty that were gradually extended
to other sects. 16 In New York, a generation of relative tolerance occurred
under James II, who began administering the colony as its Protestant proprietor, but was later deposed as its Catholic monarch. In the wake of the socalled Glorious Revolution of 1688 (the nadir of English anti-Catholic sentiment), Jacob Leisler's rebellion was explicitly designed to drive Romanists
17
from New York.
In 1691, the elective assembly reenacted an earlier charter of broad religious liberty to Christian persuasions, but added this proviso: "Allwayes
provided that noething herein mentioned or Contained shall extend to give
Liberty for any persons of the Romish Religion to exercise their manor of
worshipp Contrary to the Laws and Statutes of their Majesties Kingdom of
England."'1 8 Leisler was replaced by Governor Henry Sloughter, whose instructions to establish the Church of England also required him "to permit a
liberty of Conscience to all Persons (except Papists) so they be contented
with a qu[i]et and Peaceable enjoyment of it, not giving offence or scandall to
the Government.' 9 Within a decade, the New York penal laws emulated
15 People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 291 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
16 See SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION, supra note 2, at 115-37.
17 See Walter J. Walsh, Religion, Ethnicity, and History-Clues to the CulturalConstruction
of Law, in THE NEW YORK IRISH 50 (Ronald H. Baylor & Timothy J. Meagher eds., 1996)
[hereinafter Walsh, Religion, Ethnicity, and History].

1 STATE OF NEW YORK,
1896); see JOHN W. PRATT,
19 3 DOCUMENTS RELATIVE
18

Lyon

THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK

248 (Albany,

James

RELIGION, POLITICS, AND DIVERSITY 38-40 (1967).
TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

B.
689

(Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co., E.B. O'Callaghan & B. Fernow eds., 1853-1887); see PRATT,
supra note 18, at 39.
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their transatlantic counterparts by forbidding Jesuit missionaries from entering the colony under penalty of life imprisonment, barring Roman Catholics
from voting or holding public office, and establishing the Anglican Church in
2°
the metropolis.
Some of these legal restrictions against Roman Catholics can be attributed to the commonly held colonial belief that the papacy was a worldly
power. 21 Because of their supposed civil allegiance to a foreign prince, for
example, the influential John Locke denied Catholics the sweeping tolerance
he advocated for all other believers, including Jews. 22 In 1741, after an outbreak of fire spread sinister rumors of a Popish and Negro conspiracy to take
over New York, John Ury was hanged on the suspicion that he was a Roman
Catholic priest; Ury was convicted largely upon evidence that he had heard
confessions and granted divine absolution, as well as performing other sacraments and rituals. 23 Even in Maryland, founded by the Calverts as a haven
for English Catholics, formal freedom to worship lasted only a half-century
before being replaced by some of the harshest anti-Catholic laws in the
24
Colonies.
The American Revolution signaled a shift in popular thinking.25 In its
immediate aftermath, although the principle of an established religion was by
no means extinguished, the Church of England rapidly lost favor. Largely on
account of its links to the Crown and the loyalist sympathies of its clergy, the
Anglican Church was disestablished in every state where it formerly held
26
sway, including the four metropolitan counties of New York City.
20

1

1 STATE OF NEW YORK, supra note 18, at 453; see PRATr, supra note 18, at 103; see also

SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM,

JAMES R. BAYLEY,

A

A

RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

414-15 (1975);

BRIEF SKETCH OF THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ON

THE ISLAND OF NEW YORK 39-41 (New York, The Catholic Publ'n Soc'y 1870); WILLIAM

215 (1909); 2 ECCLESIASTICAL
1012, 1367-69 (Hugh Hastings ed., 1901); GUSTAVUS
MYERS, HISTORY OF BIGOTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 94-96 (Henry M. Christian ed., 1945);
LEO RAYMOND RYAN, OLD ST. PETER'S 10-14 (1935); JOHN GILMARY SHEA. THE CATHOLIC
HARPER BENNETT, CATHOLIC FOOTSTEPS IN OLD NEW YORK
RECORDS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

CHURCH IN THE COLONIAL DAYS 1521-1763, at 356-57 (New York, John G. Shea 1886); James

H. Dohan, Our State Constitutionsand Religious Liberty, 40 AM. CATHOLIC Q. REV. 295 (1915);
Edward J. Maguire, An HistoricalSketch of the Relations of Church and State in New York, in 2
HISTORICAL RECORDS & STUDIES 109, 113-15 (1900).
21 AHLSTROM, supra note 20, at 88, 104, 158-59, 403-17,666-81; RAY ALLEN BILLINGTON,
THE PROTESTANT CRUSADE 1800-1860, at 1-19 (1938).
22

See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE,

A

LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (Candlestick

Publ'g ed.,

1997) (1689).
23 People v. Ury (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1741), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS 114 (John

D. Dawson ed., Scholarly Resources, Inc. 1972) (1914).
24 See, e.g., SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 362-98
(1968); McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding,supra note 3, at 1424-25.
25 BILLINGTON, supra note 21, at 22-23; MYERS, supra note 20, at 94-96. See generally
GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTrION (1991).

26 N.Y. CONST. of 1777, arts. XXXV, XXXVIII, in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTrruTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND

COLONIES 2635-37 (Frances Newton Thorpe ed., 1909); McConnell, Origins and Historical Un-

derstanding, supra note 3, at 1436-37. Note that the Dutch never conceded that the Anglican
Church had been established in the four metropolitan counties; note also that Congregationalist
establishments persisted in New England until 1834.
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Nevertheless, the place of Catholics in the new republic was still far from
secure. This was apparent at the exclusively Protestant convention that
drafted New York's State Constitution of 1777. Article 38 of the resulting
document contained the religious freedom guarantee that would become central to the Philips decision almost forty years later. A faction of delegates led
by John Jay strongly pressed for language that would ensure that the repression of Roman Catholics continued into the new republic. 2 7 Predictably, one
means of achieving this was to require the Catholics to deny the ecclesiastical
as well as civil authority of the Pope. At the lowest point of the debates,
recalling the popular hysteria surrounding the trial of John Ury more than a
century earlier, the anti-Catholics actually demanded a constitutional requirement that Catholics also expressly renounce their belief in confessionthe very sacrament that would again stir controversy decades later in Philips!
John Jay's constitutional amendment guaranteed religious liberty to all:
Except the professors of the religion of the church of Rome, who
ought not to hold lands in, or be admitted to a participation of the
civil rights enjoyed by the members of this State, until such time as
the said professors ...

swear, that they verily believe in their con-

sciences, that no pope, priest or foreign authority on earth, hath
power to absolve the subjects of this State from their allegiance to
the same. And further, that they renounce and believe to be false and
wicked, the dangerous and damnable doctrine, that the pope, or any
other earthly authority, have power to absolve men from sins . ... 2
29
Jay's proposal failed by nineteen votes to ten.
After this defeat, Jay obtained an adjournment of the debates so that his
anti-Catholic group could formulate a compromise position. In these efforts,
the anti-Catholics followed Lockean imperial thought by allowing government to discriminate against any sect that held doctrines or principles "inconsistent with the safety of civil society. ' 30 This too would have allowed free
toleration to Christians of all denominations, and to "Jews, Turks and infidels," while denying Catholics the power to own land, vote, or exercise other
civil rights. But from the outset, the more liberal New York delegates sought
a simple and unqualified constitutional promise that "the free toleration of
'31
religious profession and worship shall forever be allowed to all mankind.
27 The drafts leading up to the framing and adoption of the religion clause of the 1777 New
York Constitution can be found in 1 JOURNALS OF THE PROVINCIAL CONGRESS, PROVINCIAL
CONVENTION, COMMITTEE OF SAFETY AND COUNCIL OF SAFETY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

844 (New York, Thurlow Weed 1842) [hereinafter JOURNALS]. This language, from the convention's journal, may not have been an exact quotation of the committee's proposal. A slightly
earlier draft said: "That the free Toleration of religious profession and worship be forever allowed within this state to all mankind." The constitutional history is further described by
CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 541-45 (1906). It is also
discussed in PRATT, supra note 18, and Hamburger, supra note 8.
28 JOURNALS, supra note 27, at 844 (emphasis added).
29 Id.
30
31

Id.
Id. For slightly different wording from an earlier draft, see LINCOLN, supra note 27, at
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Gradually, after a series of barters and compromises, the liberals led by
Governor Morris and Robert Livingston found themselves compelled by the
Jay faction to adopt some exclusionary proviso to article 38 of the New York
Constitution. But these liberals insisted that the exclusion be directed
against antisocial deeds rather than based on mere opinion as the antiCatholics desired. At the same time, Jay's faction changed tack and began to
put their hopes for a proscription of Catholics in a constitutionally required
naturalization oath for aliens. 32 On April Fool's Day, after a close vote, the
constitutional convention finally trumpeted the final version of New York
State Constitution of 1777, article 38:
And whereas we are required by the benevolent principles of rational liberty, not only to expel civil tyranny, but also to guard
against that spiritual oppression and intollerance, wherewith the
bigotry and ambition of weak and wicked priests and princes have
scourged mankind: This convention doth further, in the name and
by the authority of the good people of this State, ORDAIN, DETERMINE AND DECLARE, that the free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed within this state to all
mankind. Provided, that the liberty of conscience hereby granted,
shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or jus33
tify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this State.
Thus, the liberal New York delegates' absolute liberal guarantee of religious
freedom and equality was ultimately wrapped in an anti-Catholic preamble,
and a closing exclusionary proviso written by John Jay. As John Pratt, Philip
Hamburger, and other historians correctly point out, the exclusionary proviso-denying religious protection for licentious acts or disruptive practices-flowed directly from anti-Catholic colonial sentiment. Only staunch
liberal resistance tempered Jay's blatantly sectarian constitutional demands
into the ultimately secular final wording of article 38.
Professor Hamburger identifies three positions on religious freedom in
the early postcolonial state constitutions. Some, like the later federal Free
Exercise Clause, guaranteed religious freedom without explicit reservationin New York, as we have seen, the original committee draft reflected this
liberal approach. 34 Others contained repressive Lockean caveats which allowed those states to discriminate against Catholics on account of their supposedly dangerous opinions, while actually protecting Jews and other nonChristians-we have seen that Jay's rejected imperial proviso reflected this
approach. The third constitutional position required that dangerous opinions
manifest themselves in disruptive acts before free exercise could be limitedand we know that the New York convention ultimately adopted this compromise.35 A few years later, in 1790, South Carolina copied New York's consti32

PRATr, supra note 18, at 87.

SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION, supra note 2, at 25-26, 109-10; see also JOURNALS,
supra note 27.
34 See JOURNALS, supra note 27, at 844.
35 Hamburger, supra note 8, at 921-24.
33
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tutional protection for religious freedom word for word, omitting only the
imperial anti-Catholic preamble written by John

Jay.

36

Treating the New York debates as representative, Philip Hamburger argues that "[flar from reflecting a right of exemption, the various caveats indicated the circumstances in which government could deny the religious
freedom otherwise guaranteed by a constitution. ' 37 Michael McConnell

reaches the contrary conclusion, that courts were required to grant free exercise exemptions unless the government could prove that the religious practice

was excluded by the proviso. 38 These arguments are evenly weighted and
cancel each other out: Professor McConnell uses the relative prevalence of

exemptions language in state constitutions to support his assumption that the
later federal voters also contemplated free exercise exemptions; 39 Professor

Hamburger uses the same evidence to support his assumption that the later
federal voters rejected free exercise exemptions because they did not specify
them. 40 McConnell's interpretation assumes that judicial review was contemplated with regard to generally applicable laws;41 Hamburger's interpretation
2
assumes the opposite.

4

Elsewhere in New York's Constitution of 1777, Jay and his supporters
did succeed in obtaining explicit recognition of their anti-Catholic fears. The

new naturalization oath successfully excluded immigrant Catholics by requiring them to renounce all foreign allegiance and subjection "in all matters
ecclesiastical as well as civil." '4

3

In 1788, after the Revolutionary War, the

New York State legislature carried this language into its renewed "Test
Oath," thus remaining among four states that barred Catholics from public
office. 44 In another implicit acknowledgment of Locke's influence, Jews
faced no similar barrier. 45 Jay's virulent anti-Catholicism did not stand in the
36

S.C. CONST. OF

1790, art. VIII, § 1. See generally JOHN W.

BRINSFIELD, RELIGION AND

POLITICS IN COLONIAL SOUTH CAROLINA (1983). And over a century later, the State of Washington adopted the New York provision in its new constitution. See generally ROBERT F. UTTER
& HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE (2002);

Robert F. Utter & Edward J. Larson, Church and State on the Frontier: The History of the Establishment Clauses in the Washington State Constitution, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 451 (1988).
37 Hamburger, supra note 8, at 926.
38 McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding,supra note 3, at 1504-05. For other
scholarly writings generally supporting free exercise exemptions, see W. Cole Durham, Jr., Religious Liberty and the Call of the Conscience,42 DEPAUL L. REV. 71 (1992); Kmiec, supra note 10;
McConnell, A Critique, supra note 3; McConnell, Singling Out, supra note 3; John Whitte, Jr.,
The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Constitutional Experiment, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371 (1996). For writings which do not support the exemptions, see
MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1978); Hamburger, supra note 8; West, Religion-Based Exemptions, supra note 9.
39 McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding,supra note 3, at 1511-13.
40 Hamburger, supra note 8, at 915-17.
41 McConnell, Origins and HistoricalUnderstanding,supra note 3, at 1504-05.
42 Hamburger, supra note 8, at 931-32.
43 N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XLII, in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES, supra
note 26; see also PRATr, supra note 18, at 87, 93-97, 106-08.
44 2 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 1777-1801, at 637-39 (Albany, Charles R. &
George Webster 1802); see also PRATT, supra note 18, at 98-99, 107-08.
45 BILLINGTON, supra note 21, at 21; MORTON BORDEN, JEWS, TURKS, AND INFIDELS
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way of his appointment some years later by the Adams administration as the
first Chief Justice of the United States.
II.

46

Law, Culture, and PostcolonialIrish Republicanism

Such last remnants of formal discrimination aside, increasing religious
diversity during the colonial period had already47 led to a large practical measure of religious toleration in New York City.
At the dawn of the republic, during New York's Constitutional Convention of 1777, Catholics were still a small and powerless minority. They were
far outweighed by Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Baptists, and Anglicans,
in that order. Four decades later, when Philips was decided, signs of change
were readily apparent: close to 100,000 Catholics worshipped nationally in
the United States, 15,000 of them in New York City, where they made up
about one-eighth of the population. The earliest Catholics were generally
Spanish or French, but by Jefferson's time the congregation was mainly Irish,
with German immigrants soon to follow.4 8 They joined the oppressed Africans as cultural outsiders in an anglicized Protestant society. Until the influx
of the exotic Irish Catholics, New York City was neither postcolonial nor
multicultural.
These changing demographics were heavily influenced by a shift in Irish
emigration patterns. During colonial times, Irish immigrants to British North
America were mostly Protestants, Scotch-Irish Presbyterians flocking to the
South while in New York most such immigrants had been born into the Anglo-Irish Anglican ascendancy. Before the American Revolution, the dispossessed Gaelic Irish emigrated less, and seldom to Protestant America. A
steady flow of Catholic emigration started after the 1798 Rebellion. Then,
inspired by the American and French Revolutions, a remarkable and transient alliance of Anglo-Irish dissidents, Scotch-Irish Presbyterian radicals,
and insurgent indigenous Catholics joined together to throw off the so-called
yoke of English colonial rule. The United Irish rebellion was put down at the
cost of 30,000 lives, including many public beheadings. Notwithstanding the
Adams administration's hasty passage of the notorious Alien and Sedition
13-14 (1984). See generally Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674
(1987).
46 Much of the New York Irish social history in the paragraphs that follow is drawn from
Walsh, Religion, Ethnicity, and History, supra note 17.
47

COBB, supra note 24, at 301-61; T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE

IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
48

JAY

P.

DOLAN,

THE

IMMIGRANT

CHURCH:

62-73 (1986).

NEW

YORK'S

IRISH

AND

GERMAN

CATHOLICS, 1815-1865, at 2, 11-13 (1975); RYAN, supra note 20, at 96-98. "The congregation

chiefly consists of Irish, some hundreds of French, and as many Germans, in all according to the
common estimation, of 14,000 souls," Father Anthony Kohlmann writes to a Jesuit friend in
London in November 1808. Joseph F. Mooney, Archdiocese of New York, in 11 CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (1911), http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11020a.htm (quotation omitted); see also
Edward J. McGuire, State of New York, in 11 CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra, http://
www.newadvent.org/cathen/11029a.htm; Thomas F. Meehan, Anthony Kohlmann, in 8 CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (1910), http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08686c.htm; J. Wilfrid Parsons,
Reverend Anthony Kohlmann, S.J. (1771-1824), 4 CATH. HIST. REV. 38, 40-41 (1918).
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Law to keep out the "hordes of wild Irish," many Irish republicans sought
49
political, economic, and religious refuge in New York City.
By the early 1800s, new uniform federal immigration procedures
shielded Catholic aliens from New York State's discriminatory naturalization
oath. 0 Despite, or perhaps because of, their minority ethnic status in the
early republic, New York's Irish Catholics were quick to defend their honor
on American soil. Sometimes blood was spilt. One taunt against them revived the anti-Catholic colonial symbols of Pope Day. From the 1790s, intemperate nativist youths insulted St. Patrick's Day by parading with their
"Paddies," crude straw effigies designed to ridicule Catholics in general and
the immigrant Irish in particular. After the 1798 exodus, nativist religious
and ethnic hostility mounted, and was met by the Irish in equal measure with
collective resistance and internal solidarity. Following several outbreaks of
violence between nativist gangs and Irish immigrants, the city council passed
a hate speech ordinance in 1802 that outlawed the flaunting of Paddies or
other insulting effigies. 5'
A few years later, the Irish Catholics demanded that the state assembly
in Albany put them on the same formal footing of religious freedom and
political equality. The infamous Test Oath flagrantly discriminated by excluding Catholics from public office. In 1806, Francis Cooper, an English
immigrant, became the first New York Catholic to be elected to the state
assembly. He was duly required to renounce all foreign authority "in all matters ecclesiastical as well as civil," a declaration plainly contrary to the teach52
ings of his church.
At that time, New York City's only Catholic parish was St. Peter's on
Barclay Street, founded in 1786. Naturally, it was a social, cultural, political,
and religious gathering point for Irish immigrants.5 3 On January 6, 1806, the
congregation of St. Peter's held a general meeting at which they adopted a
petition to the state legislature on Cooper's behalf.54 Within days, the petition carried over 1300 signatures.5 5 It pointed out that the Catholics composed a considerable portion of the population of New York City but were
denied the opportunity to discharge their social and civil duties. The
Catholics were deprived of "the benefits of the free and equal participation
of all the rights and privileges of citizens" that were guaranteed to them by
the state and federal constitutions.5 6 In light of these solemn guarantees, the
KERBY A. MILLER, EMIGRANTS AND EXILES 178-90 (1985).
50 Act of Mar. 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 103; see also PRATr, supra note 18, at 108 n.22.
51 ARGUS, Mar. 20 & Mar. 25, 1799; People v. O'Brien (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1802), (on file
49

with the New York City Municipal Archives); 3 MINUTES OF THE COMMON CITY COUNCIL OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK 1784-1831, at 228 (1917); EVENING POST, Mar. 15, 1804; see also JOHN
D.

CRIMMINS, ST. PATRICK'S DAY: ITS CELEBRATION IN NEW YORK AND OTHER AMERICAN

PLACES 1737-1845, at 298-303 (1902); PAUL A. GILJE, ROAD TO MOBOCRACY 129-30, 206-11
(1987); JOHN RIDGE, THE ST. PATRICK'S DAY PARADE 7 (1988).
52 For more on Cooper, see William H. Bennett, Francis Cooper: New York's FirstCatholic
Legislator,in 12 HISTORICAL RECORDS & STUDIES 29 (Thomas F. Meehan et al. eds., 1918).
53 DOLAN, supra note 48, at 54-58.
54 Bennett, supra note 52, at 31-32.
55

JOHN M. FARLEY, HISTORY OF ST. PATRICK'S CATHEDRAL

56 Id. at 37 (quotation omitted).

39 (1908).
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Catholics complained, it was especially frustrating "to have the cup of equalized rights dashed from their lips, by the subsequent determination, and an
invidious barrier, surmountable only by perjury or apostasy, placed between
them and those rights. Though yielding to none of their fellow citizens in
attachment to the prosperity and independence of the State. ' 57 The
Catholics deliberately drew up their petition in the midst of a bitter political
power struggle between competing factions of Jeffersonian Republicans. Astutely, State Senator and City Mayor De Witt Clinton introduced a bill to
abolish the Test Oath in New York State. Despite vigorous Federalist opposition in the lower house, the emancipation bill comfortably passed and
Cooper took his seat in the Assembly. 58 The Jeffersonian American Citizen
applauded the outcome, saying that "[rieligion is most prosperous when it is
most free." 59
Only the previous year, the Catholic majority in colonized Ireland failed
in their essentially identical petition to gain admittance to the British parliament in ruling Westminster. 6° It would take another generation to achieve in
Ireland what the Irish exiles accomplished in postcolonial New York City.
As Catholic immigrants became more numerous, religious passions increased
rather than dissipated. Less than a year after the Irish Catholics' successful
petition to the legislature on behalf of Assemblyman Cooper, a gang of about
fifty anti-Irish, anti-Catholic nativists known as the "Highbinders" surrounded St. Peter's Church. A spirited Irish defense against this threat
sparked off two days of rioting, leaving hundreds injured and one guardian of
6
the peace stabbed to death by the Irish. 1
But the Irish immigrants were armed with more than their fists. The
bustling, burgeoning metropolis of the newly liberated colonies offered a safe
haven to several exiled United Irish ideological leaders. In the 1790s, hard
on the heels of the American and French revolutions, the United Irishmen
cobbled together the first modern political theory of Irish republican nationalism. The banished lives and forbidden thoughts of those determined outcasts in republican New York City reveal fragments of a strikingly
antisectarian, egalitarian, and inclusive political philosophy. Today, the original tenets of Irish Republicanism often seem ignorantly forgotten or cynically
ignored, both on the mainland and among the Irish diaspora. Even so, two
full centuries later and a thousand leagues across the ocean, their distinctively postcolonial political philosophy continues to echo from the rowdy immigrant streets of New York City's earliest visible non-African ethnic
community.
57 Id. at 37-38.
58 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 9-10, 12, 20 (Albany, John
Barber n.d.) (reporting the twenty-ninth session, which began Jan. 28, 1806).

59 Petition of the Roman Catholic Church, AM. CITIZEN, Feb. 12, 1806; see BAYLEY, supra
note 20, at 53; FARLEY, supra note 55, at 37-40; MYERS, supra note 20, at 111; PRATr, supra note

18, at 123-29;
60

RYAN,

DENYS

supra note 20, at 83-86.

SCULLY,

THE IRISH CATHOLIC PETITION OF

SCULLY (Brian MacDermot ed., 1993).
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GLJE, supra note 51, at 125-33.
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A single act of attainder banished William Sampson and three other
prominent United Irish exiles who found refuge in New York City. 62 These
included Thomas Addis Emmet, a highly successful advocate; 63 William
James MacNeven, a pioneer in public health; 64 and John Chambers, a printer.

Of this quartet, all were Anglicans except for MacNeven, the only Catholic
member of the United Irish Directorate. After their imprisonment and a
sojourn in Napoleonic France, these exiles joined the rapidly growing number of their lesser-known Gaelic, Catholic compatriots who had gathered to-

gether in New York City. The professional United Irish radical leaders

65
wielded unusual influence both inside and outside this ethnic subculture.

For the United Irish republican immigrant community, a nonsectarian
ethnic identity and strongly democratic and republican political principles
were as much at stake as their religious beliefs. In the spring of 1807, only
months after the riot outside St. Peter's church, the Irish flexed their muscles
at the polls. Their target was Rufus King, who had assumed the leadership of
the Hibernophobic Federalists after Alexander Hamilton was killed in his
duel with Aaron Burr. The irony was delicious. King had been the Adams

administration's minister in London. Immediately after the 1798 Rebellion,
he had condemned the radical ideals of the imprisoned United Irishmen as
"so false and so utterly inconsistent with any practicable or settled form of
Government. '66 Alarmed at the prospect that the Irish state prisoners might
be banished to the United States, King warned Timothy Pickering, the American Secretary of State, that "[t]heir Principles and Habits would be pernicious to the Order and Industry of our People, and I cannot persuade myself
that the Malcontents of any character or country will ever become useful
Citizens of ours. ' 67 Perhaps anticipating Philips, King presciently added that
62 "An Act to Prevent persons from returning to His Majesty's Dominions, who have
been, or shall be transported, banished, or exiled, on Account of the present Rebellion, and to
prohibit them from passing into any Country at War with His Majesty." 38 Geo. III, c. 78 (1798)
(Ir.).
63 On Emmet, see THOMAS ADDIS EMMET, MEMOIR OF THOMAS ADDIS AND ROBERT
EMMET (1915) (written by his grandson); CHARLES GLIDDEN HAINES, MEMOIR OF THOMAS ADDIS EMMET (New York, G. & C. & H. Carvill 1829); R.R. MADDEN, Memoir of Thomas Addis
Emmet, in 2 UNITED IRISHMEN, THEIR LIVES AND TIMES 1 (London, J. Madden & Co., 2d. ed.
1843); Thomas P. Robinson, The Life of Thomas Addis Emmet (1955) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (on file with author).
64 On MacNeven, see R.R. MADDEN, Memoir of William James MacNeven, in 2 UNITED
IRISHMEN, THEIR LIVES AND TIMES, supra note 63, at 209; Deasmumhum 0. Raghailaigh, William James MacNeven, 30 STUDIES 247 (1944); D. Reilly, An Irish-American Chemist: William
James MacNeven, 2 CHYMIA 17 (1949); Myles D. Wyndham, William James MacNeven and Early
Laboratory Instruction in the United States, 17 AMBIX 143 (1970).
65 As a group, the Irish Jacobins are usually discussed in Irish-American histories, such as
HENRY M. FIELD, THE IRISH CONFEDERATES AND THE REBELLION OF 1798 (New York, Harpers
& Brothers 1851) (written by the brother of codifier David Dudley Field and United States
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field); THOMAS D'ARCY MCGEE, A HISTORY OF THE IRISH
SETTLERS IN NORTH AMERICA (Boston, P. Donahoe, 6th ed. 1855); and RICHARD C. MURPHY &
LAURENCE T. MANNION, THE HISTORY OF THE SOCIETY OF THE FRIENDLY SONS OF ST. PATRICK IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK 1784-1955 (1962).
66 Letter from Rufus King to Timothy Pickering, Secretary of State (Sept. 13, 1798) (on
file with the New York Historical Society).
67 Letter from Rufus King to Timothy Pickering, Secretary of State (June 14, 1798) (on file
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nowhere would the United Irish leaders be more mischievous than in the
United States, "where from the sameness of language and the similarity of
opportunities of propagating their
Laws and Institutions they have greater
68
country."
other
any
in
than
principles
In the aftermath of the 1798 Rebellion, King convinced the Adams administration to exclude the Irish state prisoners from the United States. 69 As
an Irish government official dryly explained to the captives, "Mr. King does
not like to have republicans in America. ' 70 Prematurely, King bragged 71that
his decisive action had won him the "cordial and distinguished Hatred" of
the United Irish leadership. Because no other neutral country was available,
the surviving rebel leaders spent the next four years incarcerated in Fort
George off the Scottish coast. On account of his poor health, the United
Irish cause lawyer William Sampson was transported to a Portuguese dungeon before eventually joining his comrades in Napoleonic Paris, where the
Irish Jacobins were greeted with a hero's welcome. After Thomas Jefferson's
ascension to the United States presidency, Samuel Neilson, Thomas Addis
Emmet, William James MacNeven, William Sampson, John Chambers,
Thomas O'Connor, Bernard Dornin, and many others landed in New York
City. There they joined a religiously diverse and rapidly growing Irish
community.
In New York, the United Irish exiles delighted in fulfilling the political
prophecy King had made in the aftermath of the 1798 Rebellion. In the
April 1807 elections, King led the so-called "American Ticket" for the Federalists against the Clintonians, who embraced the immigrant vote. King's
treatment of the Irish state prisoners came back to haunt him. In letters to
the American Citizen, Thomas Addis Emmet depicted gubernatorial candidate King as a royalist and an acknowledged enemy of liberty who had been
the "political dupe" of the British and who had conspired "to torture oppressed Ireland and keep her bleeding patriots in dungeons. '72 Sampson described the controversy as "a hinge of the election. '73 Yet King, who had lost
to Jefferson in the previous presidential election, aloofly chose "'to enter into
no explanations, leaving the Public to decide between me and these foreigners.'- 74 The public did just that, and sided emphatically with the United Irish
with the New York Historical Society). The notorious alien and sedition laws were designed to
exclude United Irish and French radicals. See BILLINGTON, supra note 21, at 23-24; JAMES MORTON SMITH, THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 23-24 (1956).
68 Letter from Rufus King to Duke of Portland (Sept. 13, 1798) (on file with the New York
Historical Society).
69 The story is told in E.H. BRUSH, RUFUS KING AND HIS TIMES 75-76, 95 (1926); EMMET,
supra note 63, at 410-20 (including a facsimile reprint of Emmet's broadsheet): ROBERT ERNST,
RUFUS KING: AMERICAN FEDERALIST 261-64, 302-04, 349-51 (1968).
70 ERNST, supra note 69, at 415.
71 Letter from Rufus King to Theodore Sedgwick (Mar. 21, 1799) (on file with the Massachusetts Historical Society).
72 Side View of Mr. King, AM. CITIZEN, Apr. 1, 1807 (the letter is unsigned, but the content
of the letter unmistakably describes Emmet).
73 Letter from William Sampson to Grace Sampson (Apr. 27, 1807) (on file with the private collection of Katherine A. Dickason).
74 ERNST, supra note 69, at 304 (quoting Letter from Rufus King to Christopher Gore
(Apr. 10, 1807), in AM. CITIZEN, Apr. 28, 1807).
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behind the Jeffersonian candidate Daniel Tompkins. "It was a complete political triumph," reported Sampson. 75 King's treatment of the exiles of 1798

proved equally damaging when he ran for governor again almost a decade
later, soon after the decision in Philips. "Federalists of our age," he acknowledged ruefully after this second defeat at the hands of the immigrant Irish

' 76
republicans, "must be content with the past.
These noisy Irish Jacobins aroused controversy not just at the polls, but
also before the bench. In 1806, William Sampson sought to follow his friend
Thomas Addis Emmet into the practice of American law. The parallels between the lives of these two men are uncanny. Both were born into the Anglo-Irish Protestant ascendancy. During the 1790s, both became lawyers and

anticolonial republican radicals. On the same day, while defending United

Irish political dissidents in different parts of Ireland, both symbolically took
the United Irish oath in open court to show solidarity for their disenfranchised Catholic compatriots. In 1798, both men were imprisoned under
the same arrest warrant. Within a year, both were disbarred by the same
judicial order, and both were then banished for life by the same act of attainder. After their release from foreign dungeons, Emmet and Sampson shared
their early exile with other Irish political refugees in Napoleonic Paris. Both

eventually found refuge in Jeffersonian New York City.
Like Emmet before him, Sampson traveled by coach to Albany and applied to the Supreme Court for his license to practice law again. 77 After intense debate, the New York Supreme Court bench eventually approved

Sampson's application, but then ordered that only United States citizens
would be admitted to practice law in New York State in the future. 78 As

Sampson put it, "The Court after admitting me made a rule to admit no other
strangers under similar circumstances. The door however was not shut till I

75 Letter from William Sampson to Grace Sampson (July 4, 1807) (on file with the private
collection of Katherine A. Dickason).
76 Letter from Rufus King to Christopher Gore (May 15, 1816) (on file with the New York
Historical Society).
77 The eminent bench that considered Sampson's request all subsequently attained positions of considerable influence in the early republic. Helped by the Irish immigrant vote, Judge
Daniel D. Tompkins defeated Rufus King to be elected governor of New York, later serving two
terms as vice president of the United States in the Monroe administration. President Jefferson
elevated Judge Brockholst Livingston to the federal Supreme Court. Several years later, Judge
Smith Thompson joined Justice Livingston on the federal high Court, in the interim serving as
chief justice of the State of New York and as secretary of the navy under President Monroe.
Former state attorney general Judge Ambrose Spencer was an influential Clintonian politician,
later filling Justice Thompson's place as chief justice of the State of New York. Chief Justice
James Kent, the final member of the court, won renown as one of America's most influential
jurists: his four-volume Commentaries earned Chancellor Kent's reputation as the American
Blackstone.
78 General Rule, 1 Johns. 528 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1806) ("ORDERED, That hereafter, no person, not being a natural born or naturalized citizen of the United States, shall be admitted as an
attorney or counselor of this court."); see also In re Emmet, 2 Cai. R. 386 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805);
Letter from William Sampson to Grace Sampson (Oct. 15, 1806) (on file with the private collection of Katherine A. Dickason).
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had contrived to walk in. ' '79 Nevertheless, as he jubilantly declared 80after

eight years in exile, "I have now a profession at my back once more.
With this narrow entry into American practice, the banished United
Irishman William Sampson soon emerged as the earliest career civil rights
lawyer and radical postcolonial legal theorist. While fellow banished United
Irish advocate Thomas Addis Emmet rose to New York State Attorney General and argued fourteen cases before the United States Supreme Court, the
most famous his joust with Daniel Webster in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824),81
William Sampson won renown as an advocate of the oppressed and as a leading antebellum codifier. Just a few years after his controversial bar admission, William Sampson would argue Philips as a major equality case on
behalf of his exiled Irish Catholic compatriots, demanding the first free exercise exemption in American law as a constitutional right.
III. An Imperial View of Free Exercise of Religion
In order to identify a postcolonial jurisprudence, one must first identity
its imperial antithesis. To describe as postcolonial everything that happens
after the founding of the new republic would strip that term of useful meaning. To the contrary, it has been observed that colonial institutions tend to
maintain remarkable and lasting continuity through the shift into a
postcolonial regime. 82 It is the same with colonial modes of thought. Even
today, while perhaps few would align themselves with an openly imperialist
philosophy, many embrace inherited structures of thought that might easily
be identified as imperial legacies. Postcolonial theory attacks imperial views
of the world just as it attacks imperialism itself. An imperial view of the
world internalizes and reproduces public policies originally shaped by the
needs of empire. In the early national period of the United States, the Anglocentric Federalists were those who clung most stubbornly to imperial
policies.
On the bench, the conservative jurist James Kent was the judicial soul
mate of the staunch Federalist politician Rufus King. A couple of years prior
to Philips, it was the Federalist Chief Justice Kent who handed down New
York's first reported opinion on its constitutional promise of religious equality. In People v. Ruggles, Chief Justice Kent was called upon to decide
whether article 38 of the New York State Constitution forbade a common law
prosecution for blasphemy. 83 Ruggles had announced to a crowd that "Jesus
79 Letter from William Sampson to Grace Sampson (Oct. 15, 1806) (on file with the private collection of Katherine A. Dickason). Curiously, if Sampson and Emmet had waited a
century and a half before applying for admission, they would have been protected by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). That decision
declared citizenship restrictions on bar admissions to be unconstitutional discrimination against
aliens in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 719-29.
80 Letter from William Sampson to Grace Sampson (Aug. 17, 1806) (on file with the private collection of Katherine A. Dickason).
81 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
82 See generally FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (1963).
83 People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
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Christ was a bastard, and his mother must be a whore."8 4 For this utterance
the trial court convicted Ruggles of blasphemy. 85 He was sentenced to three
months imprisonment and a $500 fine, roughly a year's wage for a typical
86
artisan.
On appeal to the New York Supreme Court, Ruggles's counsel argued
that the English common law on blasphemy rested on that country's establishment of religion. Because Christianity was not part of New York com87
mon law, he reasoned, the blasphemy conviction could not be sustained.
According to the reporter, Ruggles's counsel argued that in New York, "[tihe
constitution allows a free toleration to all religions and all kinds of worship.
The exception as to licentiousness, refers to conduct, not opinions. '88 For all
that the court knew, Ruggles may have been a Jew, a Mahometan, or a Socinian; and if so, he had a constitutional right to declare his opinions.
The prosecutor responded:
While the constitution of the state has saved the rights of conscience, and allowed a free and fair discussion of all points of controversy among religious sects, it has left the principle engrafted on
the body of our common law, that Christianity is part of the laws of
the state, untouched and unimpaired. 89
Chief Justice Kent sided with the prosecutor in a well-known opinion
written in high imperial Anglocentric style. The basic question was whether
the English common law of blasphemy had survived the revolution. According to the chief justice, Ruggles had spoken with a wicked and malicious disposition and not in a serious discussion upon any controverted point of
religion. 90 He had reviled Jesus Christ and thereby Christianity itself.91 This
fell within the English common law definition, because it tended to corrupt
the morals of the people and to destroy good order. 92 Blasphemy had survived the American revolution. "Such offences have always been considered
independent of any religious establishment or the rights of the church. They
93
are treated as affecting the essential interests of civil society.
Nothing in American manners and institutions prevented the application
of this English common law. "We stand equally in need, now as formerly,"
wrote the social conservative Chief Justice Kent,
of all that moral discipline, and of those principles of virtue, which
help to bind society together. The people of this state, in common
with the people of this country, profess the general doctrines of
Christianity, as the rule of their faith and practice; and to scandalize
the author of these doctrines is not only, in a religious point of view,
Id. at 291.
Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 292.
90 Id. at 294.
84
85

91

Id.

92

Id.
Id.

93
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due to
extremely impious, but, even in respect to the obligations
94
society, is a gross violation of decency and good order.
According to the chief justice, "[n]othing could be more offensive to the
virtuous part of the community, or more injurious to the tender morals of the
young." 95 To declare such outbursts lawful would confound the distinction
between things sacred and profane. 96 Chief Justice Kent quoted Lord Bacon-"one of the greatest oracles of human wisdom"-to the effect that
"profane scoffing" and "curious controversies" defaced the reverence for religion and led to atheism. 97 No polished country, either in antiquity or in
modern Europe, had ever hazarded such a bold experiment as to permit "the
general religion of the community to be openly insulted and defamed." 98 Indeed, "[tihe very idea of jurisprudence with the ancient lawgivers and philosophers, embraced the religion of the country." 99

What of Ruggles's constitutional right to express his unorthodox religious views?
The free, equal, and undisturbed enjoyment of religious opinion,
whatever it may be, and free and decent discussions on any religious
subject, is granted and secured; but to revile, with malicious and
blasphemous contempt, the religion professed by almost the whole
community, is an abuse of that right. Nor are we bound, by any
expressions in the constitution, as some have strangely supposed,
either not to punish at all, or to punish indiscriminately the like attacks upon the religion of Mahomet or of the grand Lama; and for
this plain reason, that the case assumes that we are a christian people, and the morality of the country is deeply ingrafted upon christianity, and not upon the doctrines or worship of those impostors.1
In any event, Chief Justice Kent continued, "the imputation of malice could
not be inferred from any invectives upon superstitions equally false and
unknown." 101
It mattered nothing that there might be "savage tribes, and perhaps
semi-barbarous nations, whose sense of shame would not be affected by what
we should consider the most audacious outrages upon decorum." 1°2 For the
imperial jurist, it was sufficient that the English common law was "suited to
the condition of this and every other people whose manners are refined, and
whose morals have been elevated and inspired with a more enlarged benevo'10 3
lence, by means of the christian religion.
Chief Justice Kent held that New York State's constitutional rejection of
religious establishments did not prevent the proscription of all offences
94

Id.
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Id.
Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 295.
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Id.

Id.

101 Id.
102 Id. at 295-96.
103 Id. at 296.
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against religion and morality. 10 4 Blasphemy did not rest on any religious establishment. It was punishable because it struck at the root of moral obligation and weakened the security of the social ties.10 5 New York's
constitutional protection of religious liberty was noble and magnanimous
when duly understood, but it never meant to withdraw from legal consideration religion in general, and with it the best sanctions of moral and social
obligation. 10 6 Article 38 required only "a free and universal toleration, without any of the tests, disabilities, or discriminations, incident to a religious
establishment. To construe it as breaking down the common law barriers
against licentious, wanton, and impious attacks upon christianity itself, would
be an enormous perversion of its meaning." 10 7 Chief Justice Kent exposes
the plasticity of republican legal rhetoric in postrevolutionary America: If the
New York City Council can protect Irish Catholic refugees by outlawing the
flaunting of Paddies on Pope Day, cannot the Protestant Christian majority
protect itself equally by outlawing blasphemous utterances against "the religion professed by almost the whole community"?
According to the Federalist chief justice, his interpretation of the New
York's religion clause followed the intent of its authors. "[Tihe framers of
the constitution intended only to banish test oaths, disabilities and the burdens, and sometimes the oppressions, of church establishments; and to secure
to the people of this state, freedom from coercion, and an equality of right,
on the subject of religion."' 1 8 Reasonable minds could not ask for more. 10 9
"On both sides of the Atlantic," this was precisely what had been long sought
by enlightened friends to the rights of mankind, "whose indignation had been
roused by infringements of the liberty of conscience." 110 Ruggles's convic11 1
tion and sentence were therefore affirmed.
On both sides of the Atlantic? What did this Anglocentric decision offer
Irish Catholics, whose constitutional rights would be tested just a couple of
years later in Philips? Chief Justice Kent has been described as an ultraFederalist. For him, the constitutional role of religion in American public life
did not require equal treatment for those who denied the divinity of Christ.
Although Chief Justice Kent's blasphemy ruling might theoretically be supported on secular, majoritarian grounds, such neutral justifications seem inconsistent with his gratuitous derision of non-Christian religions as the
barbaric and superstitious worship of impostors. In other words, Kent was
clearly no mushy multiculturalist.
For the Irish Catholics, the Ruggles opinion pointed both ways. On the
one hand, Catholics obviously accept the divinity of Christ; under this reading, Catholics might expect the equal treatment which, according to Chief
Justice Kent, non-Christian minorities could constitutionally be denied. But
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 295-97.
Id.at 297.
Id.

111 Id.at 298.
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this hangs on what exactly New York's eminent jurist meant by "the Christian religion," which he described as commanding the law's respect as "the
general religion of the community."' 12 Elsewhere in his opinion, Chief Justice Kent noted that the people of New York State, and of the United States,
"profess the general doctrines of Christianity, as the rule of their faith and
practice. ' 113 He described "Christianity" as "the religion professed by almost
the whole community."11 4 Even in 1811, Catholics were still an exotic minority. For many Americans, the term "Christianity" was still confined to Protestantism. Catholics were more numerous than Muslims and Jews, but
perhaps for that very reason-as well as the traditional fear of Popery-they
may have been more despised. If Chief Justice Kent shared the bigoted
views of Chief Justice Jay, Ruggles was not written to protect the religious
freedom of immigrant Catholics demanding an exemption from positive law.
But the Federalist Chief Justice Kent was not called upon to test the seal
of the confessional in Philips. Instead, that task fell to his ideological adversary, the Jeffersonian De Witt Clinton. 15 For the Irish, De Witt Clinton was
a much more sympathetic figure than Kent. His uncle, George Clinton, was a
republican Irish Protestant who had immigrated to become governor of New
York and vice president o? the United States. Following in George's political
footsteps, De Witt Clinton served successively as United States senator,
mayor of New York City, and governor of the state. During the Jeffersonian
era, the United Irish immigrant community sealed a mutually rewarding political pact with the Clintonians. The Clintonian political dynasty was sensitive to the Irish, becoming more and more dependent on their growing
vote.

116

When Chief Justice Kent decided Ruggles in 1811, Mayor Clinton stood
in the way of the United States's gradual movement towards a war with Britain. He knew that the resulting embargo would cause great economic hardship. The following year, Clinton ran on his antiwar platform for the United
States presidency. His rival was James Madison-a fellow Republican, primary drafter of the federal Free Exercise Clause, and at 5'4" the shortest
president in the nation's history. Clinton lost heavily. In defeat, Clinton was
reappointed to his former office as mayor of New York City. In that capacity, Mayor Clinton headed the Court of General Sessions, commonly known
as the "Mayor's Court," which handled criminal offences. The following
year, in Philips, Mayor Clinton recognized the first constitutional free exercise exemption in postcolonial history.11 7

Id.at 295.
Id. at 294.
Id. at 295.
See SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION, supra note 2, at 8.
The Jeffersonian push for immigrant votes is recounted in HOWARD B. ROCK, ARTISANS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 26-27, 38, 83, 98, 144 (1984).
117 See SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION, supra note 2, at 114.
112
113
114
115
116
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During the War of 1812, the Irish immigrants won that initial constitutional exemption for free religious exercise. 118 Compared to earlier riots, the
controversy in People v. Philipsat first seemed mundane. James Keating, an
Irish coppersmith and a parishioner of St. Peter's, reported a theft of some
jewelry. Later, Keating mysteriously sought to withdraw his complaint.
Upon questioning by the justices of the peace, it emerged that Keating had
got his property back, but he refused to say who returned it. Only when
threatened with jail did Keating reveal that the intermediary was his parish
priest, Father Anthony Kohlmann, the rector of St. Peter's, which served a
heavily Irish congregation.1 1 9 On other evidence, immigrants Daniel and
Mary Philips 120 were indicted as receivers by a grand jury, and the Alsatian

Jesuit was subpoened to identify those whose repentance had led to the restitution. But Father Kohlmann shut up tight as a clam. He would not reveal
even the color or the sex of the penitent who had come to him with a rewhom he had made return of the stolen goods a condimorseful spirit and for
121
tion of forgiveness.
Father Kohlmann's Civil Disobediance

A.

Father Kohlmann begged to be excused from testifying on the ground
that his religious scruples would not permit him to reveal anything that had
reached his ears in the darkness of the confessional. He vowed that he was
bound both by the laws of God and the canons of the Catholic Church to a
perpetual and inviolable secrecy. Knowledge he had obtained during the sacrament of penance could not be disclosed to anyone in the world without
violating his religious tenets with the greatest impiety. Much worse than any
worldly misfortune that his civil disobedience could bring down upon him,
Father Kohlmann feared sinning in the eyes of God, becoming an outcast
from his religious community, and risking the fires of hell.
"[I]f called upon to testify in quality of a minister of a sacrament, in
which my God himself has enjoined on me a perpetual and inviolable sePeople v. Philips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813), reported in SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESsupra note 2. Unless otherwise indicated, the history that follows is drawn from Sampson's

118
TION,

work.

119 For more on Kohlmann, see Meehan, supra note 48; Parsons, supra note 48.
120 The defendants' surname is spelled "Philips" in Sampson's report of the case, but a
second "I"appears in the record of indictment. SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION, supra note 2, at
52. I have followed the first usage to refer to the case throughout this Article, as this is also
consistent with the handwritten notations in the court minutes book. See Court of General Sessions Minutes Book, Mar. 3 & 5, 1813 (on file with the New York City Municipal Archives). I
have not, however, altered the spelling used by other authors who rely on the alternative
spelling.
121 SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION, supra note 2; see also Court of General Sessions Minutes Book, Mar. 3, 5 & 8, 1813 (on file with the New York City Municipal Archives); New York
City Police Court Register of Felonies, Feb. 10, 1813 (on file with the New York City Municipal
Archives). For general discussions, see MYERS, supra note 20, at 118-22; RYAN, supra note 20,
at 111-15; 1 ANSON PHELPS STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED
STATES 838-50 (1964); PORT FOLIO MAG., Dec. 1813; McConnell, Origins and HistoricalUnderstanding, supra note 3, at 1410-12, 1504-06.
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crecy, I must declare to this honorable Court," Father Kohlmann stated, "that
I cannot, I must not answer any question that has a bearing upon the restitution in question; and that it would be my duty to prefer instantaneous death
or any temporal misfortune, rather than disclose the name of the penitent in
question. 122 He continued, "For, were I to act otherwise . . . I should become a traitor to my church, to my sacred ministry and to my God. In fine, I
1 23
should render myself guilty of eternal damnation.
Despite the conscientious nature of Father Kohlmann's objection, the
English common law apparently recognized no evidentiary exemption that
would relieve him from his obligation to testify. On account of its importance, the case made its way from the Police Court to the Court of General
Sessions, presided over by Mayor De Witt Clinton sitting in his judicial capacity. 124 Suddenly, the radical United Irish lawyer William Sampson leapt
to his feet and interrupted as a friend of the court. Compulsion to break the
solemn and inviolable secrecy of sacramental confession, declared Sampson,
would offend the most basic principles of the young republic. The court
granted an adjournment so that this novel and important point could be fully
125
argued.
While the argument was pending, the newly appointed district attorney,
Barent Gardinier, generously offered to drop the prosecution out of consideration for the religious sentiments of the Catholics. Significantly, after taking Sampson's advice, St. Peter's mostly Irish board of trustees said no. They
were alarmed that any doubt should exist as to the existence of an exemption
upon which rested the free toleration of their Catholic religion. Illustrating
the more democratic origins of American Catholicism, the trustees apparently charted the course of their church even in deciding what was owed to
God and what to Caesar. Gotham City's Irish immigrants boldly requested
an early trial so that they could secure for all Catholics, "in common with the
rest of mankind," a judicial determination that would protect them in the
1 26
"free exercise and enjoyment of their religious profession and worship.
The event ranks as perhaps the earliest recorded instance of impact litigation
in American constitutional history-a postcolonial test case in which an insusupra note 2, at 9.
Id.
124 In the Jeffersonian era, there was no strict separation of powers; the mayor acted as
chief magistrate. CHARLES P. DALY, HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE JUDICIAL TRIBUNALS OF NEW
YORK FROM 1623-1846 (New York, John W. Amerman 1855); ROCK, supra note 116, at 28. This
changed with the mayorality of Stephen Allen shortly before President Jackson came to power.
GILJE, supra note 51, at 269-70; PAUL 0. WEINBAUM, MOBS AND DEMAGOGUES 112 (1979).
125 SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION, supra note 2, at 9.
126 Petition of the Trustees of St. Peter's Church to New York District Attorney (Apr. 19,
1813), reprintedin SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION, supra note 2, at 52-54 (quoting N.Y. CONST.
of 1777, art. XXXVIII). For the turbulent history of trusteeism-the legally mandated lay ownership of church property and the consequent shift in power from hierarchy to congregationsee Peter Guilday, Trusteeism, 18 HIST. RECORDS & STUDIES 7 (U.S. Catholic Historical Soc'y
ed., 1928). See also BILLINGTON, supra note 21, at 38-41, 292-300; PATRICK J. DIONAN, A His122
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TORY OF THE LEGAL INCORPORATION OF CATHOLIC CHURCH PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES

1784-1932 (1935); FARLEY, supra note 59, at 4-17, 32, 74-82; RYAN, supra note 20, at 44-56,
132-56, 184-208; 2 JOHN GILMARY SHEA, HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE UNITED
STATES 1763-1815, at 324 (Akron, D.M. McBride & Co. n.d.).
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lar minority sought to appropriate the power of the courts to transform the
American social structure.
B.

The Arguments of Riker and Blake for Father Kohlmann

The first free exercise case was argued in June 1813 in a crowded courtroom in Irish architect John McComb's magnificent new City Hall, which had
opened only the previous year. After another banished Irish rebel lawyer,
Thomas Addis Emmet, was called to a different court, William Sampson's
Jeffersonian friend, Richard Riker, joined him as Father Kohlmann's advocate-strangely, as the former district attorney Riker had issued the challenged subpoena! During the continuance of the case Riker had lost office
and switched sides. Riker became "convinced that the exemption was legal"
127
In his place, Barent
and offered his services to maintain that opinion.
Gardinier, the newly appointed district attorney, took over for the state.
Riker opened for Father Kohlmann. His argument was twofold. Riker
maintained, first, that the clergy privilege was supported by common law
principles; second, Riker argued that independent of every other consideration, the religious freedom guarantee in article 38 of the New York State
128
constitution fully protected Father Kohlmann in his claimed exemption.
Addressing the common law, Riker noted the existence of other testimonial privileges, such as the privilege against self-incrimination, the spousal
privilege, the attorney-client privilege, and the secretary of state's constitutionally based executive privilege. 129 He acknowledged that the consensus by
Anglocentric elementary writers on the law of evidence was against the
clergy privilege. 130 In Philips, counsel found only two decided cases on the
clergy privilege, both of them adverse, and the court did not supplement
them.
In the unreported English case of King v. Sparkes (circa 1790), Justice
Buller had apparently admitted into evidence the confession of a "papist" to
a Protestant clergyman. 13 ' Lord Kenyon doubted the wisdom of that ruling
when it was stated to him by counsel only the following year. 132 In Du Barre
v. Livette (1791), Lord Kenyon said of Sparkes, "I should have paused before
'133
I admitted the evidence there admitted.
Most damaging to Father Kohlmann, the other cited precedent was the
colonial Irish decision in Butler v. Moore (1802).134 In this case, Cork's Rosupra note 2, at 13.
Id. at 13-14 (Riker); see also STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 121, at 841.
129 SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION supra note 2, at 14 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
130 Id. at 15 (citing 1 LEONARD MACNALLY, THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ON PLEAS FROM
THE CROwN 247 (Philadelphia, P. Byrne 1804)).
131 Id. at 18 (Riker) (citing The Case of Du Barre, Peake's 78, and discussing King v.
Sparkes).
132 Id. (citing The Case of Du Barre, Peake's at 79).
133 Du Barre v. Livette, 170 Eng. Rep. 96, 97 (K.B. 1791) (referring to Justice Buller's
unreported ruling in King v. Sparkes (K.B. circa 1790)).
134 SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION, supra note 2, at 18 (Riker) (citing 1 MACNALLY, supra
note 130, at 253-55). Further proceedings can be found at 2 Schoales & Lefroy 249 (Ir. H. Ct.
1805). This case is referenced in The Confessional, 3 BROWNSON'S Q. REv. 327, 341 (1846).
127

128
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man Catholic Bishop John Butler converted to the established church,
thereby qualifying for his lineal inheritance of nobility and a large country
estate. But before his death, the newly titled former bishop Lord Dunboyne
bequeathed his property for the education of Catholic seminarians. Under
the Irish penal laws, this bequest opened the door for his heirs to argue that
Lord Dunboyne had relapsed into Popery on his deathbed, thus depriving
him of power to make a will.
Lord Dunboyne was attended in his last days by Father William Gahan,
a Dublin Augustinian who refused to reveal Lord Dunboyne's dying principles. 135 Father Gahan told the court that any knowledge he had of the matter
"arose from a confidential communication made to him in the exercise of his
him to disclerical functions, and which the principles of his religion forbid
1 36
close: nor was he bound by the law of the land to answer."'
In a deeply Anglocentric and imperialist opinion, Sir Michael Smith, the
Irish Master of the Rolls, denied the priest-penitent privilege. Judge Smith's
colonial court held Father Gahan in contempt and sentenced him to a week's
imprisonment in the Trim county jail for upholding the tenets of his majority
religion. Father Gahan's congregation was a colonized, mainly Gaelic-speaking people, who were introduced to the Protestant Reformation by the colonizing sword of Oliver Cromwell. Among various efforts to distinguish Judge
Smith's imperial Irish Butler decision, Riker argued that "[i]t is made in a
country more remarkable for nothing, than the religious intolerance and bigotry of its laws. Precedents in such a country, and in such cases ought to be
admitted, by us, with the most scrupulous caution ....,137
Riker referred the postcolonial Philips court to a number of English and
American cases in which courts pronounced certain common law rules as
heresies. He presented Father Kohlmann's republican right to religious freedom as requiring that Butler and Sparkes be "exploded.' 138 He also cited
several holdings that witnesses could not be forced to answer questions that
subject them to a penalty or forfeiture; impair their civil rights; or degrade,
disgrace, or disparage them.
Dr. Kohlmann informs us under the solemnity of an oath, that besides violating his religious faith and committing the greatest impiety, he should if he revealed what passed in confession, be degraded
in the Church-he would forfeit his office-he would be stripped of
his sacerdotal character-he would lose his clerical rights-he
would be disgraced in the eyes of all Catholics-in fine he would be

For more on Father Gahan, see Franqois-Xavier Martin, Guillaume Gahan, in 6 Dic69 (M. Viller et a]. eds., 1965); P.J. Toner, William Gahan, 6 CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (1908), http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06334c.htm. Father Gahan's
writings include WILLIAM GAHAN, MANUAL OF CATHOLIC PIETY (Dublin, Eason n.d.); WILLIAM
GAHAN, YOUTH INSTRUCTED IN THE GROUNDS OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION (Dublin, McDonnel 1798).
136 SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION, supra note 2, at 19-21 (Riker); id. at 56-76 (Sampson).
135

TIONNAIRE DE SPIRITUALIT8

137
138

Id. at 21 (Riker).
Id. at 23-24 (Riker).
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rendered infamous, and according to his belief have to do penance
139
for the residue of his life.
Thus, even under the American common law, Father Kohlmann could not be
forced to testify.
On the constitutional issue, Riker recited article 38, New York State's
religious liberty clause, in its entirety and discussed it fully. After showing
the threat to religious freedom, he concluded that under any possible view
"the exemption claimed by Dr. Kohlmann, is fully supported by the enacting
clause of the Constitution. It only remains to be seen, whether this right be
'140
impaired by the proviso in the Constitution.
Counsellor Riker's answer was no. Auricular confession did not tend to
excuse licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety
of the state. This was evident from the spiritual nature of confession; from its
historical acceptance in most European countries, including Russia, Spain,
France, Portugal, and Germany; from the concessions of anti-Catholic writers
such as Blackstone; and from George Washington's respect and friendship
141
for the bravery and loyalty of American Catholics.
Riker closed his postcolonial republican constitutional rhetoric with
these words:
I confess I feel a deep interest in this cause. I am anxious that the
decision of the Court should be marked with liberality and wisdom.
I consider this a contest between toleration and persecution. A contest involving the rights of conscience. A great constitutional question, which as an American Lawyer, I might, which strict right and
perfect propriety have discussed, independent of adjudged cases.
To compel the Reverend Pastor to answer, or to be imprisoned,
must either force his conscience or lead to persecution. I can conceive of nothing, more barbarous-more cruel-or more unjust
than such an alternative. To compel him to answer, against his religious faith or to confine his person, would be the highest violation of
right that I have ever witnessed. It would cast a shade upon the
jurisprudence of our country. The virtuous and the wise, of all nations, would grieve that America should have so forgotten herself,
142
as to add to the examples of religious despotism!

Riker also quoted the language of Lord Mansfield, who declared that
"[c]onscience is not controllable by human laws, nor amenable to human
tribunals.

143

139 Id. at 39 (Riker). Based on his reading of modern English law on this issue, G.D. Nokes
concludes "that any privilege against the incrimination of a spiritual adviser by disclosure of
professional secrets could extend to [the Roman Catholic] Church only, and probably does not
extend to any Church." G.D. Nokes, ProfessionalPrivilege, 66 L.Q. REV. 88, 103 (1950).
140 SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION, supra note 2, at 31-32 (Riker).
141 Id. at 33-35 (Riker).
142 Id. at 40 (Riker); see also STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 121, at 844.
143 SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION, supra note 2, at 40 (Riker). Further extracts from, and
analysis of, Riker's argument are contained infra Part VII.B.
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After Riker had finished his argument for Father Kohlmann, some brief
observations were added by a Catholic attorney for the clergymen and trustees. Counsellor Blake considered the question "of high importance to every
member of the Roman Catholic Church, and to him among the rest," but
preferred to leave its argument to Riker and Sampson. Blake agreed with
Riker's points "and affirmed that as well by the principles of the common
law, as by the constitution; the privilege of the witness was secured." He
added his own criticisms of "the doctrines of the British, and still more on
those of the Irish code, as respecting the Catholic religion." Blake said that as
it was the first, so he hoped it would be the last time he should ever hear of
such a question in a court of justice. 144
C. District Attorney Gardinier'sArgument for the State

The newly appointed district attorney, Barent Gardinier, had been active for many years in Federalist politics. Having inherited this case from his
predecessor and now his adversary, Riker, Gardinier argued it reluctantlyand only to permit a test case when the Roman Catholic Church earnestly
beseeched him to bring the point to a decision. Gardinier described it as "a
question delicate and tender in its nature, and he foresaw that it would be
scarcely possible to touch it, even argumentatively, without giving some de' 145
gree of pain.
The district attorney passed quickly over Riker's common law argument.
It was a well-known principle of the law that one of the citizen's primary
duties was to reveal all knowledge necessary for the public good. Only the
attorney could claim an exemption from this general obligation to testify.
Because the priest fell within the general evidentiary rule, and no authority
favored any exception, there was no priest-penitent privilege at common
law. 146 Consistent with his imperial Federalist jurisprudence, District Attorney Gardinier began his legal analysis with the inherited English common
law, rather than the American constitutional promise of religious freedom
and equality.
Gardinier eventually turned to the free exercise guarantee of the New
York State Constitution. He opened with the candidly imperial observation
that
the people of the State of New York, were at the time of making
their constitution, a Christian, ProtestantPeople. But aware of the

injustice and evils of religious intolerance, they wisely and magnanimously resolved, that not only every section of the great protestant
church should be equal with every other, but that persons of other
religions should also be equal to them-but it was never intended
1 47
that any one should ever be superior to any other.
In other words, religious equality was not at stake. To the contrary, to exempt a Roman Catholic clergyman from his civic duty to testify would be to
144
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Id. at 42 (Gardinier).
Id. at 42-44 (Gardinier).
Id. at 44 (Gardinier); see also

146
147

supra note 2, at 41-42 (Blake).
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confer upon that religion a privilege enjoyed by none other. 14 8 The logic of
Gardinier's contention conceals a doubtful premise. Majority religious believers will seldom require any exemption from civil obligations, because
lawmakers will typically consider their religious practices when making law.
On the other hand, minority religious believers-often immigrants-cannot
lightly assume that the goodwill or foresight of the lawmaker will protect
them from conflict with positive laws.
District Attorney Gardinier demonstrated that the punishment of crimes
is essential to the public safety. It followed that the asserted priest-penitent
evidentiary privilege fell within New York's constitutional proviso setting
forth unprotected forms of religious exercise. To allow a Catholic priest to
conceal his knowledge of criminal activity would justify a practice "'inconsistent with the peace or safety of this state.' "149 It could not be considered
religious freedom or equality. It could not be supposed that the representatives of a Protestant people were so tolerant as to engage in a suicidal act.
What if a religious sect sincerely believed it to be their duty to sacrifice their
firstborn in every family? What if a Roman Catholic priest knew the actors
in a treasonable conspiracy that might be defeated? No sect was permitted to
invoke its religious tenets to indulge in cruelty, dishonesty, or public
indecency.
Remarkably, nowhere in his argument did Gardinier invoke Chief Justice Kent's recent Ruggles opinion (which was more predictably buried also
by Father Kohlmann's counsel). Gardinier argued that society had granted
toleration to all religions, but superiority to none. It had not approved the
right of silence when the public interest and safety might be jeopardized.
Such a pretension soared above the level of the common equality and demanded an unreasonable preference that society could not allow. In short,
the constitution has granted, religious "profession and worship," to
all denominations, "without discriminationor preference:" but it has
not granted exemption from previous legal duties. It has expelled
the demon of persecution from our land: but it has not weakened
the arm of public justice. Its equal and steady impartiality has
soothed all the contending sects into the most harmonious equality,
but to none of them has it yielded any of the rights of a well organ150
ized government.
At the close of District Attorney Gardinier's argument, the court adjourned
till the following morning to hear William Sampson's reply.
D.

The Irish Penal Laws

For inspiration, human rights lawyer William Sampson pondered his
pending argument in the graveyard of Saint Paul's Church in Fulton Street,
the burial ground of city notables. As Sampson later recalled, he meditated
on the doctrines of auricular confession "between the monument of immortal
supra note 2, at 13, 42-51 (Gardinier).
Id. at 44-45 (Gardinier) (quoting N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art XXXVIII).
150 Id. at 51 (Gardinier); see also STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 121, at 845.
148
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fame and the monument of immortal life."'' Sampson's cause lawyering was
shaped by his own experience. For defending the religious freedom of his
colonized and oppressed Irish Catholic compatriots, Sampson had been summarily evicted from his native land. Together with his fellow New York
United Irish exiles Emmet, MacNeven, and Chambers, Sampson had tried to
dismantle the religious and racial apartheid which had excluded threequarters of the Irish population from that country's political and economic
life for centuries. Of the United Irish Directorate, all but MacNeven were
Protestants who defied the colonial Anglo-Irish ascendancy to which they
belonged. These dissidents were enraptured by Enlightenment ideals that
seemed thoroughly inconsistent with the discriminatory political order of
their own country. Colonial English administrations had maintained power
through a religious and racial caste system designed to repress the indigenous
Gaelic Catholic masses.
As an anticolonial legal historian, Sampson had closely studied the Irish
penal laws. Under them the Catholic majority paid tithes to the established
Anglican church, and were denied the rights to own property, educate their
children, celebrate their religion, marry the colonial Protestant ascendancy,
hold government office, vote in elections, sit in Parliament, serve on juries, or
act as judges or lawyers. 152 One series of statutes outlawed the Roman Catholic clergy. 153 They were ordered to leave Ireland within three months or be
subject to transportation to the West Indies or elsewhere. 154 If they returned
to their native land, they were deemed traitors. 155 As such, their punishment
was to be dragged to their place of execution and hanged by the neck; their
entrails were then to be taken out and burned while the victim was still alive;
finally, their heads were to be cut off and their body quartered and left to the
king's disposal, to be piked or gibbeted, as was most for his royal pleasure
and the honor of God.' 56 Popish priests were forbidden to enter the kingdom
under similar penalties. 157 Those who remained were required to take the
oath of abjuration and forbidden to celebrate mass.' 58 Magistrates were authorized to demolish all crosses, pictures, and inscriptions that were the occa151 Letter from William Sampson to Gulian Verplanck (Apr. 17, 1827) (on file with the
New York Historical Society); Letter from Grace Sampson to Catherine Sampson Tone (June 1,
1828) (on file with the private collection of Katherine A. Dickason).
152 WILLIAM SAMPSON, Irish Penal Code Abridged, in SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION,
supra note 2, at 115 [hereinafter SAMPSON, Penal Code]; see also H.B. PARNELL, HISTORY OF
THE PENAL LAWS AGAINST THE IRISH CATHOLICS (London, Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme,
Brown, and Green, 4th ed. 1825); DENYS SCULLY, STATEMENT OF THE PENAL LAWS, WHICH
AGGRIEVE THE CATHOLICS OF IRELAND (Dublin, H. Fitzpatrick 1812). Recent works include
S.J. CONNOLLY, RELIGION, LAW AND POWER (1992); MARGARET WALL, THE PENAL LAWS
1691-1760 (1961); Joel Berlatsky, Roots of Conflict in Ireland: ColonialAttitudes in the Age of
the Penal Laws, 18 EIRE-IRELAND 40 (1983); R.E. Burns, The Irish Penal Code and Some of Its
Historians, 21 REV. POL. 276 (1959).
153 SAMPSON, Penal Code, supra note 152, at 127.
154 Id.

155 Id.
156
157
158

Id.
Id. (citing 7 & 9 Will. 3, c. 26; 2 Ann., c. 3; 8 Ann., c. 3; 4 Ann., c. 2).
Id. at 128-29 (citing 2 Ann., c. 7; 8 Ann., c. 3; 1 Geo. 1, c. 9).

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol. 73:1

sion of popish superstition. 59 The statutes also set forth an elaborate system
of fines for those harboring Catholic clergy and rewards for those who informed upon them.
Education was another target of the Irish penal laws. Under one colonial statute, under penalty of fine and imprisonment papists were forbidden
to instruct youth either in schools or in private homes except for their own
family.1 60 At the same time, it was made unlawful to send a child abroad to
be educated in the popish religion. 161 Papists were forbidden to teach either
publicly or privately; if discovered, they were to be imprisoned and transported.162 Catholic teachers who returned to their native land were deemed
traitors and risked being hung, drawn, and quartered on the same terms as
the clergy. 163 Those harboring papist teachers were to be heavily fined, with
generous rewards on offer to informers. 164 Protestants were required to edu65
cate their children in the established religion.
Domestic relations were also closely governed by the Irish penal laws.
Several colonial statutes were designed to prevent miscegenation between
the English Protestant settlers and the colonized Irish Catholic natives. Protestants who married papists were stripped of various legal rights including
their capacity to inherit or devise property.166 A mixed marriage celebrated
by a popish priest was null and void. 167 The priest who celebrated it risked
imprisonment and transportation, and being hanged, drawn, and quartered if
he returned. 168 Those refusing to inform upon such a marriage were punishable by three years incarceration. 169 A Catholic wife could claim one-third of
her husband's property by "conforming" to the established church. 70 Also
by "conforming," the eldest son could divest his father of his property, reducing him to tenant for life. 17' Children of mixed marriages could be taken
away from the popish parent.172 Papists were not permitted to be guardians
of orphan children, who were to be committed to strangers for a Protestant
173
upbringing.
The colonized Irish Catholics were denied the right to purchase or inherit land or to take a lease for more than thirty-one years. 174 Regardless of
its value, the horse of a papist was subject to seizure by any Protestant in
return for five-and-a-half pounds. 175 Papists concealing their horses were
159

Id. at 129 (citing 8 Ann., c. 3).

160

Id. at 123-24.

161

Id. at 123 (citing 7 Will. 3, c. 4).
Id. at 125.

162

163 Id.

Id. (citing 8 Ann., c. 3).
Id. at 124-25 (citing 3 Ann., c. 3; 2 Ann., c. 6; 8 Ann., c. 3).
166 Id. at 125-26 (citing 9 Will. 3, c. 28; 6 Ann., c. 16; 2 Ann., c. 6; 9 Will. 3, c. 28).
167 Id. at 126 (citing 19 Geo. 2, c. 13; 23 Geo. 2, c. 10).
168 Id. (citing 6 Ann., c. 16; 8 Ann., c. 3; 12 Geo. 1, c. 3).
169 Id. at 127 (citing 23 Geo. 2, c. 10).
170 Id. (citing 8 Ann., c. 3).
171 Id. at 130 (citing 2 Ann., c. 6; 8 Ann., c. 3).
172 Id. (citing 3 Ann., c. 3; 2 Ann., c. 6; 8 Ann., c. 3).
173 Id. at 131 (citing 2 Ann., c. 6; 6 Geo. 1, c. 6).
174 Id. at 132 (citing 2 Ann., c. 6).
164
165

175

Id. at 137.
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subject to three months imprisonment and a hefty fine. 176 Burial services in a
suppressed monastery, abbey, or convent rendered all present liable to fines
with rewards to informers. 77 Meetings and assemblies at certain holy wells
and springs were deemed riots. 178 Catholics were not permitted to own
swords, firearms, or ammunition, nor to apprentice themselves in the manufacture of such weapons. 179 Papists were denied the right 80 to vote and,
through the Test Oath, they were excluded from Parliament.1
Catholics were excluded from every aspect of the administration of colonial justice. Only Protestants were permitted to enroll as law students in the
King's Inns.181 Catholics were not permitted to practice as barristers or solicitors or to serve as judges.' 82 Upon admission, oaths of abjuration and
against transubstantiation were required, which could be demanded again at
any time in open court. 183 Candidates who were born of popish parents or
who had converted must prove that they had been practicing Protestants for
two years and that their children had been raised as Protestants. 184 The attorney privilege was abrogated with respect to exposing suspected papist lawyers.185 Sheriffs and their clerks must have been five years Protestants. 186
Only approved Protestants could serve as watchmen, the equivalent of
police.

187

Irish Catholics could not enlist in the militia or the army. 188 Nor were
they eligible to serve on juries unless a sufficient number of Protestants could
not be had; even then, in all trials under the popery laws, any papist juror was
open to the prosecutor's peremptory challenge.' 89 In Sampson's words,
"Catholics were to be thrown on the mercy of their persecutors."' 9 °
Reflecting upon the Irish penal laws in 1813, William Sampson observed
that
the tormentor sought out every tender part where the moral being
could be afflicted, and cruelly conveyed the maddening poison
through every organ of most exquisite sensibility; insulting religion,
reversing the principles of law, violating parental affection, private
friendship, filial duty, conjugal love, promoting family dissention,
preventing education, proscribing industry, and having done all this,
Id. (citing 2 Geo. 1, c. 9; 7 Will. 3, c. 5; 8 Ann., c. 3).
Id. at 130 (citing 7 & 9 Will. 3, c. 26).
178 Id. (citing 2 Ann., c. 6).
179 Id. at 135-36 (citing 7 Will. 3, c. 5; 12 Geo. 2, c. 6; 15 & 16 Geo. 3, c. 21; 10 Will. 3, c. 8;
25 Geo. 3, c. 43).
180 Id. at 134 (citing 2 Ann., c. 6; 2 Geo. 1, c. 6).
176

177

181

Id. at 132.

182

Id.

Id.
Id. (citing 2 W. & M., c. 2; 10 Will. 3, c. 13; 6 Ann., c. 6; 1 Geo. 2, c. 20; 21 & 22 Geo. 3, c.
32; 7 Geo. 2, c. 5).
185 Id. at 131 (citing 2 W. & M., c. 2; 10 Will. 3, c. 13; 6 Ann., c. 6; 1 Geo. 2, c. 20; 21 & 22
Geo. 3, c. 32; 7 Geo. 2, c. 5).
186 Id. at 132 (citing 1 Geo. 2,c. 20).
187 Id. at 137 (citing 6 Geo. 1,c. 10).
188 Id. at 135 (citing 2 Geo. 1, c. 9).
189 Id. at 134 (citing 6 Ann., c. 6).
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184
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setting a bar against all future acquisitions of wealth, influence, or
knowledge; in short, leaving nothing that hell could invent unattempted, in order to brutalise and enfeeble a race of beings whose
courage and intellect was still formidable even in this abject state.191
Sampson also noted the formidable ideological capacity of the Irish penal
laws to obscure authentic moral and legal norms, especially in a colonial common law system. "It appears throughout this code that all principles of law
are reversed and go by contraries, and that what is law for protestants is not
for catholics, and vice versa," observed Sampson. 192 "It is not therefore wonderful that those familiarized to it by education and habit should judge in the
same perverse sense, even where there was no statute, precisely oversetting
193
the principles of the law.
In historical context, the racialization of Irish law in furtherance of English colonization preceded and influenced both the slave codes and the Indian laws in Britain's North American colonies. For the American
colonizers, the Irish penal laws also served as a ready text on the subjugation
of the indigenous culture; color was easily substituted for religion as the jurisprudential marker for race.1 94 At the same time, the Irish penal laws were
then replicated throughout the British North American colonies so as to disenfranchise Catholics in general.
In Ireland, as their inconsistencies suggest, the penal laws were enforced
with fluctuating degrees of severity. 195 Nevertheless, by the late eighteenth
century, they had successfully reduced the Gaelic Catholic masses to an impoverished class of subsistence tenant farmers, almost entirely excluded from
national political and economic life. From the 1770s, rising discontent in a
revolutionary age forced concessions from the exclusively Protestant Irish colonial administration, leading to the Catholic Relief Act of 1793. By then, a
year after Sampson began his law practice, the American and French revolutions had fueled demands for electoral representation without regard to religion, and even anticolonial calls for complete independence and a republican
form of government.
191

Id. at 123.

192

Id. at 131-32.

193

Id.

194 This insight was brilliantly and coldly explained by Sir John Davies, the first English
attorney general in Ireland, in SIR JOHN DAVIES, A DISCOVERY OF THE TRUE CAUSES WHY
IRELAND WAS NEVER COMPLETELY SUBJUGATED (James P. Myers, Jr. ed., Catholic Univ. of

Am. Press 1988) (1612). Recently, Robert Williams has described the influence in America of
the racist legal ideology imposed upon colonized Ireland. Successively, in Ireland, Asia, North
America, and Africa, the colonial imagination devised legal forms for its imperial social values.
In each place, such imperial legal mandates sought to destroy the indigenous legal order with the
war cry of civilization. ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT, at pt. 2 (1990).

195 Because the Public Record Office was destroyed in the civil war that followed Ireland's
limited gain of sovereignty in 1922, it is difficult to trace precisely the history of enforcement of
the penal laws. A useful early work based on the original sources is WILLIAM P. BURKE, THE
IRISH PRIESTS IN THE PENAL TIMES 1660-1760 (1968); see also PATRICK FAGAN, AN IRISH
BISHOP IN PENAL TIMES (1993).
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The oligarchical Irish authorities responded in the courts with a crackdown on political dissent. That decade was marked by numerous major treason, sedition, and seditious libel prosecutions, in most of which Sampson
either participated as advocate or reported in pamphlets or the radical press.
As a member of the United Irish legal defense team, he argued over a hundred political trials alongside the renowned John Philpot Curran. The anticolonial United Irish advocates invariably defended their clients' actions by
using the courtroom to expose the Irish system of government as lawless and
corrupt. 196 Sampson's experience in the Irish courts later enabled him to
emerge as America's first career civil rights lawyer, preceding Clarence Darrow by almost a century; it also inspired his jurisprudentially radical
197
postcolonial codification movement.
For his radical lawyering, and for his prolific (although generally anonymous) political writings on social and religious equality, Sampson became a
marked man. A warrant was issued for his arrest along with the United Irish
leaders shortly before the 1798 rebellion broke out with belated and inadequate French aid. Sampson went underground, but was captured, imprisoned, disbarred, and banished by act of attainder. For a total of eight years
he was severed from his wife Grace and their two surviving children. It was
treason even for her to correspond with him. "Alas!," he lamented, "the
advocates of the poor are few, and their reward is ruin." 198 But Sampson
fared better than his dissident friends who were hanged. He described Ireland as "my ill-fated country, where atrocity leads to honour, and virtue to
the scaffold." 199 After a rendezvous and sojourn in Napoleonic Paris, Sampson and some of his exiled comrades made their way to New York City. In
landing on American shores, these United Irish exiles both figuratively and
literally left behind the colonial world and stepped into the postcolonial
world of a Jeffersonian New York City, which was then inventing itself in
every way-including its choice of legal thinking.
Although their dream of a United Irish republic had been shattered in
their homeland, the banished exiles of 1798 endeavored to secure just such an
196 For a fascinating description of Sampson's practice as a radical United Irish lawyer, see
his preface to WILLIAM HENRY CURRAN, LIFE OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE JOHN PHILPOT
CURRAN (New York, William H. Creagh 1820). He defended such clients as Archibold Hamilton Rowan, Reverend William Jackson, William Orr, Samuel Neilson and other proprietors of
the Northern Star, and Peter Finerty, the printer of the Press, all facing sweeping common law
charges of treason, sedition, and seditious libel.
197 In New York, Sampson argued numerous free speech, religious freedom, and equality
issues, frequently for indigent Irish and African clients. For example, prior to the first free exercise case, Sampson defended the earliest strikers to be prosecuted for a conspiracy to raise their

wages.
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egalitarian polity in their adopted nation. The revolutionary ideology of the
early Irish immigrant community made an important contribution to an
emerging United States, particularly in their heralding of a multicultural society through their bold assertion of their ethnic identity and their insistent
demands for religious, cultural, and political equality. The exiles of 1798 introduced the postcolonial political theory of the banished United Irishmen
into the new world. Their collective experience in exile shaping a brand-new
republic offers fascinating clues to what might have been had their ill-starred
rebellion remade political power in late-eighteenth-century Ireland.
If there was one tenet on which the eighteenth-century United Irish
rebels agreed, it was that religious inequality had no place in any modern
polity. During the Jeffersonian era, the New York Irish refugees' community
established that ideal in American law by winning the first constitutional victory for the free exercise of religion in the United States. In Philips, the
impassioned rhetoric of their Protestant United Irish advocate William
Sampson urged the fiercely antisectarian ideals of those original Irish Republicans and made their postcolonial political philosophy a vital part of the new
republic's evolving constitutional structure. In that test case, Sampson's clients were mainly Irish Catholics, seeking the religious, political, and economic equality that was denied to them in their homeland. The decision was
rendered by Mayor De Witt Clinton, who came from Irish Protestant republican stock and who had already formed close political bonds with the Irish
immigrants.
The rich ethnic dimensions and complex postcolonial implications of
Philips have been almost completely overlooked. Constitutional historians
exemplified by Professor McConnell typically trace the American notion of
free exercise of religion to such dominant intellects as John Locke in Carolina, William Penn in Pennsylvania and Delaware, Roger Williams in Rhode
Island, the Calverts in Maryland, and Thomas Jefferson and James Madison
during the founding period. In America's first successful free exercise case,
only Penn was mentioned, and then in passing.210 Rather, the Philips court
was swayed by Sampson's firsthand account of systematic religious persecution in his Irish homeland.
The Philips court listened carefully as Sampson savaged the anti-Catholic, antimajoritarian Irish penal laws. The early American republic's first
constitutional victory for free religious exercise did not flow from cold textual
analysis, but was a gut response to a skillful and appalling United Irish rhetorical portrait of religious, ethnic, and racial persecution against the colonized native Irish. In its inception, in its argumentation, and in its resolution,
the first successful free exercise argument turned on the history of New York
City's earliest Irish immigrants. As the record of America's first postcolonial
constitutional religious exemption, Philips offers important clues to the cultural construction of law. 20 1
CATHOLIC QUESTION, supra note 2, at 65.
For an important exception to the conventional American jurisprudential description of
religion as an individual pact between believer and creator, see Robert M. Cover, The Supreme
Court 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). Cover portrays
free exercise problems in terms of sharp cultural conflict.
200
201
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E. Sampson's Argument and the Rhetoric of Hibernocentric Postcolonial
Jurisprudence
To counter the prosecution's argument in Philips, the Protestant Sampson painted a vivid portrait, drawn from his own experience as a United Irish
lawyer, of the horrors of religious persecution against his Catholic compatriots in their homeland. He attacked the moral iniquity of the Irish penal
laws. 20 2 Sampson's postcolonial rhetoric in the first free exercise case occupies an important place in the United Irish exiles' ongoing effort to create an
Irish nationalist and republican historiography.20 3 Sampson appropriated the
New York courtroom to put Irish history on trial and to inject his United
Irish ideology into American law. He understood the central object of political resistance in the courtroom well: to portray the lawmaker as unlawful,
and the lawbreaker as lawful.
Sampson attacked the only precedent closely on point directly. Right
from the start, Sampson warned the American court to reject Judge Smith's
colonial Irish decision in Butler v. Moore204 because it came from a land
"where the people were catholic, and the law anti-catholic; where the few
trample upon the many, and where no concessions were made to the feelings
of the proscribed, or the dictates of humanity or piety. '205 According to
Sampson,
if there be any country on the habitable globe, where we should not
go to look for a pure and sound decision, upon the rights of Roman
Catholics, it is surely that one ... that Island, where for centuries
past, a code has existed, and been in full and vigorous activity,
20 6
which shames humanity.
Irish law had been corrupted by its history. "[E]very where else," he said,
"though there may be madness, superstition, or idolatry, there may be some
chance of impartiality; but in Ireland there can be none!' 20 7 Sampson argued
that "we should never look to Ireland for a precedent, where the rights of
catholics were concerned. '208 A few years previously, Sampson had tried this
identical postcolonial strategy when defending striking shoemakers (including some Irishmen) charged with Anglocentric common law conspiracy to
20 9
raise their wages.
202

203

supra note 2, at 52-95.
Martin Burke, Piecing Together a Shattered Past: The Historical Writings of the United
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Irish Exiles in America, in THE UNITED IRISHMEN 297 (David Dickson et al. eds., 1993); see also

Martin J. Burke, The Politicsand Poetics of Nationalist Historiography,in THE LITERATURE OF
POLITICS AND THE POLITICS OF LITERATURE (C.C. Barfoot et al. eds., 1995).
204 MACNALLY, supra note 130, at 253-55 (discussing Butler v. Moore (Ire. Ch. 1802)).
205 SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION, supra note 2, at 55.
206 Id. at 56.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 68.
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At the heart of America's first free exercise case was Sampson's
Hibernocentric, anticolonial, and antisectarian United Irish historiography.
"[Tihe rights, lives, liberties, and feelings of the catholics had been assailed
through successive ages, in every wanton form that avarice, vengeance and
malignity could devise," railed Sampson.210 Bigotry and fanaticism had denied them even an education on their native soil. In such circumstances, it
was hardly surprising that colonial Protestant judges had rendered bad decisions. "The system under which they acted; the barbarous code with which
they were familiar, was enough to taint their judgement. No judge, no legislator, historian, poet or philosopher, but what has been tinctured, with the
follies or superstitions of his age. '211 More probably, "may we not well susand to
pect those Irish judges to have imbibed the poison of their cruel2 code,
12
have eaten of the insane root that taketh the reason prisoner.
For Sampson, it was better to ground legal protections on reason, progress, and human rights. He observed that "it is easier to excite wickedness
than it is to subdue it"2' 1 3 and noted how "dangerous it is to give the reins to
cruel prejudice. 2 14 He pointed to the sufferings of the Quakers at the hands
of the American colonists. "[T]hus did those who fled from persecution in
England, become through ignorance most intolerant persecutors in
America," maintained Sampson. 215 "Such is the nature of that fiendlike
centuries to
spirit," he sighed, "which it requires but a moment to raise and
216
lay. Thank heaven it is laid in this land, and I trust forever.
In the same breath, Sampson claimed that only greed could fully account
for persecution of the Irish Catholics by Protestant settlers who included his
own ancestors. "[M]istaken conscience had nothing to do with the matter,
nor religion nothing; but that the love of plunder, power, and confiscation
was the sole and only motive. ' 217 Continuing this attack, he bluntly declared
that it was in their interests: "They lived upon it. They had no living else
than plots and forfeitures! They were not simple bigots, acting from mistaken conscience. They were pirates determined to hold what they had 21got,
8
and rather than lose it scatter law and justice to the winds and waves.
The United States must learn from Ireland. "Were there rebellions?
Were there massacres? Aye, to be sure, there were! They were the natural
crop. For he that sows must reap! '219 Indeed, in later times, added Sampson,
"the continuance of the catholic oppressions has taken the character of
downright folly. '220 After setting forth abundant examples of the civil rights
denied to the indigenous Irish Catholics, Sampson offered a grim but inspiring account of the United Irish Rebellion of 1798:
210
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[Tihat government that refused to tolerate catholics, tolerated, instigated and indemnified a faction, whose deeds will never be forgotten. Then came hangings, half hangings, conflagrations, plunder
and torture. Rape, murder and indemnity went hand in hand. And
then it was, that a spectacle new and appalling, for the first time,
presented itself; and presbyterian, churchman, and catholic were
seen to ascend the same scaffold, and die in the cause of an indissol221
uble union.
Although the United Irish rising had ended in bloody tragedy, Sampson
pointed out that the great cause of human emancipation still proceeded in
Ireland as the first free exercise case was being argued across the ocean in
222
America.
Why not contrast Ireland's history and its barbarous code with article 38
of the New York State Constitution which protected its citizens against religious persecution? Like a beacon on a rock, this American principle of
postcolonial religious liberty was established to be a light and guide to all the
world. To Sampson, it seemed "as if providence had decreed this land, to be
the grave of persecution, and the cradle of tolerance. '223 If anybody could
not see the wisdom of this enactment, said Sampson, "let him open the page
of history, and read of the bloody religious wars of Europe, of which the
wounds are still fresh and bleeding. Let him reflect who his own fathers
were, and he will find the cogency and wisdom of the act. '22 4 In this country,
according to the United Irish advocate, Catholic persecution received its
death blow from the American revolution.2 25 Although it was true, as the
district attorney had pointed out, that the United States was formed by Protestants, "in establishing a constitutional code, different from that of England,
'22 6
they did nothing but unshackle themselves and the catholics together.
Exempting Father Kohlmann from testifying would not grant Roman
Catholics any preference over other religions.227 "We claim no supremacy,"
insisted Sampson.
We seek nothing but pure and perfect equality. From the bottom of
our hearts we sincerely tolerate you all. We will lay hands on none
of you, for your worship or profession; and for ourselves, we claim
neither more nor less. Hands off on all sides. And if any of you are
aggrieved we will invoke the constitution in your favour, as we do in
our own.

22

8

In short, "[elvery citizen here is in his own country. To the protestant it is a
protestant country; to the catholic, a catholic country; and the jew, if he
'229
pleases, may establish in it his New Jerusalem.
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229

Id. at 67.
Id.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 81.
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Id.; see also STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 121, at 846-47. Oddly, Professor Amy Gut-
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Sampson's postcolonial United Irish rhetoric drew added strength from

his personal Anglican convictions. "I have been educated in that church," he
230
pointed out.

I am no bigot, I see in it no certain token of exclusive grace, and yet
I claim the right to love it above all others, if so I am disposed; and I

turn to it with the more affection, because those nearest and dearest
to me, by every mortal tie, have been, and are its ministers, and

have been good and virtuous men. I challenge for the catholic, the
self same right, and I should despise him as I should myself, if force
swerve from any tenet of a religion,
or violence should make him
1
23
which he held as sacred.

More puckishly, Sampson asked, "If my neighbour cleaves to his own wife,
shall I quarrel that he does not prefer mine, and love her better; and if he
'232
loves his own religion better, is that a ground of enmity?
For good reason, Sampson's postcolonial argument was charged with an
extraordinary passion. "I am a friend to catholics," explained Sampson, recalling his own struggles as a United Irish advocate challenging an oppressive
legal regime. 233 "[A]mongst the friends I have had," he added, "none have
been more true, more loyal, or more noble hearted, than catholics have
proved. Without being a confessor, I have had occasions of knowing their
inmost thoughts, in the hour of trial and sincerity. '234 The importance of
religious freedom he had seen at first hand. "The peculiar reasons I have had
to dread and abhor every colour and shade of religious persecution, has communicated to my argument, perhaps, an over earnestness," explained Sampmann quotes this plea with the disapproving rejoinder that "Sampson's statement suggests a
vision of the way some religious believers may view this country, as a place that they value only
insofar as the country reflects their religious beliefs." Gutmann, supra note 7, at 916. She adds
that this fails her principled injunction that in a democracy "citizens have a responsibility to
address each other in a way that we can reasonably be expected to accept, even if we do not
share each other's religious or secular perspectives." Id. at 918. Professor Gutmann is not the
first to mistake the religion of the human rights lawyer who was imprisoned, disbarred, and
banished by act of attainder for advocating equal rights for his disenfranchised Catholic compatriots. As the next utterance in William Sampson's impassioned courtroom argument squarely
reminds us, Professor Gutmann's error is all the more ironic: William Sampson's rhetorical employment of the first person "We" is actually a radical United Irish redefinition of their shared
national identity, where this dissident member of a privileged establishment becomes one with
fellow refugees from the colonized indigenous majority population! Professor Gutmann proceeds to argue for a permeable wall of separation between church and state which "allows for
exceptions to the rule that religious believers should not be exempt from otherwise legitimate
laws just because of their religious beliefs." Id. at 919. Such exemptions should be constitutionally required where they "do no damage to the basic purpose of the law and not making an
exception would be discriminatory." Id. This approach is, of course, a perfect description of
Philips, in which Sampson established the postcolonial priest-penitent privilege as an exception
to the general rule of compelled testimony, insisting that any contrary result would indeed
amount to an effective establishment of his own majority Protestant religion.
230 SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION, supra note 2, at 92.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 85.
234 Id. at 93.
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son.235 "Those who have not seen and felt as I have done, may think it
common place. ' 236 He closed with the great Christian commandment: "Thou
237
shalt love thy neighbour as thy self.
F. Mayor Clinton's Opinion

De Witt Clinton, the Mayor of New York, delivered the court's unanimous decision. 238 In the first free exercise case, Mayor Clinton bought Sampson's United Irish historiography lock, stock, and barrel; the court's opinion
in Philips is an early classic of postcolonial jurisprudence. Asked to choose
between Anglocentric imperial precedent and republican constitutional ideology, Mayor Clinton flatly rejected the leading colonial common law precedent of Butler v. Moore, the Irish decision in which Father Gahan was jailed
for protecting the secrets of Lord Dunboyne. 239 "With those who have
turned their attention to the history of Ireland," said the mayor, "the decisions of Irish courts, respecting Roman Catholics, can have little or no
weight. '240 Republican America had no need for Irish legal authority from
colonized Ireland.
"That unfortunate country has been divided into two great parties, the
oppressors and the oppressed," declared Mayor Clinton. 241 "The Catholic
has been disfranchised of his civil rights, deprived of his inheritance, and excluded from the common rights of man; statute has been passed upon statute,
and adjudication has been piled upon adjudication in prejudice of his religious freedom. '242 That system of discrimination would surely collapse in
time. "The benign spirit of toleration, and the maxims of an enlightened policy, have recently ameliorated his condition, and will undoubtedly, in process
of time, place him on the same footing with his Protestant brethren," Mayor
Clinton argued, "but until he stands upon the broad pedestal of equal rights,
emancipated from the most unjust thraldom, we cannot but look with a jeal243
ous eye upon all decisions which fetter him or rivet his chains.
Invoking the social compact, civil and religious liberty, and the republican principles of American government, the court construed the New York
State Constitution and the First Amendment to exclude forever calamities
244
that had deluged Ireland and other countries with tears and with blood.
The state had failed to carry its burden of proof. The state had failed to
establish, as required by article 38's proviso, that Father Kohlmann's conscientious refusal to testify was inconsistent with the peace or safety of the
state. 245 Even before a Protestant court, Mayor Clinton held, in a stirring
235
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237 Id. at 95. Further extracts from and analysis of Sampson's argument are contained infra
Part VII.B.
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declaration of postcolonial constitutional principle, the fundamental religious
liberty of American Roman Catholics was safe. 246 "They are protected by
the laws and ,.onstitution of this country, in the full and free exercise of their
religion, and this court can never countenance or authorize the application of
insult to their faith, or of torture to their consciences. ''247 In the face of Father Kohlmann's impenetrable silence, the defendants were immediately
acquitted. 248
V.

The PostcolonialJurisprudentialLegacy of Philips

Having described the origins, context, and outcome of Philips, I now
want to trace its postcolonial influence on American constitutional jurisprudence. This discussion will seek to establish the place of Philips within the
narrow form of intellectual history that is called legal doctrine. Our investigation will follow the constitutional history of the postcolonial free exercise
exemption from generally applicable laws. Elsewhere, I examine the history
of the postcolonial priest-penitent or clergy privilege in the law of evidence;
evidentiary scholars may find themselves startled at the significance of ethnic,
nationalist, and postcolonial jurisprudence in the evolution of privilege doctrine. 249 Similarly, Sampson's United Irish rhetoric and De Witt Clinton's
responsive opinion in Philips may confound American constitutional historians who causally trace the legal doctrine of free exercise primarily to influences in high philosophy. Instead, Philips was perhaps the earliest
constitutional victory for civil rights lawyering. The archaeology of the first
free exercise case thus offers fascinating clues to the cultural construction of
0
law.25
Today, legal opinion in the United States is sharply divided between two
dominant interpretations of the federal Free Exercise Clause with vastly different social implications. At the heart of this dispute is a political reality. In
a religiously diverse society no legal obligation is immune from a sincere conscientious objection. Thus, genuine respect for religious freedom fundamentally challenges basic understandings of the rule of law. In a multicultural
society, unregulated free exercise threatens anarchy. A sincere conviction
that a killing was ordained by God, for example, has often been invoked to
indemnify murder.
On the other hand, ideas about religious liberty and equality do seem
central to any comprehensive philosophy of fundamental human rights. One
conceptually limited response to this jurisprudential dilemma is a narrow
reading of the American Free Exercise Clause. Under this construction, government does not violate the right to free exercise unless it targets some particular religious practice. Unless official action is directed against religious
practice, civil duties should be enforced. In contrast to this narrow vision, the
246
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competing conception of the Free Exercise Clause is much more expansive.
The broader reading presumptively forbids all burdens on religious practice,
even when no interference with conscience is initially foreseen. Under this
approach, unless the government demonstrates some unusually pressing secular justification for enforcing the challenged law, free exercise exemptions
from generally applicable civil obligations must be granted.
At least theoretically, much is at stake. For advocates of the narrow
interpretation, neither religious believers nor sympathetic judges should hold
a veto over the will of a democratic majority. To read into the First Amendment a requirement that free exercise exemptions be granted is to subvert
the very ideal of democratic government itself. Legitimate social policy
would be hopelessly compromised. Only the legislature, the argument goes,
has the discretion to grant free exercise exemptions from generally applicable
neutral laws adopted in a republican democracy. Moreover, even then, by
favoring some religious practice over a general civil obligation any political
exemption runs a substantial risk of falling afoul of the Establishment Clause.
Those who elevate religious freedom above democratic process resist
such contentions. Advancing their much more expansive alternative construction of the Free Exercise Clause, these thinkers insist that judicially enforceable exemptions are implicit in its absolute language, even when the
challenged law has been adopted for purely secular purposes. Indeed, to
leave such unfettered power in the hands of the legislature is to ignore precisely the majoritarian problem the First Amendment was supposed to avoid.
The federal Constitution was designed to set certain limits upon majority
rule. By definition, only mainstream religions or others with substantial political clout can win legislative exemptions. Moreover, it will always be impossible for lawmakers to anticipate the infinite ways in which seemingly
innocuous civil obligations may intrude upon minority religious practice.
Only through a case-by-case adjudication of conflicts between God and Caesar, therefore, can the fundamental constitutional guarantee of religious freedom be upheld. To deny the availability of judicially enforced free exercise
exemptions from generally applicable laws would be to write the Free Exercise Clause out of meaningful existence.
In choosing between these rival interpretations of religious freedom and
equality, despite recent protestations by Justice Antonin Scalia and some academic commentators, Philips turns out to be of critical historic importance:
As the very first courtroom victory for constitutional religious freedom,
Philips was also the earliest judicial recognition of a constitutional exemption
from generally applicable laws. In other words, in the formative era of constitutional law, as we have seen, Philips adopted the broader construction
favoring religious freedom and equality above civic order. Although arguably dominant during the antebellum period, Philips'sconstitutional principle
requiring free exercise exemptions was judicially forgotten for roughly a century from the Civil War. Yet during the same period, the clergy privilege (in
which that postcolonial doctrine of constitutional exemptions first appeared)
became progressively more entrenched by way of statutory codification and
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widespread scholarly and judicial acceptance. 251 Moreover, the passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment increased the potential applications of the federal Free Exercise Clause.
What are our historical sources? We must examine the postcolonial constitutional judicial record if we are trying to trace the historical genealogy of
the expansive reading of free exercise guarantees. Philips is central as the
earliest judicial adoption of the controversial constitutional doctrine requiring conscientious exemptions from generally applicable laws. Thereafter, our
historical method is straightforward: I treat every case approving Philips as
an implicit or explicit judicial approval of its conscientious exemptions doctrine, at least with regard to that original constitutional paradigm of the
priest-penitent evidentiary privilege. 252 Our universe of later conscientious
exemption cases must also include those in which other free exercise litigants
prevailed upon some similar theory. When they failed, we must still consider
whether such exemption claims were rejected as a matter of constitutional
principle, or for some different reason-for example, failure to prove that
any religious practice was actually burdened, or the state's establishment of a
countervailing state interest in uniform law enforcement that overrode the
conscientious objection.
A.

Antebellum State Court Decisions: The Rise of Philips's Postcolonial
Constitutional Theory of Conscientious Exemptions

Within weeks of its historic ruling, human rights advocate William Sampson published his comprehensive report of the Philips decision-including
full verbatim transcripts of the proceedings, the argument, and the opinion,
together with supplementary material. 253 Sampson's The Catholic Question
in America was widely read and Philips was cited in at least four antebellum
religious freedom cases-People v. Smith (1817),254 Farnandis v. Henderson
(1827),255 Simon's Executors v. Gratz (1831),256 and Commonwealth v.
Cronin (1855).257 All but once, Philips was approved.
The first case to rely on Philips was the New York decision in People v.
Smith. 25 8 There, with little discussion, Justice Van Ness accepted the priestpenitent privilege established four years earlier in Philips, although rejecting
a prisoner's effort to keep his Protestant pastor, who raised no conscientious
objection to testifying, off the witness stand. Acknowledging the authority of
Philips,the Staten Island Court of Oyer and Terminer took an explicit "distinction between auricular confessions made to a priest in the course of discipline, according to the canons of the church, and those made to a minister of
See Walsh, Priest-PenitentPrivilege, supra note 2, at pts. II-I1I.
Some of the following cases are also discussed from the perspective of evidentiary theory in my article on the history of the priest-penitent privilege. See id.
253 SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION, supra note 2.
254 People v. Smith (N.Y. Oyer & Terminer 1817), reprintedin 1 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS,
supra note 23, at 779.
255 Farnandis v. Henderson, 1 C.L.J. 202, 213 (Union Dist. S.C. 1827).
256 Simon's Ex'rs v. Gratz, 2 Pen. & W. 412, 412 (Pa. 1831).
257 Commonwealth v. Cronin, 1 Q.L.J. 128 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1855).
258 People v. Smith, 1 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS at 779.
251
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the gospel in confidence, merely as a friend or adviser. '259 The court made
no explicit reference to constitutional free exercise provisions.
In the few successful antebellum free exercise cases, South Carolina's
Chancellor Desaussure also appears to have favored the principle of constitutional exemptions. That issue was not raised directly in Farnandisv. Henderson.26° There, Chancellor Desaussure decided that the South Carolina
Constitution forbade the exclusion of Universalists as competent witnesses.
In that case the state constitution's religious freedom guarantee broke down
an entire legal barrier based on religious belief-the testimonial incompetence of those who denied the existence of divine retribution in the next
world-so that no conscientious exemption was necessary to protect religious
liberty. However, in concluding an erudite opinion in favor of religious freedom and equality, Chancellor Desaussure drew explicit support from Philips.
The court's warm endorsement is all the more striking in light of the shared
constitutional text: in 1790 South Carolina had borrowed its free exercise
guarantee word for word from article 38 of the New York State Constitution
of 1777.261
Chacellor Desaussure wrote:
I feel strengthened in the view of the case by the growing liberality
of the age, in the respect shewn to the tenderness of conscience, in
the case [Philips] of the Roman Catholic priest, in New-York, who
refused to give evidence in a criminal prosecution as to facts which
came to his knowledge as a priest in the confession of the penitent.
Mr. Clinton, the Mayor of New-York, in a learned and elegant argument, exempted him from the obligation of disclosing such
262
confession.
Upon review, South Carolina's Court of Appeals, the state's newly constituted high court, "concur[red] in opinion" with Chancellor Desaussure's Farnandis decision.

263

With this indirect endorsement of Philips, South Carolina's new high
court offered more sympathy to conscientious objectors than had its predecessor, the recently dismantled five-member constitutional court. Only four
years previously, in one of its last decisions, that court had rejected an exemption claim in the strongest possible terms. In State v. Willson (1823),264 a
Covenanter refused to serve on a grand jury. A decade after St. Peter's
259 Id. at 784. In American State Trials, published in 1914, John Lawson quotes Justice Van
Ness as saying, "I think there is a grave distinction between auricular confessions made to a
Id.
I..."
(emphasis added). The word "grave" does not appear in Daniel Rogers's origipriest .
nal report. It seems to have been inserted by Lawson when he converted the statements of the
court, counsel, and the witnesses from the third person to the first person. Wigmore relies on
Lawson rather than the original report by Rogers. For more detail on People v. Smith, see
Walsh, Priest-PenitentPrivilege,supra note 2, at pt. II.
260 Farnandis,1 C.L.J. at 213. For more detail on Farnandis,see Walsh, Priest-PenitentPrivilege, supra note 2, at pt. II.
261 Farnandis,1 C.L.J. at 211 (quoting S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. 8, § 1).
262 Id. at 213.
263 Id. at 214.
264 State v. Willson, 13 S.C.L. (2 McCord) 393 (S.C. 1823).

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol. 73:1

board of trustees in Philips, Willson pressed his religious freedom in another
test case to "settle a principle. '265 Strangely, the constitutional court never
referred to the language of South Carolina's free exercise guarantee, nor did
it ever mention Mayor Clinton's interpretation of that same language in
Philips. Soon afterwards, the South Carolina Constitutional Court was disbanded and replaced as the state's high court by the court of appeals. The
author of Willson was demoted to a new intermediate court, but two of his
concurring colleagues joined in affirming Chancellor Desaussure's opinion as
members of the three-judge court of appeals that approved Farnandis.266 Although Professors McConnell, Bradley, and Lash all note the Willson court's
emphatic hostility to free exercise exemptions, 267 they fail to notice Chancellor Desaussure's subsequent endorsement of Philips with the unqualified
concurrence of South Carolina's reconstituted high court.
In mid-century, Judge Meredith ruled in Commonwealth v. Cronin that
constitutional free exercise guarantees required the priest-penitent privilege.
Cronin faithfully followed Philips in its explicit adoption of the expansive
interpretation of free exercise, holding that the postcolonial priest-penitent
privilege was required by both the state and federal constitutions. 268 In that
case, Irish immigrant John Cronin was accused of murdering his pregnant
wife in the heat of passion after finding her with another man in the middle
of the night. Before her death a couple of weeks later, Margaret Cronin
made a sacramental confession to her parish priest in Richmond, Virginia.
At his trial, Cronin sought to extract from Father John Theeling the fact that
his wife had committed adultery. Father Theeling respectfully declined to
answer on grounds of conscience. He read to the court a prepared statement
explaining his reasons in theological terms pulled directly from Father
Kohlmann's stated reasons in Philips. The issue was squarely raised and
"elaborately argued." 269
In Cronin, Judge Meredith adopted in full Mayor Clinton's constitutional free exercise rationale for the priest-penitent privilege. He saw no
need to examine any alternative common law theory. After noting the
"dreadful predicament" in which the witness stood, Judge Meredith
continued:
Id.
Interestingly, in upholding the competency of Universalist witnesses in Farnandis,
Chancellor Desaussure expressly rejected the contrary view which two judges of the disbanded
constitutional court had advanced in State v. Petty, 16 S.C.L. (Harp.) 59 (S.C. 1824). One of
those judges was Judge Richardson, the author of Willson; the other was Judge Colcock, who was
reappointed to the new court of appeals. Dismissing the view held by Judges Richardson and
Colcock, Chancellor Desaussure wrote that it was evidently "not the opinion of the [Harper]
Court, but the opinion of two Judges, which are entitled to great respect, but does not establish
the law." Farnandis,1 C.L.J. at 210. The three remaining judges in Petty included Judges Nott
and Johnson, who together with Judge Colcock were the first appointees to the new three-judge
high court. These jurists reserved their opinion on the witness competency issue until they affirmed Chancellor Desaussure's Farnandisreasoning in the absence of Judge Colcock.
267 Bradley, supra note 4, at 284-85; Lash, supra note 6, at 1122-24 & nn.71 & 76; McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding,supra note 3, at 1510-11, 1513.
268 Commonwealth v. Cronin, 1 Q.L.J. 128 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1855).
269 Id. at 132.
265

266
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If then it be found that the generally mild and just rules of the com-

mon law place the witness in this exquisite dilemma, between perjury on the one hand, and false swearing on the other, we must look
to our own laws-to our constitution and bill of rights, which proclaim religious toleration and guarantee the free exercise of religious worship, and see if they do not view with a more liberal eye the
religious feelings of our people, and dispense with a more equal
270
hand the universal and immutable principles of Justice.

Judge Meredith then asked: "Is this privilege embraced in the guarantees furnished by our Constitution in favor of religious toleration, and does it violate
any principle of public policy?" Like Mayor Clinton in Philips, Judge Meredith set forth both the Free Exercise Clause of the federal Constitution and

also the state free exercise guarantee. 271 "It is impossible to conceive of
more broad and comprehensive terms than are used in our Bill of Rights, and
our State and Federal Constitutions," declared the Cronin court. 272 "Relig-

ious toleration was the great purpose their framers had in view. '273 Here and
elsewhere, several passages in Judge Meredith's opinion are directly

plagiarized from counsel's arguments and the court's reasoning in Sampson's
report of Philips. Judge Meredith concluded that state intrusion into the confessional would deny Roman Catholics "the great constitutional boon of re'274
ligious toleration.
On constitutional grounds Philips, Farnandis,and Cronin (and implicitly
People v. Smith) all recognized the seal of the confessional, thereby exempting Roman Catholic clergy from the general secular duty to tell the whole
truth under subpoena. These three later free exercise cases all directly ad-

dressed and approved Mayor Clinton's opinion in Philips. The remaining
antebellum court that considered Philips stood alone in rejecting its reasoning. In Simon's Executors v. Gratz (1831), a Jewish litigant with the coincidental name of Levi Philips had refused to appear in court on a Saturday. 275

When his suit was dismissed because of his absence, Philips invoked his constitutional right to liberty of conscience. 276 On appeal, his counsel cited the
Id. at 134.
Judge Meredith quoted the Virginia provisions as follows:
Our Bill of Rights declares that, "religion, or the duty we owe to our Creator, and
the means of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by
force or violence; and therefore all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of
religion, according to the dictates of conscience;" and our Constitution enacts that,
"no man shall be compelled to frequent, or support any religious worship, place or
ministry whatsoever: nor shall any man be enforced, restrained, molested,
burthened in his body, or goods, or otherwise suffer on account of his religious
opinions or belief; but all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain
their opinions in matters of religion, and the same shall in no wise affect, diminish,
or enlarge their civil capacities."
Id. at 137 (quoting unnamed provisions of the Virginia Constitution).
272 Id.
273 Id. The language is borrowed from Riker's argument for Father Kohlmann, as quoted
in SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION, supra note 2, at 26.
274 Cronin, 1 Q.L.J. at 142.
275 Simon's Ex'rs v. Gratz, 2 Pen. & W. 412, 412 (Pa. 1831).
276 Levi Philips invoked the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provided that "'no human
270

271
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New York decision in Philips in support of a conscientious exemption. 277 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. 278 Writing for a unanimous court in
Gratz, Chief Justice Gibson castigated the Philips approach because it invited
judicial legislation.279 According to the chief justice, Mayor Clinton had entered the forbidden domain of policy considerations, whereas the true course
of a magistrate was "prescribed, not by discretion, but rules already established. '' 280 In unqualified terms, Chief Justice Gibson expressly rejected the
notion of judicially recognized free exercise exemptions from generally applicable laws. Justice Antonin Scalia, a modern disciple of the antebellum Chief
Justice Gibson, describes Gratz as one of two cases "flatly rejecting" the free
281
exercise exemption granted in Philips.
Of the four antebellum cases that directly considered Philips,all but one
approved it. But other cases addressed similar issues without citing Philips at
all. Indeed, Chief Justice Gibson's opinion for the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Gratz echoed a dissent he had previously written without any reference to Philips. Like Chancellor Desaussure's Farnandis opinion the year
before, Commonwealth v. Lesher (1828)282 was argued amidst the concurrent
283
controversies over American codification and Irish Catholic emancipation.
In Lesher, a prospective juror had been excluded from a death penalty case
because of his religious objection to capital punishment. 28 4 The Lesher majority appeared to sidestep the religious liberty question by upholding the
state's important interest in empanelling impartial jurors who would follow
the law. 2815 In dissent, however, Chief Justice Gibson accused the majority of
allowing religious scruples to justify exemptions from jury service or other
general civic duties. 286 Interestingly, therefore, Chief Justice Gibson ranks
Lesher as an acceptance of the Philips constitutional exemptions principle.
In both Lesher and Gratz, Michael McConnell explains Chief Justice Gibson's rejection of Philipsas the result of his "idiosyncratic" dislike for judicial
review, as evidenced by his famous dissenting opinion in Eakin v. Raub
(1825).287 Gerard Bradley denies this characterization of Chief Justice Gibson's thinking, pointing out that other Pennsylvanian justices expressed simi288
lar hostility towards religious exemptions.
authority can in any case, whatever, control or interfere with, and that no preference shall ever
be given by law to any religious establishments, or modes of worship."' Id. at 414 (quoting PA.
CONST. of 1776, art. IX, § 3).
277 Id.
278

Id. at 417.

279

Id.

280

Id.

See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 543 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
Commonwealth v. Lesher, 17 Serg. & Rawle 155 (Pa. 1828).
283 For more regarding Sampson's efforts on behalf of Catholic Emancipation and towards
codification, see Walsh, Priest-PenitentPrivilege, supra note 2, at pts. I-Il.
284 Lesher, 17 Serg. & Rawle at 155.
281

282

285

Id. at 160.

Id.
Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 344-58 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, C.J., dissenting);
McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding,supra note 3, at 1510.
288 Bradley, supra note 4, at 277-84.
286
287
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Justice Scalia and Professor Bradley also draw a negative inference from
the earliest reported case in which a constitutional free exercise exemption
was apparently claimed. In Stansbury v. Marks (1793),289 the trial court de-

nied a conscientious exemption to a Jewish witness who refused to be sworn
on his Sabbath. However, because the defendant subsequently waived his
testimony the fine was discharged, and it is actually unclear from the memorandum report whether the exemption issue ever reached the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court.
Following Professor Bradley, Justice Scalia pairs Stansbury along with
Gratz as the other case "flatly rejecting" the constitutional free exercise exemption granted in Philips.290 Because Justice Scalia and Professor Bradley
put the relative weight of Stansbury directly in issue, the reader must decide.
The entire surviving record of that case is this:
In this cause (which was tried on Saturday, the 5th of April) the
defendant offered Jonas Phillips, a Jew, as a witness; but he refused
to be sworn, because it was his Sabbath. The Court, therefore, fined
the benefit of his
him £10; but the defendant, afterwards, wa[i]ving
291
testimony, he was discharged from the fine.
In contrast to Justice Scalia and Professor Bradley, I do not read Stansbury as
a judicial rejection of constitutional exemptions.
Instead, the Stansbury report seems to suggest that the exemptions issue
became moot when the subpoena was waived, thus lifting the fine and eliminating any need for a ruling by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Professor
McConnell's treatment is brief. He writes that "[i]n the state courts, there
was only one reported case involving a religious exemption claim during the
twenty years following ratification of the first amendment. Unfortunately, it
is nothing more than a cryptic paragraph in Dallas' reports from the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania. ' 292 McConnell then turns to his extended discussion
as a paradigm of
of Philips, having already used that case in his introduction
2 93
the constitutional riddle posed by religious exemptions.
After accusing Professor McConnell of overvaluing Philips, Professor
Bradley complains that McConnell "blew past" Stansbury.294 Professor
Tushnet agrees with Professor Bradley: "McConnell's conclusion simply ignores a 1793 Pennsylvania Supreme Court holding that rejected a religious
exemption. The Pennsylvania court reached its holding within two years of
the First Amendment's adoption," writes Professor Tushnet, "and as far as
we can tell, the court's holding was not connected to some principled opposition to judicial review. ' 295 Of course, McConnell might respond, as lawyers
drafting briefs typically do, that the 1793 holding is "cryptic" and uneStansbury v. Marks, 2 Dal. 213 (Pa. 1793).
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 543 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
291 Stansbury, 2 Dali. at 213.
292 McConnell, Origins and HistoricalUnderstanding, supra note 3, at 1504.
293 See id.
294 Bradley, supra note 4, at 282.
295 Tushnet, supra note 5, at 125.
289

290
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laborated. Still, one inclined to a different interpretation might evaluate the
evidence differently.
Professor Bradley, Justice Scalia's muse, goes further than Professor

Tushnet in asserting that Stansbury "is hardly 'cryptic.' Its import is clear
enough. ' 296 There is certainly no justification for McConnell devoting several pages to Philips, contends Professor Bradley, particularly when Stansbury gets just a couple of sentences.2 97 But as we have seen, Stansbury is
difficult to decipher. Besides, using a rather crude standard, the proportion-

ate word count ratio of Professor McConnell's treatment of the tiny Stansbury decision (fifty-five words!) is almost one-to-one. In contrast, his four
pages devoted to Philips represent a mere one-thirty-fifth of the proceedings,
arguments, and opinion, and about one-fiftieth of the entire volume William
Sampson published as The Catholic Question in America in 1813.298

Another early Pennsylvanian case raising the exemptions issue involved
a Sabbatarian's complaint against Sunday closing laws similar to those later
attacked in other states.2 99 That early challenge was decided just four years

after Philips, but without any reference to Mayor Clinton's opinion. In Commonwealth v. Wolf, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to recognize the
conscientious objection of a Jewish merchant. 300 Because of its finding that
Jewish law did not require Wolf to work on Sunday, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied that Wolf had actually been subjected to any religious
burden. 30 1 Several later Sunday closing cases are similarly inconclusive, ei-

ther because the religious burden was questioned, or because the religious
believer sought to have the statute struck down in its entirety without any
30 2
exemption granted.

Bradley, supra note 4, at 282.
Id. at 290.
298 Because Philips has been mistakenly disregarded as "unreported," it bears repeating
here that William Sampson promptly published his report of Philips as an impressive free-standing volume. See SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION, supra note 2. For the full bibliographic history
of Philips, with its own jurisprudential consequences, see Walsh, Priest-PenitentPrivilege, supra
note 2.
299 Commonwealth v. Wolf, 3 Serg. & Rawle 48 (Pa. 1817).
296
297

300
301

Id. at 50.
Id. at 49.

302 Three decades later, again without any reference to Philips, in Specht v. Commonwealth,
8 Pa. 312 (1848), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court returned to the question of Sunday closing
laws. The Specht court cited with approval Chief Justice Gibson's intervening opinions in Lesher
and Gratz and declared firmly that "conscientious doctrines and practices can claim no immunity
from the operation of general laws made for the government and to promote the welfare of the
whole people." Id. at 322. Yet according to Professor McConnell, the Specht court nevertheless
veered away from Gibsonian absolutism and closer to the Clintonian balancing of Philips. McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding,supra note 3, at 1510. As in Wolf, he points out,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dwelt on the fact that Sabbatarians are not religiously obliged
to work on Sundays, and concluded that the believer Specht was not really being compelled to
violate his conscience. Id. Indeed, going beyond Wolf, the Specht court specifically noted that
on different facts a generally neutral law "'might well be regarded as an invasion of his conscientious convictions."' Id. (quoting Specht, 8 Pa. at 326). Offering lengthy extracts from Specht
with very different implications, Professor Bradley suggests that McConnell's interpretations of
both decisions are "fanciful." Bradley, supra note 4, at 292-95.
The constitutionality of Sunday closing laws was also litigated in several other states with
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In addition to People v. Smith30 3 and the Sabbatarian cases, another

early clergy privilege case generated the prosecutorial argument that no religious burden was actually at stake. The facts of Commonwealth v. Drake
were far removed from Philips because no clergyman was actually threatened
with forced disclosure. 30 4 A Baptist prisoner sought to exclude his public

confession to fellow congregants, none of whom raised any conscientious objection to testifying. 30 5 After the prosecutor argued that the prisoner Drake's

confession was not required by church tenets, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts affirmed without opinion, leaving no discernable principle affecting either the clergy privilege or the larger constitutional doctrine of free
exercise exemptions. 3 6 It is not apparent that either Philips or People v.
Smith was discussed in argument.
Critically, Professors McConnell, Bradley, Tushnet, and Lash all fail to

notice Chancellor Desaussure's South Carolina opinion in Farnandis and
Judge Meredith's Virginia decision in Cronin, which seem to have joined
New York's Philips as the only three antebellum constitutional courtroom
victories for religious freedom that survived intact. In both Farnandisand
Cronin, Philips was considered authoritative postcolonial constitutional precedent. While Professor McConnell discusses most but not all of the remainmixed results. See generally ABRAM HERBERT LEWIS, SUNDAY LEGISLATION 239-42, 265-70,
290-91 (1902); see also Wolf, 3 Serg. & Rawle at 48. In South Carolina, one trial court upheld
such an ordinance in 1833, Town Council v. Duke, 32 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 508, 531 (S.C. 1846), while
another trial court struck one down three years later, Specht, 8 Pa. at 317 (Rice, J.). The conflict
was settled by the South Carolina Court of Errors in 1848 in favor of the statutes' validity. City
Council v. Benjamin, 32 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 508 (S.C. 1848). The Ohio Supreme Court reached a
similar conclusion, Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ward. 388; but see City of Cincinnati v. Rice, 15 Ohio
225, 242 (1846), as did the Arkansas courts, see Shover v. State, 10 Ark. 259 (1850). Virginia
appears to have held such an ordinance void. See Specht, 8 Pa. at 317 (citing unidentified opinion). A Saturday Sabbatarian who invoked the California Constitution persuaded the court to
strike down a Sunday closing statute. Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502 (1858). Just three years
later, however, a differently constituted California Supreme Court overturned Newman in an
opinion authored by Justice Stephen Field-the famous codifier's brother and future federal
Supreme Court justice-who had dissented in Newman. Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 678 (1861).
303 People v. Smith (N.Y. Oyer & Terminer 1817), reprintedin 1 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS,
supra note 23, at 779.
304 Commonwealth v. Drake, 15 Mass. (14 Tyng) 161 (1818).
305 Id. According to McConnell, Drake relied on the free exercise clause of the Massachusetts State Constitution. McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding, supra note 3, at
1506. The constitution provided that
[N]o subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained,in his person, liberty, or estate, for
worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeableto the dictates of his own
conscience, or for his religious profession or sentiments, provided he doth not disturb the public peace or obstruct others in their religious worship.
Id. at 1457 & n.242 (citing MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. 11) (emphasis added). McConnell
notes that rather than resisting Drake's constitutional interpretation, the state denied that his
confession was required by the teachings of his church, thus suggesting that no religious burden
was established. Id. at 1506. Bradley retorts that because the constitutional principle at stake
was that of self-incrimination, not religious freedom, McConnell "finds a silver lining where
there is none." Bradley, supra note 4, at 284-85. Under Bradley's interpretation, Drake was
simply not a free exercise case.
306 See Drake, 15 Mass. (14 Tyng) at 161.
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ing antebellum cases, Professor Bradley chastises him
for artificially limiting
30 7
his universe of free exercise exemption decisions.
For example, Professors Bradley and McConnell quibble over the relative weight of various other categories of decisions, such as the several blasphemy convictions including Chief Justice Kent's imperial New York opinion
in People v. Ruggles30 8 and the several cases regarding the competency of
witnesses. 30 9 McConnell excludes such decisions because "[slince both of
these categories of cases involved laws specifically directed at religion, they

did not raise the exemption question. '310 Implausibly, Professor Bradley replies that both blasphemy prosecutions and oath requirements were inspired
by essentially secular, neutral, and general purposes, whatever their effect; he
claims that such rules were "not to subordinate unpopular religions or to promote majoritarian prejudices. ' 31 1 But even if this doubtful assertion is true,

it is hard to see how a court could uphold a constitutional free exercise challenge in a blasphemy case without invalidating the blasphemy law, or in a
witness exclusion case without invalidating the oath requirement. In such
cases, therefore, conscientious exemptions were simply not an available
option.
More persuasively, Bradley complains that McConnell should also have

discussed the implications of various other decisions, addressing such issues
as conscientious objections to compelled financial support for religious institutions, 312 a "typically unsympathetic" line of cases denying Roman Catholic
objections to Bible reading in the public schools, 3 13 and numerous church
property disputes in which claims of religious freedom were uniformly rejected. 314 Apparently unaware that Philips was approved in People v. Smith,
Bradley, supra note 4 at 273-77, 293.
People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811); see supra Part III; see also State v.
Chandler, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 553 (1837); Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 206
(1838); Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawle 394 (Pa. 1824).
309 United States v. Kennedy, 26 F. Cas. 761 (C.C.D. Ill. 1843) (No. 15,524) (McLean, J.);
Wakefield v. Ross, 28 F. Cas. 1346 (C.C.D. R.I. 1827) (No. 17,050) (Story, J.); Jackson v. Gridley,
18 Johns. 98 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820).
310 McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding,supra note 3, at 1503. With respect
to the oath cases, he might have added that the question of testimonial competency generally
seems to have been more important to the actual litigants than to the excluded witnesses; in New
York, for example, no Universalist ever argued that that sect's exclusion from the witness stand
violated their constitutional right to religious equality.
311 Bradley, supra note 4, at 274-77, 301-02. Whatever about the witness incompetency
cases, the language of the blasphemy cases tends to refute this claim. In Ruggles, for example,
Chief Justice Kent expressly refused to extend the criminal law to protect non-Christian religions, describing their prophets as "imposters." See id. at 293. His blatant intolerance in that
case drew heavy criticism during New York's constitutional convention of 1821, forcing the chancellor to retreat to Bradley's position during the debates. See generally LEONARD LEVy, BLAS307

308

PHEMY

(1993).

Bradley, supra note 4, at 285-86 (discussing Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43
(1815); Barnes v. Inhabitants of the First Parish, 6 Mass. 401 (1810); Adams v. Howe, 14 Mass.
(13 Tyng) 340 (1817); Holbrook v. Holbrook, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 248 (1822); and Muzzy v. Wilkins, 1 Smith 1 (N.H. 1803)).
313 Id. at 286 (discussing Donoghue v. Richards, 38 Me. 376 (1854)).
314 Id. at 287-89 (discussing many cases involving Roman Catholic and Protestant church
property); see also DIGNAN, supra note 126; FRANCIS E. TOURSCHER, THE HOGAN SCHISM AND
312
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Farnandis, and Cronin, Justice Scalia, Professor Bradley, and every other
scholarly writer treats that New York decision as an isolated anomaly, mistakenly asserting that no other nineteenth-century ruling supported free exercise exemptions from generally neutral laws.
In fact, of the four
antebellum courts that considered the postcolonial constitutional theory of
Philips,only Gratz rejected it.
B.

From the Civil War to the Second World War: Philips's Postcolonial
Constitutional Theory of Conscientious Exemptions Survives as
an Evidentiary Principle

After it was relied on by the Virginian Judge Meredith in the 1850s,
Philips fell into judicial disuse for a full century until the late 1950s. In the
half century since, Philips has been cited in at least nine cases, including
seven judicial references within the past decade: Mullen v. United States, 315
Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law School v. Georgetown
University,316 Simpson v. Tennant,317 Scott v. Hammock,31 8 Rosado v.
320
Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp.,319 Nestle v. Commonwealth,
323
322
32 1
Mockaitas v. Harcleroad, City of Boerne v. Flores, and Cox v. Miller.
None of these nine modern cases questioned Philips, except for Justice
Scalia's concurrence in Flores. Moreover, although Philipswas judicially forgotten between the Civil War and the Second World War, the priest-penitent
evidentiary privilege it announced gradually won universal support: Today,
Philips'spostcolonial United Irish clergy privilege is codified throughout the
32 4
United States.
In the nineteenth century the federal Free Exercise Clause was seldom
openly litigated, perhaps because of its doubtful application to state actions.
Until the Second World War, the constitutional history of free religious exercise in the United States was considerably shaped by the early distribution of
functions between the federal and state governments. State governments exclusively regulated most matters until well into the American federal, republican political experiment, and early Americans did not know today's massive
federal bureaucracy. Until the 1940s, long after the Fourteenth Amendment,
and even longer since adoption of the First Amendment, the general view
was that the Free Exercise Clause bound only the federal authorities, not the
PHILADELPHIA 1820-1829 (1930); Robert F.
McNamara, Trusteeism in the Atlantic States, 1785-1863, 30 CATH. HIST. REV. 135 (1944); Alfred
G. Stritch, Trusteeism in the Old Northwest, 1800-1850, 30 CATH. HIST. REV. 155 (1944).
315 Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
316 Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Sch. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1
(D.C. 1987) (en banc).
317 Simpson v. Tennant, 871 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
318 Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947 (Utah 1994).
319 Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No CV 93-302072, 1995 WL
348181 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 31, 1995) (unpublished opinion).
320 Nestle v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 133 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
321 Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1997).
322 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
323 Cox v. Miller, 296 F.3d 89, 103 (2d Cir. 2002).
324 I recount this history in Walsh, Priest-PenitentPrivilege, supra note 2.
TRUSTEE TROUBLES IN ST. MARY'S CHURCH,
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states. Because of the dominant role of state governments, and because of
the First Amendment's limited federal reach, the early free exercise cases in
state courts relied on protections contained in state constitutions. In that
respect, Philips was typical. But Mayor Clinton's reasoning was also quite
unusual, as the court did rely at least rhetorically on the federal Free Exercise
Clause to provide additional constitutional support for the priest-penitent
32 5
privilege.

Three decades after Philips, the United States Supreme Court sidestepped the constitutional issue of religious exemptions in its first ever encounter with the Free Exercise Clause. In Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of
New Orleans, New Orleans Catholics challenged a citywide ban on open-cas-

ket funerals. 32 6 This public health measure did not affect Protestants because
of their different burial practices. The federal Supreme Court declined to
address the exemptions issue, holding that complaints against state governments must be resolved under state constitutions, as the federal bill of rights
bound only the federal government. 327 Predictably, Professors McConnell
and Bradley disagree on the relative significance of the city's argument,

before the court's jurisdictional holding, that its yellow fever ordinance was

'32 8
justified by "the law of necessity.
Hence, a very curious case is Commonwealth v. Cronin,32 9 decided just
before the Civil War and a full decade or two after the unsympathetic Supreme Court rulings in Barron and Permoli. Presiding over a state court interpreting state constitutional guarantees, the Virginian Judge Meredith

ignored such unfavorable precedent, and explicitly based his decision in part
325

SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION,

supra note 2, at 110-11, 114. Riding on circuit, a lone

federal Supreme Court Justice also suggested that the First Amendment restrained state governments from interfering with sincere religious practices. Rejecting contrary Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent, as well as the state legislature, Justice Henry Baldwin upheld a common
law claim to property made by an unincorporated religious group: "[W]hen we add to these
[common law rights of religious organizations], those expressly secured to them by the constitutions of the state and Union, we cannot doubt that they are as inviolable as a charter could make
them." Magill v. Brown, 16 F. Cas. 408, 423 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 8952); see also Lash, supra
note 6, at 1138 n.151. Oddly, Justice Baldwin offered this expansive constitutional interpretation
just one month after Barron v. Baltimore (1833), in which the full United States Supreme Court
flatly declared the contrary view that the national Bill of Rights bound only the federal government, not the states. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 743 (1833). Twelve years later, in a
curt opinion, the Permoli Court declared that "[tihe Constitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the respective states in their religious liberties; this is left to the state
constitutions and laws." Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 588
(1845). After the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause was adopted to
increase federal control over the broken Confederate states. This resulted in a gradual expansion of federal power. In the decades since, most but not all of the specific promises in the Bill
of Rights have been used to restrain state as well as federal actions. This hermeneutic device is
known as the incorporation doctrine. Under it, the federal Supreme Court eventually heard the
merits of a First Amendment free speech claim in 1931. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931).
326 Permoli, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 588.
327

Id. at 609.

Compare McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding,supra note 3, at 1503, with
Bradley, supra note 4, at 273.
329 Commonwealth v. Cronin, 1 Q.L.J. 128 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1855); see supra Part V.A; see also
Walsh, Priest-PenitentPrivilege,supra note 2, at pt. II.
328
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on the federal Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, paying due
homage to Philips in his constitutional reasoning. Judge Meredith hewed

closely to Mayor Clinton's deviant constitutional theory by relying heavily on
the federal Bill of Rights. But both Philips and Cronin nevertheless rested

primarily on state constitutional provisions, and prior to the Second World
War the First Amendment's federal Free Exercise Clause did not generally
330
protect against state action.
In federal cases, religious exemptions in the tradition of Philips were

occasionally granted. Through the Civil War, religious believers were often
forbidden by state statutes from aiding and abetting runaway slaves. In many
cases, conscientious objectors were nevertheless exonerated by juries when
prosecuted in federal courts, while in others federal judges sternly admonished jurors that fugitive slave laws could not be broken with impunity by
claiming rights of conscience. 331 In one case immediately after the Civil War,

the State of Missouri was prevented from imposing a loyalty oath upon dissi'332
dent clergymen, whose right to preach was termed "inalienable.

Professor Lash joins Professors Hamburger, Bradley, and Tushnet, as
well as Justice Scalia, in concluding that free exercise exemptions were not
contemplated by the original eighteenth-century framers of the federal Constitution. Apparently unaware of later judicial endorsements of Philips in
People v. Smith, Farnandis,and Cronin, Professor Lash also mistakenly joins
Justice Scalia, Professor Bradley, Professor Tushnet, and to a lesser extent
Professor McConnell, in treating Philips as an isolated anomaly throughout
the antebellum period. According to Professor Lash, however, the nation's

adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment after the Civil War marked a second
adoption of the Free Exercise Clause, then extending it to cover state as well
as federal actions. 333 Professor Lash cites impressive evidence that Northern
dismay at the Southern states' suppression of slave religion contributed to the
Fourteenth Amendment's passage. 334 In his thoughtful argument, free exer330 In Cronin, Judge Meredith's invocation of the First Amendment was even more direct
than Philips, Cronin, 1 Q.L.J. at 128, 137-38, which is quite surprising in light of the Supreme
Court's explicitly contrary intervening decisions in Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 243 and Permoli,
44 U.S. (3 How.) at 588. For other pre-Barron courts that thought the federal Bill of Rights
applicable to the states, see 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUION
IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1049-82 (1953). See also infra Part VII.A.
331 These cases are discussed by Professor Lash. Lash, supra note 6, at 1153 n.208. For
examples of jury acquittals, see Vaughn v. Williams, 28 F. Cas. 1115 (D. Ind. 1845) (No. 16,903);
Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 33. For examples of federal judges' instructions to disregard conscientious objections, see
Jones v. Vanzandt, 13 F. Cas. 1040, 1045 (D. Ohio 1843) (No. 7501) ("[M]uch has been said of the
laws of nature, of conscience, and of the rights of conscience. This monitor, under great excitement, may mislead, and always does mislead, when it urges any one to violate the law."); Van
Metre v. Mitchell, 28 F. Cas. 1036, 1041 (W.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 16,865) ("Some men of disordered
understanding or perverted conscience may conceive it a religious duty to break the law, but the
law will not tolerate their excuse ....He is on trial for his acts: and if his opinions, ceasing to be
speculative, have ended in conduct, let no morbid sympathy-no false respect for pretended
'rights of conscience'-prevent either court or jury from judging him justly, without favour as
without fear.").
332 Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 321 (1866); Lash, supra note 6, at 1137-40.
333 Lash, supra note 6, at 1110.
334 Id. at 1133-36.
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cise exemptions were therefore required from Reconstruction, although not
initially from the founding period. 335 Professor Lash's historical conclusion
therefore ultimately favors the constitutional exemption announced by
Philips, but only from the later period of the Civil War onwards. Professor
Lash, however, overlooks important early336cases, and he is quick to describe
the antebellum evidence as inconclusive.
Despite Professor Lash's historical evidence that the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to incorporate the Free Exercise Clause, in the
century leading up to the Second World War, state actions still continued to
escape direct federal review. Consequently, only a mere handful of free exercise claims against various federally controlled territories reached the Supreme Court. In 1875, at the end of Reconstruction, the Supreme Court
recognized Philips's clergy privilege in Totten v. United States.337 In Totten, a
Union spy was unable to enforce a valid contract entered into by the president for secret service behind Confederate lines. 338 According to the Court,
public policy forbade the maintenance of any suit that would "inevitably lead
to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and
respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be violated. '339 The
United States Supreme Court continued: "On this principle, suits cannot be
maintained which would require a disclosure of the confidences of the confessional . ... 340 The Totten opinion was written by Justice Stephen Field,
who had codified the California clergy privilege as a pioneer legislator just a
couple of decades before. Justice Field was influenced by his famous brother,
codifier David Dudley Field. And as a young man, David Dudley Field was
inspired by the writings of William Sampson, the banished Irish cause lawyer
who argued and won Philips!
Three years later, the Supreme Court rendered the first federal decision
to discuss openly the merits of the Free Exercise Clause. In Reynolds v.
United States, a Mormon challenged the bigamy statute in the territory of
Utah. 34 1 Here, conscientious exemptions were not an available option since
the Reynolds Court could hardly allow a free exercise challenge while simulof
taneously upholding the bigamy statute. Reynolds suggests no balancing
342
polygamy.
of
dangers
perceived
the
against
diatribe
its
in
interests
The Court waited until the outbreak of the Second World War, in the
midst of the Nazi Holocaust of European Jews, before it interpreted the Due

339

Id. at 1156.
Id. at 1123.
Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
Id. at 105-06.
Id. at 107.

340

Id.

335
336
337
338

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 152 (1878).
See McConnell, Origins and HistoricalUnderstanding,supra note 3, at 1412 & n.4 (discussing Reynolds); see also Bradley, supra note 4, at 272, 274, 301 (same). For other Supreme
Court holdings resting on judicial disapproval of Mormon polygamy, see Davis v. Beason, 133
U.S. 333 (1890); The Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890); and Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946). Similar views were
expressed even before Joseph Smith founded the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.
SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION, supra note 2, at 113-14.
341

342
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to extend the Free Exercise
Clause to state actions. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court retired the an343
tebellum Permoli by reviewing a free exercise challenge to state action.
Finally, in the maverick antebellum tradition of Philips and Cronin, the
Court explicitly asserted its power, through the intervening Fourteenth
Amendment, to bind state governments to the terms of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. So it was that in Cantwell's wake, First Amendment free exercise claims against state governments began to flood the
federal courts. After the Second World War, the significance of Philips in the
history of constitutional impact litigation became increasingly apparent. Its
historic role as perhaps the original expression of postcolonial American
equality jurisprudence was understood by Gustavus Myers, who wrote only a
couple of years after Cantwell, at a time when the Nazis were exterminating
Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, and other minorities. Myers described Philips
as "a noteworthy case evincing the cleavage in the public attitude towards
full religious freedom." 3"
Myers wrote in the shadow of "Hitlerized Germany and [other] subjugated countries," hoping to shatter the sanguine attitude of those opposed to
bigotry who had until recently "looked upon it as spasmodic, having its occasional flashes and then seeming to subside, and in nowise significant or affrighting. 345 Myers proposed instead that, "[u]nhappily, bigotry remains
constant, its victims varying from time to time, but in essence continuing the
same." 346 His History of Bigotry in the United States is a valuable though
depressing account of three centuries of virulent American anti-Catholicism,
nativism (directed conspicuously against the Irish immigrants), anti-Semitism, racism, and successive exclusion of numerous other minority groups.
"With its Constitutional guarantees of full religious freedom and the
right of anybody to believe or not as his convictions dictate," noted Myers,
"this Republic of the United States of America is the last place, it may be
' 34 7
thought, where bigotry should have recurred as formidable movements.
Yet such is the case. Lauding Philips as "a precedent of immense importance" that marked the heartening culmination of a relatively broad-minded
era, 34 8 Myers sadly demonstrated that this deceptive intermission was immediately counteracted by a resurgence of old hatreds against the Irish immigrants and their faith. Historians of the Irish ethnic experience and historians
of American Catholicism have consistently hailed Philips as a long overdue
legal commitment to their cultural equality in a frequently hostile nation.
C.

The 1950s Revival of Philips's Postcolonial Constitutional Theory of
Conscientious Exemptions: From Mullen to Smith

Also during this period, the nationwide codification of Philips's clergy
privilege accelerated. By the end of the 1950s, Mayor Clinton's recently re343
344
345
346
347
348

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
MYERS, supra note 20, at 118.
Id. at vii-viii.
Id. at viii.
Id.
Id. at 122.
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published opinion in Philips, the rule's influential 1828 New York codification, and a significant postcolonial Irish constitutional ruling by Judge Gavin
Duffy in Cook v. CarrolP49 all combined to produce a significant American
federal decision. In Mullen v. United States,350 without explicit reference to
the Free Exercise Clause, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit concluded that "[slound policy-reason and experience-concedes to religious liberty a rule of evidence that a clergyman shall
not disclose on a trial the secrets of a penitent's confidential confession to
him, at least absent the penitent's consent."'35 1 The court therefore ruled
in a Lutheran minister who raised no coninadmissible confidences reposed 352
scientious objection to testifying.
After noting Anglocentric jurisprudence that opposed the clergy principle, Judge Fahy recognized the subversive authority of the case that first
pressed the clergy privilege in the United States:
[A]s we have seen, the denial was never uniform or resolute, so
strong were the claims of reason in support of the privilege. In our
own time, with its climate of religious freedom, there remains no
barrier to adoption by the federal courts of a rule of evidence on
353
this subject dictated by sound policy.

Judge Fahy's words marked the first judicial recognition of Philips since the
forgotten Cronin decision a century before. The Mullen court also noted
later American dicta favoring the clergy privilege, including the comment of
Justice Field in Totten and a more recent endorsement of that view by
Learned Hand, an influential modern jurist. 354 Although First Amendment
principles seem implicit in his discussion, Judge Fahy never explicitly mentions the Constitution. The following year marked the historic election of
John F. Kennedy as the first Roman Catholic leader of the United States.
In 1963, the year of President Kennedy's assassination and exactly a century and a half after Philips,the United States Supreme Court recognized its
first free exercise exemption.35 5 Mayor Clinton's expansive postcolonial interpretation of free exercise of religion in Jeffersonian New York was implicitly honored by the federal high Court in Sherbert v. Verner, protecting the
unemployment benefits of a religious believer who refused to work on his
Sabbath. 356 As in Philips, even when enforcing general laws, Sherbert required the state to either grant a free exercise exemption to sincere religious
349 Cook v. Carroll, [1945] I.R. 515 (Ir. H. Ct.). This case and the acceptance of the priestpenitent privilege after the Second World War are both discussed in Walsh, Priest-PenitentPiivilege, supra note 2, at pt. V.
350 Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
351

Id. at 280.

352

Id.
Id. (citing 5

JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM
§§ 2394-96 (2d ed. 1923); People v. Daniel Philips & Wife, 1 W.L.J. 109 (1813)).
McMann v.
354 Id. at 278 (citing Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875) (Field, J.);
SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir.) (Hand, J.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937); United States v.
Keeney, 111 F. Supp. 233, 234 (D.D.C. 1953) (Holtzoff, J.), rev'd on other grounds, 218 F.2d 843
(D.C. Cir. 1954).
355 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
353
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356
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objectors or else prove some compelling interest in demanding civil obedience. 357 The test put forth in Sherbert became known as the "compelling
governmental interest" standard. In structure, although not in terminology,
the Sherbert Court's First Amendment principle replicated Mayor Clinton's
early postcolonial interpretation of the New York and federal constitutions
because it forced the state to justify its exercise of power. Yet, in adopting
the compelling governmental interest standard in Sherbert, the United States
Supreme Court did not advert to the 150 years of constitutional authority
represented by Philips. Indeed, the Sherbert Court failed to conduct any historical inquiry into the many conflicting decisions that had already confronted the issue of free exercise exemptions under state constitutions.
Justice Scalia's recent protestations in Flores notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has otherwise taken Philips'sclergy privilege for granted since
first endorsing it in 1875 in Totten. 358 Similarly, a century later, the Supreme
Court included an elaborate version of the clergy privilege along with eight
others submitted to Congress for approval. 359 During these 1970s debates a
decade after Sherbert, the clergy privilege announced in Philips in 1813 was
uniformly treated in contrast to other proposed privileges as "a long-recognized principle of American law."'360 Lawmakers insisted that evidentiary
privileges such as the priest-penitent exemption do not protect procedural
but rather substantive rights: The priest-penitent evidentiary privilege, for ex361
ample, acknowledges the fundamental human right of religious freedom.
The following year, in rejecting President Nixon's claim for an executive privilege, the Court noted that "generally, an attorney or a priest may not be
362
required to disclose what has been received in professional confidence.
In 1980, the Supreme Court described the clergy privilege as "rooted in the
imperative need for confidence and trust. The priest-penitent privilege recognizes the human need to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and absoor thoughts and to
lute confidence, what are believed to be flawed acts
'363
receive priestly consolation and guidance in return.
357

Id.

358

See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).

359 Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D.

183 (1973).
360 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 381 (3d Cir. 1990).
361

Id. at 380.

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 45 (1980). Apart from Flores, the only other
conflicting utterance came in the famous case protecting Jehovah's Witness children from a compelled flag salute. Ironically enough, it is contained in the concurrence of Justice Murphy-the
only Justice to decide that case on free exercise rather than free speech grounds, and moreover
the only Catholic on the Court. Justice Murphy wrote:
The right of freedom of thought and of religion guaranteed by the Constitution
against state action includes both the right to speak and the right to refrain from
speaking at all, except insofar as essential operations of government may require it
for the preservation of an orderly society-as in the case of compulsion to give
evidence in court.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring). It is
unclear whether Justice Murphy actually had the clergy privilege in mind. Because he was such a
staunch champion of civil liberties, that seems unlikely to Professor Eugene Gressman, who
362
363
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Ironically, the recent revival of Philips in American constitutional discourse took place just a few years before an intense historical controversy
broke out over the history of the American free exercise exemption. In her
important lead opinion in Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University
Law School v. Georgetown University, Judge Julia Cooper Mack discussed

Philips, the first free exercise case, in considering a Roman Catholic university's claim for a conscientious exemption
from the nation's first sexual orien364
tation antidiscrimination statute.
More typically, the 1960s Sherbert test languished through three decades
of increasingly reluctant enforcement that ultimately degenerated into pure
lip service in federal courts. Eventually putting an abrupt halt to Sherbert's
constitutional revival of free exercise exemptions, the Supreme Court did an
about-face on their constitutional legitimacy in Employment Division v.
Smith.365 There, the Rehnquist Court reviewed an Oregon case implicating
the right of Native Americans to use peyote, a hallucinogenic cactus out366
lawed by the state, which their religion attributes with spiritual qualities.
In an opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Supreme Court explicitly
reverted to a narrow construction of the Free Exercise Clause. 3 67 The Court
3 68
essentially jettisoned several of its own precedents, including Sherbert. It
denied the availability of free exercise exemptions from neutral civil obligations unless other constitutional rights were also threatened. 369 The Smith
decision largely relieved the government of any obligation to show a compelling governmental interest of greater weight than religious freedom.
D. After Smith: The Surprising Fin-de-Siecle Resurgence of Philips's
Postcolonial Constitutional Theory of Conscientious
Exemptions

Like its 1960s precursor Sherbert, Smith never adverted to the historical
record on free exercise exemptions. Without any briefing or argument on
this pivotal question, the Supreme Court's Smith decision unexpectedly
tacked sharply away from the postcolonial constitutional tradition of free exercise exemptions established in 1813 by Philips and endorsed a century and
a half later by Sherbert. Partly due to historiographical criticism, the Smith
decision provoked a storm of political controversy, culminating in a successful lobby led by such unlikely bedfellows as the American Civil Liberties
Union and the religious right. The consequence was Congress's passage of
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") in 1993,370 which put in
began his judicial clerkship with Justice Murphy only a few months after Barnette was decided
and continued working in his chambers until 1948. Personal conversation between author and
Professor Eugene Gressman (Spring 1997).
364 Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Sch. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1
(D.C. 1987) (en banc).
365 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
366 Id. at 876.
367

Id. at 876-79.

Id. at 884-85.
Id. at 881.
370 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000)).
368

369
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statutory form the religious exemptions doctrine found in the constitutional
tradition of Philips and Sherbert. Three years after371Smith, Congress passed
and President Bill Clinton signed RFRA into law.
RFRA granted religious believers a statutory right to free exercise exemptions from burdensome governmental laws. 372 Flouting Smith, Congress
enacted RFRA with the announced intent of reinstating the 1960s Sherbert
test for resolving conflicts between God and Caesar. 373 The statute directed
federal courts deciding free exercise conflicts to return to the compelling governmental interest standard, under which burdens on religious practice were
permissible only when essential to accomplish the most important secular
objectives. 374 That compelling interest test, adopted in Sherbert and then
codified in RFRA, stood as a modern extension of the postcolonial constitutional tradition of free exercise exemptions initiated almost two centuries ago
in Philips.

Most recently, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court rejected
RFRA, passed just four years earlier, as an unconstitutional usurpation of
power by Congress. 375 In Flores, a Catholic parish in Texas sought a free
exercise exemption from a local zoning ordinance that prevented the church
from expanding to meet the needs of its growing congregation. The church
invoked RFRA, adopted by Congress in an effort to override the Supreme
Court's politically controversial ruling in Smith. 376 The 6-3 Flores majority,
led by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg, avoided discussing the historical integrity of Smith's peremptory rejection of free exercise exemptions. Instead,
the FloresCourt concluded that "RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary
to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance," and thus exceeded Congress's Fourteenth Amendment power to enforce religious
freedom.

377

Thus, in 1813, Philips originated the constitutional principle of religious
exemptions; in 1963, Sherbert adopted that same principle in federal law; and
in the 1990s, in quick succession, Smith nullified Sherbert, RFRA nullified
Smith, and Flores nullified RFRA. Amidst their various rhetorical conflicts,
four members of the United States Supreme Court-Justices Scalia,
O'Connor, Breyer, and Souter-treat the historical sources as critical evidence (the remaining five justices did not address this issue). The Flores dissent, written by Justice O'Connor and joined by Justice Breyer and in its
historical methodology by Justice Souter, argued vigorously that Justice
Scalia's Smith decision flew in the face of both precedent and history. It betrayed the American constitutional tradition of religious freedom and Flores
only compounded the error. "I believe that, in light of both our precedent
and our Nation's tradition of religious liberty, Smith is demonstrably wrong,"
Id.
372 See id.
373 See id.
374 See id.
375 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534-36 (1997).
376 Id. at 511-12.
377 Id. at 536.
371
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wrote Justice O'Connor. 378 Rather, the Free Exercise Clause "is best understood as an affirmative guarantee of the right to participate in religious practices and conduct without impermissible governmental interference, even
'379
when such conduct conflicts with a neutral, generally applicable law.
Justice Souter agrees with Justices O'Connor and Breyer that a close
reading of the origins is crucial to the proper understanding of the Free Exercise Clause, but he is waiting for full historical briefing and argument before
committing himself. "I have serious doubts about the precedential value of
the Smith rule and its entitlement to adherence," wrote Justice Souter in Flores.380 "These doubts are intensified today by the historical arguments going
to the original understanding of the Free Exercise Clause presented in Justice
O'Connor's dissent.., which raises very substantial issues about the sound381
ness of the Smith rule."
Justice Scalia, the author of Smith, responded directly to the dissent's
historical argument for the free exercise exemption. According to Justice
Scalia, the "most telling point" in Justice O'Connor's extended discussion of
the historical record surrounding the ratification debates is her failure to cite
any antebellum constitutional decision actually granting a conscientious exemption from a generally applicable law. 382 Justice Scalia's reasoning locates
Mayor Clinton's 1813 opinion at the historical center of this vital debate. Justice Scalia duly acknowledges Philips as the strongest such precedent, but
quickly brushes it aside as a "lone case" from a "minor court" that provides
"weak authority" for the claim that constitutional free exercise exemptions
were required before the mid-nineteenth century. 383 Justice Scalia denied
that Philips announced any valid jurisprudential tradition of constitutional
free exercise exemptions. 384 To the contrary, insists Justice Scalia in his Flores concurrence, the historical evidence concerning free exercise exemptions
"is not compatible with any theory I am familiar with that has been proposed
'385
as an alternative to Smith.
Thus, after Flores, at least four members of the current Supreme Court
describe the hotly contested constitutional history of the free exercise exemption as pivotal. We must assume that this controversy in early constitutional
historiography will continue to bedevil the Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence with what Justice Souter terms an "'intolerable tension.' ",386 In
this Hibernocentric Essay in postcolonial jurisprudence, I endeavor to show
that Justice Scalia entirely misapprehends the historical significance of
Philips and its enduring jurisprudential influence. Without such serious historical study, the Supreme Court cannot justly resolve its deep divisions over
Id. at 548 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 546.
380 Id. at 565 (Souter, J., dissenting).
381 Id.
382 Id. at 542 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
383 Id. at 543.
384 Id. at 544.
385 Id.
386 Id. at 566 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting his own concurrence in Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 564-77 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring)).
378
379
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the constitutional religious exemption. As the earliest free exercise exemption, and in light of recent judicial and legislative controversy over the origins
of this doctrine, Philips generates political and constitutional repercussions
even today.
The radical constitutional equality principle of free exercise exemptions
was indeed the Hibernocentric postcolonial doctrinal legacy of Philips, Justice Scalia's protestations notwithstanding. Mayor Clinton's opinion was not
merely the first constitutional victory for free exercise of religion, Philips also
adopted an expansive interpretation of religious liberty, thus making it also
the earliest instance of a judicially approved conscientious exemption from a
generally applicable law. Under the Philips principle of constitutional interpretation, the state must do more than simply refrain from targeting religious
practices. Government must affirmatively accommodate believers by going
so far as to grant conscientious exemptions from burdensome laws, even
those with purely secular motives. Put differently, under Philips,-religious
practices may not be regulated unless the state satisfies its burden of proving
some particularly pressing social interest that outweighs religious freedom.
Like Sherbert, the burden of proof lies upon the state and an exacting standard must be met. Philips thus stands as the constitutional forebear of Sherbert and RFRA and as the historical antithesis of Smith and Flores. In a
democratic republic, as opposed to a hierarchical monarchy, Philips insists
that in matters of cultural equality, government must constantly be constitutionally accountable to its citizens.
In the 1990s, after Smith but prior to Flores,several modern courts relied
heavily on Philips in recognizing that the postcolonial constitutional foundation of the clergy privilege requires an exemption from the usual civic duty to
testify under oath. The first such case to rely on Philips was Simpson v. Tennant, which the Texas Court of Appeals approached as a question of statutory
interpretation. 387 On facts identical to Philips, the court ruled that the clergy
privilege protects not just the content of secret communications, but also the
identity of their bearer.3 8 8 Justice Cannon explicitly relied on Father
Kohlmann's early refusal to name the penitent who brought him stolen jewelry, which Father Kohlmann then passed on to the police. Nevertheless, in
Simpson, Justice Cannon made no direct reference to constitutional
389
provisions.
Just a couple of weeks after Simpson, in holding that a broad clergy privilege protects nonpenitential spiritual communications within the Church of
Latter Day Saints, the Utah Supreme Court directly recognized the constitutional footing of the clergy privilege. 390 In Scott v. Hammock, the Utah Supreme Court summarized the postcolonial history of the privilege, carefully
identifying Philips as the source of "the principle that compelling a priest to
breach the confidentiality of the confessional would violate the constitutional
387 Simpson v. Tennant, 871 S.W.2d 301, 310 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994). This case is also discussed in Walsh, Priest-PenitentPrivilege,supra note 2, at pt. V.
388 Tennant, 871 S.W.2d at 312.
389 Id.
390 Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947, 951-54 (Utah 1994). This case is also discussed in
Walsh, Priest-PenitentPrivilege,supra note 2, at pt. V.
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right to the free exercise of religion."'391 Accordingly, the Scott court announced that the free exercise guarantees of both the Utah State constitution
and the First Amendment require a broad evidentiary privilege so as to protect "the essential religious role clergy play in dealing with the wrongdoing of
parishioners. ' 392 These "[c]onstitutional considerations" therefore buttressed an expansive reading of the Utah statute to protect confidential spiritual communications. 393 The Utah Supreme Court simply ignored Smith, in
which the federal Supreme Court had recently rejected the constitutional
394
doctrine of free exercise exemptions first recognized in Philips.
Similarly, in Connecticut, a trial court spontaneously read Philips as
standing for a postcolonial constitutional free exercise privilege exempting
clergy from their civil obligation to testify.395 In Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., the court relied on the constitutional theory
laid out in Philipsto stretch the Connecticut clergy privilege beyond its previous statutory and common law limits. 396 Constitutional concerns buttressed
the court's extension of state law out of respect for the historic American
tradition of religious liberty. 397 "[H]ere, unlike England," wrote Judge Levin,
"we enjoy written constitutions," quoting both the Connecticut and federal
free exercise guarantees. "While these constitutional provisions are not directly dispositive of the issue before the court, which is not claimed to be of
constitutional dimension, neither can judges in divining the common law be
blind to constitutional mandates which politically and otherwise continue to
' 398
define us as a people.
In Virginia, too, the fin-de-siecle Court of Appeals recently followed
Philips in accepting the idea of a constitutionally required conscientious exemption for the clergy privilege. 399 In Nestle v. Commonwealth, the court

recounted the postcolonial historical development of the privilege, describing
Philips as "relying upon the priest's freedom of religion as guaranteed by
New York's constitution." 400 The Virginia Court of Appeals relied heavily on
Philips for its constitutional premises, noting what the American court considered a scholarly consensus that the priest-penitent privilege is not part of
England's common law legacy, and is not recognized there today.40 1 "The
priest-penitent privilege has fared much better in the United States," the
Nestle court continued, where it was first recognized in Philips on constitu391
392

Scott, 870 P.2d at 952.
Id. at 954.

Id.
See id. at 953-54.
395 Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. CV 93-302072, 1995 WL
348181 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 31, 1995) (unpublished opinion). This case is also discussed in
Walsh, Priest-PenitentPrivilege,supra note 2, at pt. V.
396 Rosado, 1995 WL 348181, at *11-12.
397 Id. at *13.
393
394

398

Id.

Nestle v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 133, 137 (Va. Ct. App. 1996). This case is also
discussed in Walsh, Priest-PenitentPrivilege, supra note 2, at pt. V.
400 Nestle, 470 S.E.2d at 137.
399

401
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tional free exercise grounds. and later codified nationwide. 42 Ironically, the
Nestle court was apparently unaware that binding but obscure antebellum
Virginia case law had already reached similar conclusions almost a century
Cronin (1855), Judge Meredith followed Philips almost
and a half earlier-in
40 3
word for word!
Five months before the Supreme Court decided Flores, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed Philips in concluding
that the clergy privilege is constitutionally required as a conscientious exemption by the federal Free Exercise Clause and sometimes also by the Fourth
Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. 4°4 In
Mockaitis v. Harcleroad,a zealous Oregon prosecutor had secretly taped a
prisoner's jailhouse spiritual confession to his Catholic minister. 40 5 "No question exists that [the prosecution] has substantially burdened Father Mockaitis's exercise of religion as understood in the First Amendment," wrote
Judge Noonan. 40 6 "When the prosecutor asserts the right to tape the sacrament he not only intrudes upon the confession taped but threatens the security of any participation in the sacrament by penitents in the jail; he invades
their free exercise of religion," Judge Noonan reasoned, "and doing so makes
it impossible for Father Mockaitis to minister the sacrament to those who
seek it in the jail.

' 407

Like the other recent constitutional decisions, Judge Noonan relied
heavily for historical support on Mayor Clinton's postcolonial opinion in
Philips.40 8 Judge Noonan said that the nation's history has shown a uniform
respect for sacramental confession as inviolable by law enforcement. 4°9 "The
first known case in the United States to consider such an attempt is famous
for the court's rejection of the invasion and for the court's reason for its rejection. '410 In Mockaitis, Judge Noonan quoted at considerable length from
the Philips opinion authored by De Witt Clinton, whom he described as "a
noted statesman and astute analyst of the spirit of the new republic." 411 Like
the other courts that have confronted this issue, Judge Noonan then summarized the history of the postcolonial priest-penitent privilege, including its
codification and its apparent adoption by the Supreme Court.412 The court
was unable to find any American case in which a court approved state invasion of the Catholic rite of confession. Moreover, applying the Fourth
Amendment, Father Mockaitis reasonably relied on "the nation's history of
Id.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cronin, 1 Q.L.J. 128, 137 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1855) (nearly identical language); SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION, supra note 2, at 26 (as discussed supra note 274
and accompanying text).
404 Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522, 1530 (9th Cir. 1997). This case is also discussed
in Walsh, Priest-PenitentPrivilege, supra note 2, at pt. V.
405 Mockaitis, 104 F.3d at 1525.
406 Id. at 1530.
407 Id.
408 See id. at 1532.
409 Id.
410 Id.
411 Id.
412 Id.
402
403
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respect for religion in general and respect for the sanctity of the secrets 413
of
privacy.
of
expectation
reasonable
a
had
so
and
particular,
in
confession
Most recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recounted the constitutional origins of the postcolonial religious exemption established by Philips.414 For slitting the throats of a New York couple
asleep in their bedroom, Paul Cox was convicted of murder, which was mitigated to manslaughter because he acted in a state of extreme emotional disturbance, and sentenced to a lengthy prison term. 415 His conviction closed a
brutal unsolved crime that had baffled police investigators for several years.
It emerged that in a drunken haze, Cox had broken into his childhood home
and slaughtered the current residents, perhaps out of rage against his own
parents. 416 This truth came to light only after Cox subsequently joined Alcoholics Anonymous ("A.A."), whose twelve-step program requires that all
members make "a searching and fearless moral inventory of [them]selves"
and "admit[ ] to God, to [themiselves, and to another human being the exact
nature of [their] wrongs. ' 417 On separate occasions, Cox confessed his crime
to at least seven fellow A.A. members, one of whom, on the advice of her
psychiatrist, contacted the police. 4 18 The police then spoke to the other
group members who confirmed these various grisly confessions, apparently
without protest.419 Based on this new information, the police arrested Cox
and matched his palm print with that found at the crime scene almost five
years earlier. 420 Cox's pretrial motions to suppress these A.A. statements
failed, as did his objections to their use in evidence at trial. 421 After a hung
jury, a second trial, and an unsuccessful appeal, Cox sought federal habeas
corpus relief from his convictions, arguing that New York state's refusal to
extend its priest-penitent privilege so as to exclude these several confessions
to his fellow A.A. members amounted to an unconstitutional violation of the
federal Establishment Clause, because it favoured traditional over nontradi422
tional forms of religious practice.
Citing Philips, Judge Sack noted that "[t]he emergence of a cleric-congregant privilege in New York antedates its adoption of the privilege by statute in 1828. '' 423 The Second Circuit noted that "[n]otwithstanding the
'general rule, that every man when legally called upon to testify as a witness,
must relate all he knows,"' the Philips court had reasoned that because of its
constitutional magnitude, the issue "must not be solely decided by the maxims of the common law, but by the principles of our government. ' 42 4 The

414

Id. at 1533.
Cox v. Miller, 296 F.3d 89, 91, 94-95 & n.5 (2d Cir. 2002).

415

Id. at 91.

413

Id.
Id. at 94 n.5 (discussing steps four and five of the A.A. twelve-step program) (quotations omitted).
416
417
418

419
420
421
422
423
424

Id. at 94-96.
See id.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 96-97.
Id. at 91-98.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 103.
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Cox court quoted Mayor Clinton's warning that "[rieligion is an affair between God and man, and not between man and man .... Established reli-

gions, deriving their authority from man, oppressing other denominations,
prescribing creeds of orthodoxy and punishing non-conformity, are repugnant to the first principles of civil and political liberty. ' 425 The federal court
recalled the Philips holding, invoking the free exercise clause of the New
York State Constitution, that permitting Kohlmann to invoke the cleric-con426
gregant privilege was "essential to the free exercise of [his] religion.
Even so, the Second Circuit found it unnecessary to confront the exemptions issue on its habeas corpus review: "This argument misconceives the potential constitutional question presented here. The issue is not whether the
First Amendment mandates a cleric-congregant privilege. Cox does not
make that argument. '427 Rather, wrote Judge Sack:
The issue is whether, assuming that A.A. must be treated as a "religion" in this context and in light of the New York legislature's
choice to enact a cleric-congregant privilege, courts may, under the
Establishment Clause, interpret the privilege to extend to some religions but not to A.A. Cox claims, in other words, that New York's
privilege officially discriminates against the "religion" of A.A. 428
In the end, even this constitutional issue the court found unnecessary to resolve. It concluded that Cox's particular statements to his fellow A.A. members were simply outside the scope of the New York privilege because they
were not "made in confidence and for the purpose of obtaining spiritual guidance. '429 Instead, wrote the court, "Cox spoke with other A.A. members
primarily to unburden himself, to seek empathy and emotional support, and
perhaps in some instances to seek practical guidance (e.g., legal advice). 43 °
Smith and Flores not withstanding, Philips's increasing influence as the
earliest judicial application of the conscientious exemptions principle moves
the constitutional foundation of the clergy privilege back to its original place
as the very center of the historiographical controversy over the constitutional
limits of religious freedom in America. In the specific context of Philips's
postcolonial clergy privilege, the underlying constitutional issue is forced by
such incidents as the notorious episode surrounding the secret taping of Father Mockaitis's jailhouse ministry, and also by the proliferating state statutes
that legally oblige professionals-often including priests-to report suspected child abuse to authorities. One wonders what Justice Scalia would do
tomorrow if confronted with the constitutionality of the clergy privilege.
Would he decide Philips differently?
Justice Scalia rejects the Philips postcolonial jurisprudential tradition of
free exercise exemptions against the overwhelming weight of both antebellum and modem constitutional thinking. Since it was decided in New York
425
426
427
428
429
430

Id. (quotation omitted).
Id. (quotation omitted).
Id. at 101.
Id.
Id. at 111.
Id.
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City in 1813 as the first constitutional victory for religious freedom, Philips
has been cited as judicial precedent in a baker's dozen cases, four before the
Civil War, and another nine since the Second World War, including a halfdozen decisions between Smith and Flores during the turbulent 1990s. As we
have seen, in all but two of those thirteen cases, Philips's constitutional exemptions doctrine has not been questioned. The only exceptions are Justice
Gibson's 1833 opinion in Gratz, and Justice Scalia's 1997 concurrence in Flores, both predicated on the democratic sanctity of majority rule. The extraordinary shelf life of Philips now approaches two centuries, an enduring
record of expanding judicial and political influence that can be matched by
only a few historic Supreme Court opinions. This enthusiastic judicial reception suggests that the constitutional modern anomaly is not Philips, but
rather the constitutional theory of Justice Scalia himself.
VI.

The Current HistoriographicalDebate over the Constitutional
Significance of Philips

Over the past decade or so, constitutional historians have vigorously debated the very problem considered by Justice Scalia and several other members of the Supreme Court: the constitutional origins of the free exercise
exemption, including the historical significance of Philips. Their conclusions
range along a spectrum from those histories most sympathetic to religious
exemptions, to those histories most hostile-from arguing that constitutional
exemptions were intended by the original framers of the First Amendment,
to arguing that the conscientious exemption has never actually existed.
These constitutional historians have employed several distinct methodologies to reach their conflicting conclusions. In the Supreme Court, the Flores
dissent rested upon the apparent acceptance by Justices O'Connor, Breyer,
and Souter of Professor Michael McConnell's historical arguments in favor of
religious exemptions during the framing period over the rival claims of Professor Philip Hamburger. On the other hand, Justice Scalia's concurrence in
that case rested heavily upon his interpretation of later constitutional precedent including Philips,the issue directly addressed by Professors Kurt Lash,
Mark Tushnet, Gerard Bradley, and myself.
These several distinct methodologies and conclusions on the history of
the free exercise exemption might be summarized as follows:
1. McConnell. Relying primarily upon original constitutional intent, but also discussing later judicial precedent, Michael McConnell makes a historical case tracing the free exercise
exemption back to the framing period; Professor McConnell
identifies Philips as the earliest judicial recognition of that
431
principle.
2. Hamburger. Working only from eighteenth-century materials,
Philip Hamburger breaks a lance with Professor McConnell and
concludes that the framers did not contemplate religious ex431 See McConnell, Origins and HistoricalUnderstanding,supra note 3. For scholarly writings on both sides of the exemptions debate, see supra note 38.
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emptions; Professor Hamburger describes Philips as "interesting," but does not discuss it or any later constitutional
432
developments.
3. Walsh. In this Article, I do not offer any historical conclusion
regarding original constitutional intent, but I do identify and
trace a distinct and continuous postcolonial constitutional tradition of free exercise exemptions that began with the powerful
433
Philips precedent in 1813.
4. Lash. Kurt Lash agrees with Professor Hamburger that original
constitutional intent did not contemplate free exercise exemptions, but Professor Lash then goes on to argue that the passage
of the Fourteenth Amendment radically altered the meaning of
the Free Exercise Clause, introducing the conscientious exemption into federal constitutional law after Reconstruction; Professor Lash acknowledges Philips as the leading antebellum
precedent in favor of constitutional exemptions, but discards it
434
as an antebellum constitutional anomaly.
5. Tushnet. Despite the 1960s fuss over Sherbert, Mark Tushnet is
skeptical that free exercise exemptions have ever been anything
more than empty judicial rhetoric; Professor Tushnet does acknowledge Philipsas an early judicial recognition of the exemptions doctrine, but like Professor Lash he treats that decision as
435
a constitutional aberration.
6. Bradley. Historiographically, by far the most hostile to religious
exemptions is Gerard Bradley, who adamantly claims that no
constitutional tradition of free exercise exemptions ever existed
prior to Sherbert; notably, Professor Bradley is the only academic commentator to deny that Philips ever recognized a true
436
free exercise exemption.
Of these several scholars, Professor Gerard Bradley of Notre Dame Law
School is the most violently committed to the suppression of Philips-it is
from Professor Bradley's writing that Justice Scalia's extremist constitutional
historiography is directly drawn.
Professor Bradley's strong influence on Justice Scalia's Flores concurrence is plain, albeit unattributed. Just as Justice Scalia slights as "most telling" the eighteenth-century sources relied on by Justice O'Connor and her
fellow dissenters, 437 Professor Bradley suggests that his fellow constitutional
historians should have spent less time on the legal, political and religious
thought and practice of the colonies, and more on the early constitutional
decisions. 438 Passing over ambiguous influences on the framers, Professor
Bradley identifies "the dispositive body of evidence: antebellum judicial in432
433
434
435
436
437
438

See Hamburger, supra note 8.
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See Lash, supra note 6.
See Tushnet, supra note 5.
See Bradley, supra note 4.
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terpretation, both state and federal of constitutional guarantees of the free
exercise of religion. ' 439 Proposing the thrust of Justice Scalia's concurrence
in Flores, Professor Bradley's historiographical test is a simple one: "'The
'conduct exemption' exists only to the extent that there are cases instantiating it," he declares. 440 "By that I mean, at least, judicial holdings clearly
stating a willingness, as a matter of Free Exercise command, to exempt a
believer from an otherwise valid and neutral law. For more than minimum
evidentiary value, I mean a holding in favor of such a believer."' 441
Philips, anybody? Professor McConnell thinks so. He opens his influential article The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Re-

ligion by identifying Philips as the earliest judicial recognition of a
constitutionally required free exercise exemption from a law of generally
neutral application. 442 To Professor McConnell, Philips "squarely adopted
the exemptions interpretation," making it an early forebear of the Warren
Court's Sherbert decision. 443 The historical significance of Mayor Clinton's
decision in Philips is hotly denied by Professor Bradley44 4 and, to lesser extents, by Justice Scalia, 445 and Professors Tushnet, 44 6 Lash, 447 and
Hamburger. 44 8 Since Flores, this historical controversy swirling around
Philips has gained new political and jurisprudential significance.
After reviewing several early cases-although overlooking Farnandis
and Cronin-Professor McConnell concludes:
The history subsequent to adoption of the first amendment is inconclusive but tends to point against exemptions. One lower court in
New York [Philips] squarely adopted the exemptions interpretation,
and the supreme courts of Pennsylvania [Gratz] and South Carolina
[Willson] rejected it. None of these decisions was handed down
within twenty years of the first amendment, and they are therefore
weak indicators of the original understanding. The Pennsylvania
holding [Gratz] is entitled to especially little weight since it was connected to a rejection of constitutional judicial review in general. Indeed the contrast between the rationale of Chief Justice Gibson for
the Pennsylvania court and the rationales offered by Madison for
religious liberty tends, if anything, to reinforce the conclusion that
Madison's position requires exemptions. 44 9
Id.
Id. at 272; see Flores, 521 U.S. at 537 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
441 Bradley, supra note 4, at 265.
442 McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding,supra note 3, at 1410-12, 1504-05,
1513; see also McConnell, A Critique, supra note 3; McConnell, Free Exercise supra note 3; McConnell, Institutionsand Interpretation,supra note 3; McConnell, Singling Out, supra note 3. See
generally Gutmann, supra note 7.
443 McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding,supra note 3, at 1410-12.
444 Bradley, supra note 4, at 284, 289-92.
445 Flores, 521 U.S. at 537 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
446 Tushnet, supra note 5, at 124-25, 127.
447 Lash, supra note 6.
448 Hamburger, supra note 8, at 917 n.8.
449 McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding,supra note 3, at 1513.
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Both Professor Bradley and Professor Tushnet accuse McConnell of drawing
unsupported interpretations from the mass of historical evidence.
Professor Tushnet suggests that Professor McConnell might have closed
his discussion of the antebellum free exercise cases with the following alternative conclusion:
The evidence is compatible with the following interpretation: every
appellate court that considered the question in the decades after the
adoption of the First Amendment rejected the argument that the
principle of free exercise required that religious believers be exempted from compliance with generally applicable statutes. One
unreported [!] decision of a New York trial court [Philips] supports
exemptions, but that decision survives only because one of the lawyers in the case [Sampson] distributed the decision in pamphlet
form [The Catholic Question in America]; there is no reason to be-

lieve that the opinion or pamphlet reflected anything more than one
judge's views. Perhaps the understanding of the free exercise principle changed in the decades after 1791, but the religious history of
this country does not suggest that such a transformation occurred.
Thus, taken as a whole, the evidence of postadoption interpretation
strongly suggests that the free exercise principle does not require
the government to exempt religious believers from generally appli450
cable laws.
Just as it is to Justice Scalia in Flores,the marginalization of Philips is central
to Professor Tushnet's conclusion.
After reviewing additional cases, I suggest that a fair historical description of the postcolonial judicial precedents might instead be this:
In 1813, the free exercise exemption was recognized in American
constitutional thought by Philips, and a decade later that decision
was honored in its influential 1828 legislative codification by New
York State. Of the four antebellum courts that considered Philips,
all but one approved it. In New York and Virginia, the Philips doctrine of constitutionally required religious exemptions prevailed
without question, and was endorsed in Philips,People v. Smith, and
Cronin. In South Carolina, the Court of Appeals embraced the
Philips exemptions doctrine in Farnandis, apparently overruling a
flat rejection of the notion of conscientious exemptions just a few
years earlier by its predecessor court in Willson. In Gratz, Pennsylvania was the only antebellum court that rejected Philips, and
other decisions including Wolf, Lesher, and Specht contain some
hints of ambivalence in that court's rejection of conscientious exemptions. In Massachusetts, California, and other states, judicial
precedent on the issue was scant and ambiguous. Elsewhere
through the nineteenth century the constitutional question simply
did not arise, since Philips was brought as a surprisingly prescient
450

Tushnet, supra note 5, at 125.
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constitutional test case long before the modern emergence of cause
lawyering and group impact litigation.
Thus described, Philips assumes considerable historic importance.
Because it so radically challenges his no-exemptions historical theory,
the marginalization-even obliteration-of Philips is essential to Justice
Scalia's muse, Professor Bradley. Bradley maintains that "McConnell's historical methodology is perverse. Within its own terms, his analysis is frequently arbitrary and his conclusions are quite overdrawn. ' 451 The linchpin
of Bradley's argument is that the conduct exemption was not born until Sherbert.452 He says that "[w]e had judicial review from the beginning, but conduct exemptions started in the late twentieth century. '453 According to
Bradley, "Smith rightly jettisoned the conduct exemption because it is manifestly contrary to the plain meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, historically
recovered and with 150 years of precedent up to Sherbert.'' 454 But given his
own declared methodology-"[t]here is one sure way to find out who is
right-go to the cases" 455-Bradley must still get past Philips.
Professor Bradley works himself into a frenzy over McConnell's heavy
reliance on Philips as the earliest free exercise exemption. He is apparently
incensed that McConnell dares even to discuss it:
McConnell's handling of Phillips is as arbitrary as his treatment of
the Pennsylvania cases. Perhaps most arbitrary is his decision to
discuss Phillips at all, much more to feature it. Its precedential
value was nil. Decided by a municipal trial court (even if presided
over by a major political figure), distinguished and limited by the
same court just four years later, mooted and surpassed by legislation
out for
some one and one half decades after that, it was singled
456
repudiation by Gibson in [Simon's Executors] v. Gratz.
While Justice Scalia and Professors Lash and Tushnet all push Philips off to
the margins, Professor Bradley must suppress it completely.
This dismissive historical appraisal of Philips by Justice Scalia and his
academic allies is unpersuasive. Professor Bradley boldly but wrongly claims
that the "precedential value" of the first free exercise case was "nil, '457 and
elsewhere he maintains that Philips was "judicially stillborn" (little wonder,
he adds, given the widespread hostility to Catholics). 4 8 Making an oft-repeated error, Professor Tushnet wrongly disparages Philips's historic significance as an "unreported" decision because it was published privately by
Sampson as The Catholic Question in America, rather than in any "official"
volume. 459 He sees "no reason to believe that the [decision] reflected anything more than one judge's views" (even though Philips was a major group
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test case decided by a four-judge bench!). 460 More generously, Professor
Lash reports that "[t]here was one contemporary example of a true religious
461
exemption.... Philips, however, appears to be unique.
As we have seen, the historical record of Philips'senduring and growing
influence tells an entirely different story. 462 For a start, the New York City
Court of General Sessions, which unlike modern municipal courts had plenary jurisdiction over criminal trials, did not distinguish and limit Philips four
years later. Professor Bradley evidently refers to People v. Smith, in which
Staten Island's Court of Oyer and Terminer actually accepted the vitality of
Philips without reservation. 463 That court merely declined to extend the reasoning of Philips even further to keep off the witness stand a Protestant clergyman who raised no conscientious objection to testifying.4 64 Counsel on
both sides similarly accepted the constitutional mandate of Philips.4 65 Judging from the prisoner's acquittal, the jury, which was expressly empowered to
determine law, may even have favored the extension of Philips to the less
466
compelling facts before them.
People v. Smith aside, as we have seen, Philips was relied on in two of
the three remaining successful antebellum free exercise cases. Chancellor
Desaussure's warm endorsement of it in Farnandis was approved by South
Carolina's highest court. 467 The bulk of the Virginian Judge Meredith's opinion in Cronin essentially plagiarized Philips.468 Bradley, Tushnet, and Lash
are apparently unaware of Farnandisand Cronin, as is their adversary McConnell. Bradley notes that in Gratz Chief Justice Gibson "repudiated"
Philips, but fails to acknowledge his disapproval was actually unique among
the four antebellum courts we know to have squarely considered Mayor Clinton's analysis. Soon after the Civil War, Philips's early nineteenth century
clergy privilege was recognized by the United States Supreme Court. 469 As
we have seen, since the Second World War, Philips has enjoyed a remarkable
renaissance as judicial precedent, being cited nine times. Within the past decade alone, Philips has been invoked as "telling" authority in a half-dozen finde-siecle cases, including Flores.470 We have seen that just as Chief Justice
460

Id.
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Lash, supra note 6, at 1125 n.77.

SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION, supra note 2, at 8 (noting that the court included
Mayor De Witt Clinton, Recorder Ogden Hoffman-" [w]ho, on account of the importance of
the case, took his seat on the bench"-along with Aldermen Isaac S. Douglas and Richard
Cunningham).
463 People v. Smith (N.Y. Oyer & Terminer 1817), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS,
supra note 23, at 779. This case is discussed further in Walsh, Priest-PenitentPrivilege,supra note
2, at pt. II.
464 People v. Smith, 1 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS at 783.
465 Id.
466 Id. at 788.
467 Farnandis v. Henderson, 1 C.L.J. 202 (Union Dist. S.C. 1827).
468 See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
469 Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875) (Field, J.).
470 Simpson v. Tennant, 871 S.W.2d 301, 312 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); Scott v. Hammock, 870
P.2d 947, 951-52 (Utah 1994); see also Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 280 (D.C. Cir.
1959); Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Sch. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1
(D.C. 1987) (en banc).
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Gibson was isolated among antebellum jurists in rejecting the Philips doctrine, Justice Scalia writing separately is alone among modern courts-which
have otherwise uniformly followed that early American postcolonial precedent. Over the course of two centuries, with the conspicuous antebellum exception of Chief Justice Gibson in Gratz and the conspicuous modern
exception of Justice Scalia in Flores, Philips has been approved in each of the
baker's dozen cases which have considered it. No more than a handful of
Supreme Court opinions can claim such an enduring precedenUnited States471
life.
tial shelf
Moreover, Philips was not mooted and surpassed by legislation a decade
and a half later. By Bradley's own admission, "[t]he legislature codified the
priest-penitent privilege in 1828, and expanded it by prohibiting this kind of
testimony even from clerics willing to give it."'472 The statutory revisers who
codified Philips reported that Mayor Clinton's opinion had received "'gen473 The New York legislature agreed with
eral approbation in this country.' ,,
their recommendation that its rule was "too important" to be left to judicial
interpretation. 474 That codification ultimately swept through the United
States-since 1828, the legislators of all fifty states have followed New York
in codifying Philips's clergy privilege-and the New York priest-penitent
statute was even influential overseas. Today, the explicit protection of the
priest-penitent privilege in every state of the union is attributable475to Philips,
either directly, or through its influential New York codification.
Legal scholars too have almost unanimously applauded Mayor Clinton's
reasoning. Antebellum writers such as Timothy Walker and John Anthon
have been joined by a host of sympathetic commentators since the Second
World War. Anson Phelps Stokes, author of a major three-volume work on
church and state since colonial times, ranks Philips among the most significant judicial decisions in American religious history. 476 He includes it together with a mere handful of United States Supreme Court cases as a state
court decision which was "so conclusive that [ithas] never been questioned. '477 In short, Philips was very much a live birth, and its precedential
value has been far from "nil."
Even this impressive array of judicial, legislative, and scholarly support
fails to capture the true significance of successful impact litigation. Tushnet's
doubt that Philips "reflected anything more than one judge's views" is especially surprising in light of his own pioneering research into the NAACP's
471 For more detail and discussion of the rise of Philips from an evidentiary perspective see
Walsh, Priest-PenitentPrivilege, supra note 2.
472 Bradley, supra note 4, at 292.
473 Edward J. McGuire, William Sampson, in 15 AM. IRISH HIST. Soc'Y 342, 343 (1916)
(quoting report of the committee for the revision of the statutes of New York by John Duer,
Benjamin F. Butler, and John C. Spencer).
474 Id.
475 For more detail and discussion on the rise of the postcolonial clergy privilege, see
Walsh, Priest-PenitentPrivilege, supra note 2, at pts. II-V.
476 3 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 452 (1950).
477 Id. For other nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholarly endorsements, see Walsh,
Priest-PenitentPrivilege, supra note 2, at pt. V.
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478
impact litigation strategy on behalf of oppressed African-Americans.
Philips was an astonishingly early cause lawyering triumph for American
postcolonial equality jurisprudence. As a winning test case, Mayor Clinton's
opinion reflected the egalitarian, democratic, and republican values of New
479
York City's 15,000 strong, largely Irish, immigrant Catholic community.
The Philips opinion explicitly adapted into a new American equality jurisprudence William Sampson's postcolonial historiography and radical political
ideology. It is essential to remember that this Irish Protestant advocate had
been imprisoned, disbarred, and banished by act of attainder for defending
the religious and ethnic equality of his Catholic compatriots. The United
Irishmen's antisectarian, republican, and democratic political ideology had
inspired a popular uprising against discriminatory colonial laws repressing
the indigenous majority, put down at an estimated cost of 30,000 lives. 480
We should not so lightly dismiss the collective willingness to die for the
United Irish political ideology that Sampson expressed as convincing constitutional rhetoric in a postcolonial American courtroom. For the United
States, the 1798 Rebellion meant the onset of mass Irish immigration and a
sharp escalation in this nation's religious and cultural diversity. 481 To New
York's early Irish Catholic refugees, their banished Protestant advocate,
Sampson, was a living symbol of antisectarian political resistance against colonial ethnic and religious discrimination. With his dissident background, it
was certainly no accident that William Sampson emerged in the republican
United States as its first known cause lawyer and radical legal critic.
In New York City's emerging ethnic politics, De Witt Clinton's powerful
judicial ruling bound him still closer to this Irish immigrant community. Two
years after Philips, when Mayor Clinton left office soon after word of the
Treaty of Ghent reached American shores in 1815, naturalized Irishmen convened a meeting at the Mechanic Hall to express their gratitude to him. To
prepare an address, they appointed a committee that included the Catholic
attorney Dennis McCarthy, secretary of the St. Peter's board of trustees that
litigated Philips as an historic constitutional test case; the banished United
Irish Protestant advocate Thomas Addis Emmet; the banished United Irish
Catholic physician William James MacNeven; and Charles Christian, an Irish
republican justice of the peace.
For St. Patrick's Day, the New York Irish republicans' crowded meeting
adopted their eloquent address to Mayor Clinton. 482 The address began by
saying that upon his retreat from office, the Irish wanted to acknowledge
"the benefits they had received from Mayor Clinton's upright and able administration," and their "deep sense of his manifold and important services

478
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1925-1950 (1987).
See Walsh, Religion, Ethnicity, and History, supra note 17, at 51.
480 See id.; see also MILLER, supra note 49, at 185. For a more detailed discussion of the
uprising, see supra Part II.
481 Walsh, Religion, Ethnicity, and History, supra note 17, at 51.
482 Thomas Addis Emmet, Dennis McCarthy, William James MacNeven & Charles Christian, Address of the Irish Republicans of New York City to Mayor De Witt Clinton, on the
Occasion of his Leaving Office (Mar. 16, 1815) (on file with Columbia University).
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to the republic. '483 "We feel, Sir, a becoming pride in having for our chief
magistrate," declared the Irish republicans' address, "a gentleman who did
honor to the choice of a free people . . . . ,484 The Irish immigrants especially
thanked Mayor Clinton for his work on immigration reform and parliamentary representation. 48 5 Mayor Clinton's public course, said the Irish refugees,
was "that of purity as a judge, vigilance as a magistrate, wisdom
and energy
' 48 6
as a statesman, and dignity of deportment in every condition.
The address continued:
Those virtues have been a common benefit to all your fellow citizens; but Irish republicans have, moreover, peculiar motives of acknowledgement. In the full enjoyment of citizenship, in the freest
and happiest community of the universe, it would ill become them
to forget, that to you they are, in a great measure, indebted for that
inestimable privilege. While a Senator of the United States, you
stood foremost in preparing and carrying into law the existing mode
of naturalization. By this act the term of residence was reduced to
five from fourteen years; a period so long that it was intended to
operate as an exclusion of all persons of foreign birth. But thanks
to more humane as well as more enlightened views, whoever loves
our institutions, and is worthy of them, may now, within a reasonable space of time, attain a country and a home among freemen.
When many of us fled from despotism, and sought refuge in this
emancipated land, the spirit of intolerance pursued us across the
Atlantic, and spared no effort to embitter our existence, and prolong our sorrows. You, Sir, with manly generosity remembered the
country of your forefathers; you stemmed with the weight of your
character and the strength of your talents the vicious current of persecution. You honored, in those exiles, the republican principles for
which they suffered in their native homes, and which they will ever
cherish in this, their chosen abode. On the shield of your integrity
you received the shafts hurled at their defenceless heads, and you
rebuked with effect that churlish and savage jealousy, from which
professed republicans are not always exempt. The victim of oppression and the emigrant of talents equally found in you a friend; policy
and humanity equally recommended them to your esteem; for to
you, Sir, it is not unknown that arts and sciences, religion and civilization, travelled from country to country by means of foreigners.
Will it be believed that in this free state, a last remnant of English
penal law should have existed against Catholics? Yes! so inveterate
is the force of prejudice, that, even here, a qualification oath was
required from members of the Legislature, which could not be consistently taken by persons of the Catholic faith! On this as on every
other occasion, reason and justice found you their able and success483
484
485
486

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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ful advocate. You obtained an alteration of the obnoxious law, and
a large portion of your fellow citizens became invested for the first
time, with the plenitude of American liberty.
The effects of such enlightened liberality have not fallen on cold or
thankless hearts. We pray you, then, on the part of men whose
to accept our grateful
praise is sincere as their blame is48 fearless,
7
approbation of your past services.
The address concluded with the wish that Mayor Clinton would soon attain
that station where his virtue and abilities would confer the most honor and
the greatest good upon the Irish immigrants' beloved country. 488
The committee appointed by the assembled immigrants presented the
Irish republicans' address to Mayor Clinton. In his immediate reply, Mayor
Clinton described their expression of good will as one of the most pleasing
events of his life.489 Mayor Clinton continued:
If I had been ever insensible to those natural predilections which
every man must entertain for the country of his ancestors, yet patriotic considerations would have inculcated the expediency of cherishing Irish migration. For take away from America her population
of that description, and who would not mourn over the loss of many
of the best heads and best hearts in the nation? Who would not
lament so alarming a diminution of our physical strength, and such
an irreparable destruction of our productive industry?
When I see among you men whose virtues and talents reflect lustre
upon the learned professions, and whose names will live in the
memory of the wise and the virtuous of future times; and when I
consider the whole course of your irreproachable conduct-your ardent attachment to those sacred principles which it has been the
favorite object of my life to promote-THE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICANISM and your entire devotion to the supremacy of law
and good order, and to the honor and prosperity of your adopted
country. I must declare that I am proud to hail you as my friends,
and that in private as in public life, I shall never cease to entertain
the sincerest regard for you individually and
and to manifest
collectively. 49°
Plainly incompatible with Professor Tushnet's interpretation, this exchange is
an extraordinarily revealing display of ethnic solidarity between New York
City's Irish refugee community and the judge who wrote the Philips opinion
just two years before. It shows the clear postcolonial fusion between United
Irish and Jeffersonian republican political ideology. And despite the strenuous protestations of Justice Scalia and his several academic allies, the Philips
court undeniably represented prevailing political sentiment: as a prominent
487 Id.

488 Id. A couple of years later they helped elect him state governor, and Governor Clinton
rewarded their loyalty by building the Erie Canal with Irish muscle.
489 De Witt Clinton, Response to the Address of the Irish Republicans of New York City
(Mar. 18, 1815) (on file with Columbia University).
490
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Republican, Mayor Clinton articulated the dominant political ideology of his
day. Philips stood for plenty more than "one judge's views."
Like William Sampson's argument in Philips, the 1815 address to Mayor
De Witt Clinton by New York City's Irish republicans articulated their refugee community's radical collective critique of America's inherited colonial
legal structure-which persisted in a range of areas spanning immigration
law, the elective franchise, political office, and religious freedom. It records
the Irish exiles' haunting collective memory of their colonized past. Last, but
not least, this rare exchange shows the political influence of ethnic bonds.
Sampson's early argument for religious equality in Philips has always occupied a vital place in Irish-American ethnic history. That decision was a jurisprudential triumph of the Hibernocentric postcolonial imagination. Only the
most dubious of majoritarian political premises can dismiss Sampson's expressed constitutional ideals as the partisan defense of a minority refugee
community. After all, Sampson's most essential point was that our laws protect none of us, unless they protect all of us.
VII.

Six Curious Controversies Surrounding Philips

In his marginalization of Philips, Justice Scalia borrows directly from
Professor Bradley. Although in lesser degrees Professors Lash and Tushnet
join Justice Scalia in dismissing Philips,none is so violent as Professor Bradley. Evidently aware that his opening bluster will not deter the persistent
constitutional historian, Professor Bradley must therefore fashion more elaborate justifications for his surprising exclusion of Philips from the doctrinal
tradition of conscientious exemptions. He offers a handy little catalog of six
ways to exclude Philips from the tradition of constitutional free exercise exemptions. 491 In Flores, Justice Scalia relied almost verbatim on the Bradley
catalog, essentially echoing three of Professor Bradley's six attacks upon the
authority of Philips.492 The thrust of Professor Bradley's catalog is that
Philips should not be permitted to tarnish a historically golden era of unbroken legislative supremacy over religious freedom prior to Sherbert. In other
words, that Philips should not be counted with Sherbert as a successful constitutional free exercise exemption claim. I find none of the proffered halfdozen reasons especially convincing.
A.

Philips Unquestionably Announced a ConstitutionalPrinciple

First, argues Justice Scalia in Flores, Philips is "weak authority" because
"the same result might possibly have been achieved (without invoking constitutional entitlement) by the court's simply modifying the common-law rules
'493
of evidence to recognize such a privilege.
Justice Scalia's attack on Philips paraphrases the following by Professor
Bradley:
491
492
493

Bradley, supra note 4, at 289-92.
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 571 U.S. 507, 543 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
Id.
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[T]he constitutional observations in Phillips are at most one of two
independent grounds for the holding. At least, they are observations in support of common law reasoning. The issue in Phillipswas
testimonial privilege, and privileges may be extended by common
4 94
law courts without recourse to the Constitution.
Justice Scalia directly borrows Professor Bradley's argument that Mayor
Clinton and his three fellow judges could have decided Philips without reference to the constitution.
But the obvious problem with this argument is that the New York court
did not avoid the constitutional issue! Mayor Clinton's opinion is quite explicit that the priest-penitent evidentiary privilege was required by article 38
of the New York State Constitution. 495 After offering an independent justification of the priest-penitent privilege as a matter of postcolonial American
common law, Mayor Clinton continued:
But this is a great constitutional question, which must not be solely
decided by the maxims of the common law, but by the principles of
our government: We have considered it in a restricted shape, let us
now look at it on more elevated ground; upon the ground of the
constitution, of the social compact, and of civil and religious
496
liberty.
The court then engaged in a detailed analysis of article 38 of the New York
State Constitution, unbroken by any further reference to the common law,
497
before upholding the clergy privilege on pure free exercise grounds.
Mayor Clinton also supported this constitutional conclusion by direct reliance on the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause.498 The Philips court
concluded that Father Kohlmann and his congregation "are protected by the
laws and constitution of this country, in the full and free exercise of their
religion, and this court can never countenance or authorize the application of
'499
insult to their faith, or of torture to their conscience.
Philips was closely followed in a later free exercise case upholding the
priest-penitent privilege in Virginia, an opinion overlooked by Justice Scalia
and Professors McConnell, Bradley, Tushnet, Lash, and Kmiec. In Cronin,
Judge Meredith could not have been plainer in his reliance on both state and
federal free exercise guarantees. "It is impossible to conceive of more broad
and comprehensive terms than are used in our Bill of Rights, and our State
and Federal Constitutions. Religious toleration was the great purpose their
framers had in view." 50 0 Above all other considerations, "the great constitutional boon of religious toleration, which secures to all the free exercise of
religion according to the dictates of conscience, cannot be enjoyed by this
494

Bradley, supra note 4,at 290.

supra note 2, at 109-10.
Id. at 108-09.
497 Id. at 109-14.
498 Id. at 110-11.
499 Id. at 114; see also supra Part IV.F.
500 Commonwealth v. Cronin, 1 Q.L.J. 128, 137-38 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1855). Judge Meredith's
language is borrowed from Riker's argument for Father Kohlmann in Philips. See supra note
274.
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class of our people if the secrets of the confessional are to be disclosed,"
Judge Meredith noted. 50 1 "I shall hold the priest exempt from testifying as to
what was confessed to
him by the deceased in the administration of the sacra' 50 2
ment of penance.
B.

Philips Seems to Exempt Some Believers from All Civil Obligations,
Including Statutory Duties

Second, argues Justice Scalia in Flores, Philips is weak authority "because it did not involve a statute. '50 3 In this argument, Justice Scalia again
directly echoes Professor Bradley: "Phillips is not a conduct exemption case.
No statute (neutral or otherwise) was present from which exemption could
be sought. 50 4 Although it is highly conjectural and has major weaknesses,
this may yet be their best argument for limiting the constitutional exemptions
principle in Philips. The historical support for this argument advanced by
Justice Scalia and Professor Bradley hinges on reconstructing early republican conceptions of judicial review.
The Bradley/Scalia thesis is that the court would have decided Philips
differently had the challenged evidentiary rule been set by the legislature,
rather than invoked merely as judicial precedent. In other words, that Father
Kohlmann's conscientious exemption would have been denied had his subpoena been issued under statutory rather than common law authority.
Under this theory, constitutional tinkering with common law doctrine was a
far cry from judicial interference with popular legislation. Hence, according
to Professor Bradley, the absence of legislation was "crucial" in Philips when
contrasted with "the legislative guardianship of the common good displayed
in Specht. '50 5 But this is mere assertion, unsupported by historical evidence.
The certitude of Justice Scalia and Professor Bradley as to the constitutional
assumptions of the Philips court is at least misplaced, perhaps even contradicted by both text and context.
Notably, neither Justice Scalia nor Professor Bradley makes any effort to
apply their proposed distinction consistently. The majority of cases on which
they rely to demonstrate judicial hostility to constitutional exemptions did
not involve challenges to statutory obligations. For example, both Justice
Scalia and Professor Bradley place great weight on Stansbury v. Marks,
where a court fine was imposed on a witness who refused to be sworn on his
Sabbath, 50 6 and on Simon's Executors v. Gratz, where a litigant sought a trial
continuance to avoid appearing on his Sabbath. 50 7 Justice Scalia and Professor Bradley describe both cases as flat rejections of constitutional free exercise exemptions, although no statute was being challenged. Inexplicably, the
501 Cronin, 1 Q.LJ. at 142. This case is also discussed in Walsh, Priest-PenitentPrivilege,
supra note 2, at pt. II.
502 Id.
503 City of Boerne v. Flores, 571 U.S. 507, 543 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
504 Bradley, supra note 4, at 290.
505 Id.
506 Stansbury v. Marks, 2 Dall. 213 (Pa. 1793); see supra Part V.A.
507 Simon's Ex'rs v. Gratz, 2 Pen. & W. 412 (Pa. 1831); see supra Part V.A.
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statutory distinction becomes critical only in their treatment of Philips! This
conspicuous lack of rhetorical consistency seems fatal to their reasoning.
On the merits of their argument, I am unable to square the language of
Philips with the interpretation proposed by Justice Scalia and Professor
Bradley. Mayor Clinton's opinion was not so understood by contemporary
readers. The question was not directly confronted in Philips since no statute
was there in issue. But if anything, Mayor Clinton's broadly worded opinion
seems to hold that Philips'sconstitutional theory of religious exemptions protects believers equally from statutory and not merely judicial commands. For
example, Mayor Clinton asked what would be the reaction in New York if
the two Anglican sacraments of baptism and the Lord's supper were
threatened? "Suppose that a decision of this court, or a law of the state
should prevent the administration of one or both of these sacraments, would
not the constitution be violated, and the freedom of religion be infringed?
Every man who hears me will answer in the affirmative. ' 50 8 In Philips,therefore, forcing Father Kohlmann's testimony would annihilate the Roman
Catholic sacrament of penance, whether accomplished by statutory edict or
judicial decree.
Equally revealing is this passage from Mayor Clinton's opinion in
Philips:
Religion is an affair between God and man, and not between man
and man. The laws which regulate it must emanate from the Supreme being, not from human institutions. Established religions, deriving their authority from man, oppressing other denominations,
prescribing creeds of orthodoxy, and punishing non-conformity, are
repugnant to the first principles of religious liberty, and in direct
collision with the divine spirit of Christianity. Although no human
legislatorhas a right to meddle with religion, yet the history of the
world, is a history of oppression and tyranny over the consciences of
men. And the sages who formed our constitution, with this instructive lesson before their eyes, perceived the indispensable necessity
of applying a preventative, that would forever exclude the introduction of calamities, that have deluged the world with tears and with

blood

....

509

Here, Mayor Clinton explicitly declares that the court's opinion in Philips is
directed at "human legislators" regulating religious believers through
510
"human institutions.
At the close of his opinion, Mayor Clinton eloquently returns to the
same point.
[U]ntil men under pretence of religion, act counter to the fundamental principles of morality, and endanger the well being of the
state, they are to be protected in the free exercise of their religion.
If they are in error, or if they are wicked, they are to answer to the
508
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Supreme Being, not to the unhallowed intrusion of frail fallible
511
mortals.
Are not legislators, like judges, "frail fallible mortals" capable of "unhallowed intrusion"?
Explicitly relying on the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause,
Mayor Clinton adopted the following rule of construction for article 38 of the
New York State Constitution:
[A] provision conceived in a spirit of the most profound wisdom,
and the most exalted charity, ought to receive the most liberal construction. Although by the constitution of the United States, the
powers of congress do not extend beyond certain enumerated objects; yet to prevent the danger of constructive assumptions, the following amendment was adopted: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." In this country there is no alliance between church
and state; no established religion; no tolerated religion-for toleration results from establishment-but religious freedom guaranteed
512
by the constitution, and consecrated by the social compact.
Because Father Kohlmann's conscientious refusal to testify was covered by
this broad guarantee of religious freedom and equality, the only remaining
issue was whether the state had carried its forensic burden of proving that no
exemption was possible.
On this point, the Philips court's willingness to strike down unduly onerous statutory obligations may also be inferred from Mayor Clinton's unqualified pronouncement that the confidentiality of the confessional did not fall
within the proviso to article 38.
The language of the constitution is emphatic and striking, it speaks
of acts of licentiousness, or practices inconsistentwith the tranquillity

and safety of the state; it has reference to something actually, not
negatively injurious.. To acts committed, not to acts omitted-offences of a deep dye, and of an extensively injurious nature: It
would be stretching it on the rack so say, that it can possibly contemplate the forbearance of a Roman catholic priest, to testify what
he has received in confession, or that it could ever consider the
safety of the community involved in this question.513
The test here is simply whether the religious practice falls within the official
power to regulate behavior inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state.
Nothing here suggests that some exception should apply to comparable legislative burdens on religious freedom.
Of Father Kohlmann's counsel, William Sampson certainly contemplated
constitutional free exercise exemptions from statutory obligations, while
Richard Riker's view is unclear. In Philips,Counsellor Riker came closest to
511 Id. at 114.
512 Id. at 110-11.
513

Id. at 113.
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directly addressing this issue. He cited Harrison v. Evans,5 14 decided under
the English Toleration Act, 515 which "left the dissenters to act as their consciences shall direct them, in matters of religious worship. '516 Evans had
been elected a sheriff of London, but as a Protestant dissenter he was ineligible to serve. 517 In a classic catch-22, Evans was prosecuted under a corporation bylaw that imposed a £600 fine on elected officials who refused to take
office. 518 His conviction was affirmed on appeal but then reversed by the
519
House of Lords. Lord Mansfield described the distinction as "'Jesuitical."'
"Make a law to render them incapable of office; make another to
punish them for not serving. If they accept, punish them; if they
refuse, punish them . . . . My Lords, this is a most exquisite dilemma, from which there is no escaping; it is a trap a man cannot
get out of; it is as bad persecution as that of Procrustes. 5 2If0 they are
too short, stretch them; if they are too long, lop them.
Apply this to Father Kohlmann's case, Riker urged the Philips court!
We tell the Catholics-yes, you shall have the full benefit of the
constitution; you shall have the "free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship;" you shall have your seven sacraments; your Priest shall freely administer the sacrament of penance;
you shall all enjoy the consolation of auricular confession; and as we
know that your Priest cannot according to his religious faith, reveal
to any person in the world, what passes in confession;-we will not
compel him-we will only consign him to prison, and peradventure
superadd a fine which he can never pay:-or, if your Priest should
violate the seal of confession, and reveal what the penitent hath disclosed-far be it from us to violate the constitution; the penitent
shall freely enjoy "his religious profession and worship."-He has
the full benefit of it. We will only shut him up in the State Prison, or
otherwise punish him according to law. Is there, in the republic, a
man who does not see in this the most scandalous sophistry? Is

there, on earth, a man who would not abhor

52

it?

1

Here, Riker directly compared Philips with Evans, in which the believer also
sought a religious exemption from a statutory obligation. To my mind, this
analogy suggests that Counsellor Riker considered both legislative and judicial burdens on religion equally vulnerable to free exercise challenges. The
£600 fine from which Evans sought relief was levied under a law of general
application; his situation was made unbearable by the sectarian act of parlia522
ment disqualifying him from elected office.
Harrison v. Evans, 1 Eng. Rep. 1437 (H.L. 1767).
Id. at 1439.
516 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *54.
517 Harrison, 1 Eng. Rep. at 1438.
518 Id.
519 SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION, supra note 2, at 28 (Riker) (quoting the opinion of
Lord Mansfield in Harrison v. Evans).
520 Id. at 27-30 (Riker) (quoting the opinion of Lord Mansfield in Harrison v. Evans).
521 Id. at 30-31 (Riker).
522 Id. at 27-30 (Riker).
514
515

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol. 73:1

Significantly, perhaps, Riker pointed to the broad object behind the constitutional guarantee of free religious exercise. Without qualification, he asserted that "[e]verything essential to that object, is by necessary implication,
secured by the constitution; unless it leads to acts of licentiousness, or to
practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State. '52 3 This expansive view of religious freedom certainly seems to embrace free exercise exemptions from statutory obligations. In the next paragraph, however,
Counsellor Riker may suggest otherwise:
We have no statutory regulation upon the subject now under consideration, and the principles of the common law are accurately and
strongly laid down by Lord Mansfield. His words are these, "My
Lords, there never was a single instance, from the Saxon times down
to our own, in which a man was ever punished for erroneous opinions concerning rites or modes of worship, but upon some POSI524
TIVE LAW.
What Counsellor Riker really thought is impossible to discern, since in
Philips no religiously burdensome statute was actually before the court.
William Sampson has left the most comprehensive record of his thoughts
on religious freedom and equality. To my mind there is no question-considering his argument in Philips, his other prolific writings on the subject of
religious equality, and the high personal cost of his strong political commitments-that Sampson understood religious freedom and equality as fundamental natural rights beyond the whims of legislative fashion. Now it is true
that Sampson was from his Irish experience deeply suspicious of an unrepresentative judiciary; together with Edward Livingston of Louisiana, Sampson
was the leading American codifier of his day. But Sampson's democratic and
republican principles did not suggest that elected legislators should have the
last word on the fundamental right of religious equality.
In Philips, Counsellor Sampson offered this rule of postcolonial
construction:
[T]he constitution has left nothing vague or undefined that was capable of being defined. And when it lays down the general rule,
intending an exception, that exception is defined. And when it gave
toleration to the religious professions and worship of all mankind,
knowing that it was of the religion of the quaker not to fight, it
pronounced the reasonable condition upon which that exemption
was to be enjoyed. The catholic religion was surely as well known
as that of the quaker. No christian could be ignorant of it: and for
the same reason if the framers of the constitution intended any ex52 5
ception, they would have stated it.
Sampson claimed that the framers of article 38 designed that provision "to
52 6
close the door forever against religious contention.
523
524
525
526

Id. at 31 (Riker).
Id. (Riker) (quoting the opinion of Lord Mansfield in Harrison v. Evans).
Id. at 79 (Sampson).
Id. at 80.
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From thence forward no frail man is to set himself up to judge his
fellow, for his faith and usurp the power of the almighty judge, by
whom all must be judged, nor are we to lay hands on one another,
or punish either by death, by fine, or by prison, the free exercise of
religious worship or profession. If there be any, who does not see
the wisdom of this enactment, let him open the page of history, and
read of the bloody religious wars of Europe, of which the wounds
are still fresh and bleeding. Let him reflect who his own fathers
were, and he will find the cogency and wisdom of the act. From the
time of that constitution, the waters of strife were no more to be let
loose; and as rights undefined, are wrongs concealed; as exceptions
lead to contentions and equivocations; so the principle was established like a beacon on a rock, to be a light and guide to all the
world.
Under this constitution, it is lawful for one to say, I hold of Christ,
another, I hold of Paul, another, I of Cephas, another, I of Apollos.
One only exception there is, and that is the proviso, that this liberty
of conscience shall not be construed, to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of
the state, and this brings me closer to the point.
The District Attorney has laid it down, as though it were conceded,
that the general principle of law is with him, and that we who claim
an exception, must shew ourselves entitled to it. I explicitly deny
that proposition. The constitution here lays down the general rule,
that all mankind shall be tolerated, without preference or discrimination, and we claim no exception from that rule. It is our adversary that would enforce the proviso, and take advantage of it against
us; and it was for him to shew how we fell within it. 527
In Ireland, Sampson unsuccessfully challenged government power that transgressed what he understood as fundamental human rights; in the republican
United States, Sampson expressed his natural rights philosophy in positivist
terms, simply invoking constitutional intent.
Sampson perceived no inconsistency in demanding constitutional free
exercise exemptions at the same time as he urged the abolition of the common law and demanded legislative supremacy. Professor Maxwell Bloomfield suggests that such United Irish political thinking betrayed "internal
contradictions. ' 528 He says that "[liogically Sampson and his colleagues fell
between two stools. They preached emancipation from English legal tutelage
in the name of a militant nationalism, while clinging to an eighteenth-century
faith in the efficacy of unvarying moral principles. ' 529 For Sampson, one of
those unyielding moral principles was that of religious equality. In his rhetoric in Philips, Sampson stayed true to his democratic and republican principles, because the most fundamental collective determination-the
527

528

Id. at 80-81.
MAXWELL H.

BLOOMFIELD,

William Sampson and the Codification Movement, in
1776-1876, at 85 (1976).

AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY
529

Id.
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Constitution itself-recognized the precedence of religious freedom and
equality over the temporary dictates of majority rule. For Sampson, the true
starting point in identifying an American postcolonial jurisprudence was not
the common law, nor any oppressive statute, but the Constitution itself.
In 1813 both religious freedom and judicial review were evolving notions-as they are today! When Philips was decided, their potential limits
had not been tested. In the early republic, popular scrutiny of the scope of
judicial activism did not become common until Sampson led his postcolonial
codification movement in the 1820s. Chief Justice Gibson's famous rejection
of the constitutional doctrine of judicial review in Eakin v. Raub 530 was written only a year after the publication of Sampson's highly controversial Discourse on the Common Law.531 The Pennsylvanian Chief Justice Gibson
decided Lesher 32 and Gratz533 during the consequent national debate on the
codification of American law. He expressly rejected Philips's free exercise
exemption on account of his "horror of judicial legislation" and his belief that
judges should be bound by rules and not discretion. 534 Ironically, in Chief
Justice Gibson's case, it seems that Sampson may have defeated his own constitutional argument in support of free exercise exemptions with his equally
powerful jurisprudential attack against judicial legislation. Unlike the
codifier William Sampson, Chief Justice Gibson was unable to reconcile these
two arguments. Sampson did so easily by identifying the constitutional free
exercise guarantee-not the challenged civil obligation-as the expression of
popular will that bound the court in a democratic society. One result of
of Philips,
Sampson's jurisprudential agitation, New York's 1828 codification
535
must have satisfied both him and Chief Justice Gibson.
Both Justice Scalia and Professor Bradley rely heavily on Chief Justice
Gibson's 1831 holding that a litigant was not entitled to a trial continuance on
the ground that appearing on his Sabbath would violate his religious principles. 53 6 In Gratz, defense counsel cited Philips in support of their request for
a free exercise exemption. 537 "It was decided in New York," they pointed out
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, "that a Catholic priest, who received the
confession of a parishioner, could not be compelled to disclose upon oath,
the matters thus committed to him, under the convictions of a religious
duty."

538

530

Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 344-58 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, C.J., dissenting).

531

WILLIAM SAMPSON, AN ANNIVERSARY DISCOURSE DELIVERED BEFORE THE HISTORI-

CAL SOCIETY OF NEW YORK ON SATURDAY, DECEMBER

6, 1823:

SHOWING THE ORIGIN, PRO-

(New York, E. Blise &
E. White 1824).
532 Commonwealth v. Lesher, 17 Serg. & Rawle 155 (Pa. 1828).
533 Simon's Ex'rs v. Gratz, 2 Pen. & W. 412 (Pa. 1831).
534 Lesher, 17 Serg. & Rawle at 163.
535 For more detail and discussion concerning the 1828 New York codification of Philips,
see Walsh, Priest-PenitentPrivilege, supra note 2, at pt. 1I.
536 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 543 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part);
Bradley, supra note 4, at 279.
537 Simon's Ex'rs, 2 Pen. & W. at 414.
538 Id.
GRESS, ANTIQUITIES, CURIOSITIES, AND NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW
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Given his open hostility towards free exercise exemptions, Chief Justice
Gibson's contemporary reading of Philips is especially revealing: he explicitly
understood Mayor Clinton's opinion to demand judicial review of legislative
actions, and for that very reason he assailed Philips directly, making absolutely no attempt to distinguish it. Chief Justice Gibson said the principle
that any conscientious objection "shall yield to that of the laws, as to a superior moral force, is a tacit condition of membership in every society. '539 He
continued:
I therefore entirely dissent from the opinion of the Mayor's Court
of New York, in the case which has been cited [Philips]. No one is
more sensible than I of the benefit derived by society from the offices of the Catholic clergy, or of the policy of protecting the secrets
of auricular confession. But considerations of policy address themselves with propriety to the legislature, and not to a magistrate
whose course is prescribed, not by discretion, but rules already
540
established.
Thus, Chief Justice Gibson "flatly rejects" the narrowing interpretation put
forward by Justice Scalia and Professor Bradley-that Philips offers religious
exemptions only from nonstatutory legal obligations. So too does Tushnet,
who makes no attempt to wrest the case from the exemptions tradition. Referring to Mayor Clinton's opinion, he says that "one court seems to have
accepted a principle of mandatory accommodation following the First
Amendment's adoption in 1791," and he says elsewhere that Philips "sup54 1
ports exemptions.
Justice Scalia openly identifies himself as a modem disciple of the antebellum Chief Justice Gibson-describing Philips as "weak authority" partly
because it is outweighed by Gratz-but he fails to acknowledge that every
other court that has considered Philips has taken the opposite view. 542 Ignoring these numerous contrary judicial reactions, Justice Scalia and Professor
Bradley are much too insistent in their claim that nineteenth-century American courts uniformly allowed legislative power to trump individual conscience. For example, in the South Carolina decision of Farnandis v.
Henderson,5 43 Chancellor Desaussure expressly pointed out that if witnesses,
jurors, or judges could be excluded because of their religious opinions, then
by the same token "the Legislature might enact a law excluding such persons
from holding any other office, or serving in the Legislature, or becoming
teachers of schools, or professors of colleges. In my judgment," continued
the chancellor, "this would be in the very teeth of the Constitution, and
' 544
would violate the spirit of all our institutions."
Accepting William Sampson's powerful United Irish rhetoric in Philips,
Chancellor Desaussure said that such an oppressive law would unconstituId. at 417.
Id.
541 Tushnet, supra note 5, at 125, 127.
542 See supra Part V.
543 Farnandis v. Henderson, 1 C.L.J. 202, 211-13 (Union Dist. S.C. 1827).
544 Id. at 212; see also supra Part V.A.
539

540

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol. 73:1

tionally legitimize discrimination against Roman Catholics for believing in
their sacrament of penance. "I do not know in what that state of things
would differ from the galling restraints on the Irish Roman Catholics, which
have so long kept that beautiful country and that high spirited people, in a
state of degradation and misery, of discontent and rebellion, ' 545 wrote this
American judge in the midst of the Liberator Daniel O'Connell's mass agitation for Catholic Emancipation in Ireland. Chancellor Desaussure was upheld on appeal.5 46 Indeed, so far as I know there is no reported antebellum
case in which any American judge drew the distinction that Justice Scalia and
Professor Bradley now retrospectively propose between free exercise attacks
upon judicially imposed legal duties (most challenges) and those attacks
upon statutory obligations (a smaller number). Even in unsuccessful statutory challenges, judicial rhetoric sometimes rested on the constitutional premise of conscientious exemptions.
Nineteenth-century legal scholars who reviewed Philips staunchly defended its constitutional free exercise analysis. One vehement champion was
Timothy Walker. 547 The arguments advanced by Counsellors Sampson and
Riker, and adopted by Mayor Clinton, overcame this influential frontier lawyer's initial skepticism. In 1844, Walker confessed that upon confronting The
Catholic Question in America almost three decades after its publication, the
law professor and former judge reacted by rejecting the Philips doctrine out
of hand.548 The doctrine struck Walker, as he thought it would most readers,
55 0
as untenable. 549 It defied professional consensus and the textbook writers. 551
But after reading William Sampson's report, Walker changed his mind.
"What I wish now to say is, that upon further reflection, I do not see how the
Court could have arrived at a different result. It will be observed that the
doctrine is confined to Catholic priests, and this upon constitutional
grounds. '552 Walker felt that due to differences in religious teachings the
argument would not extend to Protestant ministers. 553 "Penance is one of the
sacraments," he explained.55 4 "Take away the seal of inviolable secrecy, and
you destroy the efficiency of this sacrament. You thus assail a fundamental
article of Catholic faith. And what then becomes of the religious liberty se'555
cured by the constitution?
Farnandis,1 C.L.J. at 212.
Id. at 214.
547 Timothy Walker, Editor'sNote to Abbreviated Report of People v. Phillips, 1 W.L.J. 109,
113-14 (1844) [hereinafter Walker, Editor's Note].
545

546

548
549

Id. at 113.
Id.

550 Id.
551 Id.
553

Id. at 113-14.
Id. at 113.

554

Id.

555

Id. In Cronin, Judge Meredith explicitly reached the same conclusion:
It can scarcely be necessary to notice the argument which was pressed, that this
exemption of Catholic clergymen would be extending to them a privilege not enjoyed by clergymen of the Protestant persuasion. No Protestant claims any such
exemption, and they cannot be said to be denied that which they lay no claim to.
Penance and the confessional form no part of their religious creed. They repudiate

552

The First Free Exercise Case

2004]

Walker quoted the religious freedom guarantee in the Ohio State Constitution, which warned that "'no human authority can, in any case whatever,
control or interfere with the rights of conscience."' 556 According to Walker,
"[n]o language can be more explicit than this. If it does not shield the Catholic priest from a compulsory revelation of the secrets of the confessional, it is
an empty sound. '55 7 Walker concluded by observing, "I have sometimes
doubted whether the full significance of the language above quoted from [the

Ohio] Bill of Rights, is generally felt.

'558

In his view, for example, the consti-

tutional guarantee in the Ohio Constitution must also do away with the rule
rendering witnesses incompetent to testify for lack of religious belief. 559 "I

see not how you can raise the question of religious belief," he wrote, "without first striking this language from the constitution."' 560
Without recourse to constitutional provisions, Jeremy Bentham and

some other evidentiary writers have independently reached the conclusion
that the clergy privilege should not be controlled by majoritarian preferences.
In his Rationale of JudicialEvidence, written in the decade prior to Philips

but published at the height of Daniel O'Connell's agitation for Catholic
Emancipation in Ireland, Bentham began
"with the supposition, that, in the country in question, the catholic
religion was meant to be tolerated. But with any idea of toleration,
a coercion of this nature is altogether inconsistent and incompatible.
In the character of penitents, the people would be pressed with the
whole weight of the penal branch of the law; inhibited from the ex-

ercise of this essential and indispensable article of their religion...
[to the priests, it] would be an order to violate what by them is num'5 61
bered amongst the most sacred of religious duties."
both. When this rule of evidence, or any other principle of law, shall deprive Protestants of one of the sacraments of their Church, and thus deny to them the "free
exercise of their religion according to the dictates of conscience," they should be
held exempt from the operation of any such rule, or principle of law. But until such
is shown to be the case, there is no analogy between Protestants and Catholics on
this question-such an argument is rather more popular than logical; and though it
may be invoked to excite prejudice, should never be allowed to disturb the
judgment.
Commonwealth v. Cronin, 1 Q.L.J. 128, 140 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1855).
556 Walker, Editor's Note, supra note 547, at 113 (quoting OHIO Co sT. of 1802, art. VIII,

§ 3).
557

Id.

558

Id.
Id. at 113-14.

559

560 Id. at 114. Nor can it be claimed that Walker discounted the obvious possible alternative of granting a priest-penitent evidentiary exemption through democratic legislative reform as
opposed to judicial power. Even before reading Sampson's report of Philips, Walker had from
time to time asked himself the grave question whether it would be "expedient to enact" that
clergymen and physicians should not be compelled to testify. Those reflections did not cause
him to question the expansive constitutional principle announced in Philips. See id. at 113.
561 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EviDENCE § 2396 (2d ed. 1923) (quoting 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE
588 (London, Hunt & Clark 1827)).
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Even Jeremy Bentham seems to say that majoritarian regulation of the confessional, a paradigm test of religious freedom, must give way to higher constitutional ideals.
With respect to confession, wrote Bentham,
"[t]o form any comparative estimate of the bad and good effects
flowing from this institution, belongs not, even in a point of view
purely temporal, to the design of this work. The basis of the inquiry
is, that this institution is an essential feature of the catholic religion,
' 562
and that the catholic religion is not to be suppressed by force.
Significantly, because of this threat to religious freedom, Bentham departed
from the utilitarian calculus which he almost invariably proposed as the appropriate measure for popular legislation.
Bentham's support for the priest-penitent privilege is important, not just
because he was generally hostile to privileges as barriers to the truth in litigation (he considered the exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of privilege as "one of the most pernicious and most irrational notions that ever
found its way into the human mind"). 563 As is well known, Bentham was also
a thoroughgoing positivist and the leading English codifier of his day. He
believed that "[n]atural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible
rights, rhetorical nonsense,-nonsense upon stilts. '564 Even so, Bentham
treated the secrecy of the confessional as beyond the reach of any state committed to the idea of religious freedom! Of all people, if Bentham had considered the problem a matter for majoritarian legislatures, he would have been
the first to say so.
In praising Mayor Clinton's break in Philips from the English common
law, the American scholar John Anthon made similar remarks treating its
constitutional exemptions doctrine as an aspect of fundamental human rights.
"When the confidence ... is of necessity imposed, as in the case of the peni-

tent, taught by his religion, when seeking for spiritual consolation and guidance, to repose in the bosom of a minister of his faith secret things known
only to himself and his Creator," wrote Anthon, "it seems impossible that
the disclosure of such
any sound mind can for a moment doubt, whether 565
law."
human
any
by
coerced
rightfully
be
secrets can
A partial exception to this scholarly consensus against unqualified majority rule over religious practice was the American evidentiary theorist, John
Wigmore. Wigmore endorsed the priest-penitent privilege on grounds of
common law and legislative policy, but he failed to explain its constitutional
origins and perpetuated the Anglocentric doctrinal misconception that
Philips was an anomalous American precedent. Despite Bentham's obvious
influence, McCormick has recently suggested that
Id.
5 JEREMY
Clark 1827).
562
563

564

BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE

JEREMY BENTHAM,
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WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM

193-94 (London, Hunt &

501 (John Bowring ed., Edinburgh,
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Wigmore's seemingly grudging acceptance of the privilege perhaps
reflects the difficulty of justifying its existence on exclusively utilitarian grounds, since at least where penitential communications are
required or encouraged by religious tenets, they are likely to continue to be made irrespective of the presence or absence of evidentiary privilege. A firmer ground appears available in the inherent
offensiveness of the secular power attempting to coerce an act viola566
tive of religious conscience.
Today, a growing number of evidentiary writers are rediscovering the basis of
the clergy privilege in the constitutional guarantees of religious freedom first
relied on in Philips.567 Under this postcolonial theory, the essential evidentiary justification for the clergy privilege does not depend on legislative recognition, but instead on protecting fundamental human rights.
In sum, majority rule over minority religious practice was by no means
an American constitutional principle. Justice Scalia and Professor Bradley
therefore fail to establish that the Philips court would have denied Father
Kohlmann his free exercise exemption had the subpoena been issued under
statutory authority. Nor is there any particular reason to think that modern
568
courts would entertain the novel distinction they propose.
C.

Philips Protects a Range of Religiously Motivated Conduct
Third, Professor Bradley argues:
Judge Clinton remained within the orbit of "worship" (widely construed) as the defining feature of free exercise eligibility, as his use
of "ordinances," "ceremonies," and "sacraments" attests ....Phillips is, therefore, no precedent for the more expansive "religiously
569
motivated conduct" of Sherbert v. Verner et al.

This fallback argument concedes that Philips historically supports free exercise exemptions. Its only possible effect might be to limit that historical support. Justice Scalia omits this argument from his Flores concurrence.
'570
Professor Bradley acknowledges that "[tiestifying was no sacrament.
Yet he puts weight on the fact that "Clinton cited the eternal secrecy of the
priest as an essential aspect of the sacrament; penetrating the wall of confidentiality would annihilate the sacrament itself."'571 So what? Wasn't the initial question posed by Bradley whether Philips is a "judicial holding[ ] clearly
566 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 76.2 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
567 See, e.g., Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947, 952 (Utah 1994). For other scholarly reactions to Philips,see supra Part VI; supra notes 2-6; Walsh, Priest-PenitentPrivilege, supra note 2,
at pt. V.
568 Incidentally, on the issue of legislative supremacy over religious freedom, Bradley instructs his reader to note that Father Kohlmann obeyed the law to the extent that it did not
conflict with his religious obligations-that he "dutifully responded to subpoena, recognized the
authority of the court, and was willing to testify about matters other than confessional conversation." Bradley, supra note 4, at 290. Perhaps I am obtuse, but the significance of this admonition completely escapes me.
569 Id. at 290-91.
570 Id. at 290.
571 Id.
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stating a willingness, as a matter of Free Exercise command, to exempt a
believer from an otherwise valid and neutral law"? 572 To answer that question, surely a law commanding every citizen to testify under subpoena is a
classic example of "an otherwise valid and neutral law"? And the New York
court's historic and influential priest-penitent exemption was certainly a
573
holding "in favor of" Father Kohlmann.
Bradley's "worship only" argument therefore raises nothing more than
the possibility that under Philips, although great burdens on religion would
not be tolerated, lesser invasions of conscience might. Perhaps. But that
problem of degree has no bearing on the central issue identified by Professor
Bradley. This argument necessarily acknowledges Philips's early recognition
5 74
of the conduct exemption-it merely questions its extent.
D. Philips Protects Believers from Religious Oppression Through Majority
Rule
Fourth, Professor Bradley argues:
Clinton affirmed that a broadly defined public order-similar to
that in blasphemy cases-may justify regulation of eligible conduct
like worship .... Clinton does not say that only the truth status of
religious views is denied to legislators, but that is the practical effect
575
of this part of the holding.
This proposed distinction is entirely incoherent, which may explain why Justice Scalia does not adopt it. The Philips court indicated that the judiciary
would not shelter all religiously inspired civil disobedience. From this, like a
rabbit from a hat, Bradley magically draws a judicial holding that no religiously inspired civil disobedience would be constitutionally protected. Of
course, Mayor Clinton eloquently said exactly the opposite; moreover, the
court proceeded to grant Father Kohlmann the very religious exemption he
claimed!
Bradley tries to deny the court's explicit holding by pointing out that
article 38 of the New York State Constitution permitted the legislature to
regulate religious conduct amounting to "licentiousness" or disrupting the
"peace and safety" of the state. As hypothetical instances, Mayor Clinton
suggested that laws could regulate the religious conduct of sects that "should
Id. at 272.
See id.
574 As it happened, Riker specifically demanded an expansive interpretation of the term
"worship" in article 38 of the New York State Constitution. He pointed out that the narrow
term "worship" in the English Toleration Act had won Evans his exemption by necessary
implication.
Our constitution is much more broad and explicit. The object was to secure, "to all
mankind the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without distinction or preference." Every thing essential to that object, is by necessary
implication, secured by the constitution; unless it leads to acts of licentiousness, or
to practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State.
SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION, supra note 2, at 31 (Riker).
575 Bradley, supra note 4, at 291.
572
573
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rise up and violate the decencies of life" 576-for example, by practicing their
religious rites in a state of nakedness, or by engaging in incest, polygamy,
wife-burning, bacchanalian orgies, or human sacrifices, or by establishing the
inquisition, or by fanatically attempting to pull up the pillars of society. But
Bradley omits to mention that these images were specifically invoked in contrast to the Roman Catholic confessional's seal of confidentiality. Precisely
because the constrained ambit of state power did not extend to Father
Kohlmann's peaceful and respectful civil disobedience, the court granted him
the very religious exemption he claimed. Mayor Clinton's observation that
not every religious objection would be sustained was obviously no denial of
the very exemption principle that the court announced and enforced.
It is worth noting the untroubled equanimity with which Bradley contemplates a legal and social order infused by the religious beliefs of a dominant majority. He accepts uncritically the typical judicial apologetic in the
blasphemy cases that even draconian imprisonment might legitimately follow
merely from a judicial desire to protect the majority religious group from the
vague concept of "offense." The proviso to New York's article 38 empowered government to regulate religious conduct that amounted to "licentiousness" or that disrupted the "peace and safety" of the state. Bradley's reading
of the blasphemy cases inverts the relationship between New York's free exercise clause and its limiting proviso. The Philipscourt explicitly rejected any
such possibility:
To assert this as the genuine meaning of the constitution, would be
to mock the understanding, and to render the liberty of conscience a
mere illusion. It would be to destroy the enacting clause of the proviso-and to render the exception broader than the rule, to subvert
reasoning, and overthrow all the convicall the principles of sound
577
tions of common sense.
Mayor Clinton directly rejects Professor Bradley's proposed reading.
Both friend and foe of free exercise exemptions frequently point out that
Sherbert's so-called guarantee of free exercise was ultimately picked to the
bone by its voracious offspring-the compelling governmental interest standard that increasingly legitimated incidental religious burdens. For our immediate purposes, that is irrelevant. As serious historians of the early free
exercise exemption, our initial task is not to inquire into that doctrine's wisdom, but rather to uncover its origins and subsequent development. Historically, Philips was the first judicial precedent to recognize a constitutional
religious exemption from a general law.
Although the blasphemy cases may be revealing in other respects, Bradley's attempted analogy between them and Philips is truly startling.578 Does
he actually mean to suggest that Mayor Clinton might just as easily have
written Ruggles, and that Chief Justice Kent might just have easily have written Philips? That is unthinkable. As already shown, the two decisions, only
a couple of years apart, suggest radically opposed jurisprudential visions of
576
577
578

supra note 2, at 113-14.
Id. at 113.
See Bradley, supra note 4, at 273.
SAMPSON, CATHOLIC QUESTION,
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religious freedom and equality in the early American postcolonial republicChief Justice Kent's resting on homogeneity and cultural suppression, Mayor
Clinton's on diversity and cultural inclusion. 579 From a minority perspective-that of the Irish immigrants, of Jews, of Muslims, or of African-Americans in the early republic, for example-there is a huge difference. 580
E. Philips Was Indeed Ironic
Fifth, Professor Bradley argues:
Clinton accomplished all this with the aid of a strategically placed
ellipsis overlooked by McConnell .... Clinton left out the words
"priests and" in the constitution .... Clinton lacked a sufficient
sense of irony to include this text ....He also neglected to mention
(if he knew) that John Jay, later the nation's first Chief Justice, proposed in the 1777 Constitution that no Catholic be permitted to
hold land or enjoy civil rights unless he swore that neither pope nor
priest could forgive sins. 581
Justice Scalia also omits this rather oblique argument from his Flores concurrence. Article 38 of the New York State Constitution of 1777, which Mayor
Clinton construed in Philips,contained a preamble written by the anti-Catholic John Jay. It recited that the benevolent principles of rational liberty required the state not merely to expel civil tyranny, but also to guard against
the spiritual oppression and tolerance "wherewith the bigotry and ambition
of weak and wicked priests and princes have scourged mankind. '582 In
Sampson's report of Philips in The Catholic Question in America, the words
"priests and" have mysteriously disappeared from Mayor Clinton's quotation
of that provision.
Bradley leaves unsaid how the precedential value of Philips is altered by
the two words missing from the report. He merely accuses Mayor Clinton of
lacking "a sufficient sense of irony" to include them. 583 If appreciation of
irony were the test, of course, no judicial opinion could survive it. In fairness
to Mayor Clinton's wit, it should also be said that the error could also have
been Sampson's, or even that of the printer, the Irish immigrant Edward Gillespy, about whom relatively little is known. 584 Although the omission is certainly intriguing, there is no particular reason to share Bradley's assumption
that it was deliberate. I cannot speak for the editorial honesty or proofreading abilities of either Mayor Clinton or of Gillespy, but Sampson was highly
respected as an early court reporter. 585 His record of Riker's argument for
Father Kohlmann earlier in the same work fully quotes the preamble includ579

See supra Parts III-IV.
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See generally LEONARD W.
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Bradley, supra note 4, at 291-92.
See supra Part I.
Bradley, supra note 4, at 291.
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582
583
584

N.Y.

IRISH HIsT.

LEVY, BLASPHEMY

(1993).

4 (1989).

Irving Browne, William Sampson-Lawyer and Stenographer,8 GREEN BAG 313 (1896);
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ing the two words omitted from Mayor Clinton's opinion. It should also be
noted that Philips has far outlived Jay's preamble, which was struck out as
Convention of 1821; otherwise,
redundant by the New York Constitutional
586
article 38 has remained largely intact.
In what sense might Philips's enduring historic significance as the earliest free exercise exemption be diminished by Mayor Clinton's failure to advert to framer John Jay's unsuccessful effort to discriminate against Roman
Catholics? Again, the only charge against Mayor Clinton is his lack of irony,
but that charge is evidently misplaced. The court warmly extolled the inclusionary intentions of the New York State Constitution's authors. A learned
and experienced politician and statesman, Mayor Clinton surely knew that
Jay's bigoted efforts were defeated during the constitutional debates. In that
light, his Philips opinion was supremely ironic.
Take these comments, for example:
Considering that we had just emerged from a colonial state, and
were infected with the narrow views and bigoted feelings, which
prevailed at that time so strongly against the Roman Catholics, that
a priest was liable to the punishment of death if he came into the
colony, this declaration of religious freedom, is a wonderful monument of the wisdom, liberality, and philanthropy of its authors.
Next to William Penn, the framers of our constitution were the first
legislators who had just views of the nature of religious liberty, and
who established it upon the broad and imperishable basis of justice,
truth, and charity: While we are compelled to remark that this excellent provision was adopted by a majority of one . ... 587
It is difficult to read this last remark as anything other than tongue-in-cheek.
Mayor Clinton proceeded to argue that the colonial laws against Catholics
were motivated primarily from political considerations.
Although less obviously, Counsellor Riker can be read in the same way.
Referring to the intentions of the framers who beat back Jay's bigoted
amendments, he declared:
One cannot easily conceive of more broad and comprehensive
terms, than the convention have used. Religious liberty was the
great object which they had in view. They felt, that it was the right
of every human being, to worship God according to the dictates of
his own conscience. They intended to secure, forever, to all mankind, without distinction or preference, the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship. They employed language
commensurate with that object. It is what they have said.
Again, the Catholic religion is an ancient religion. It has existed for
eighteen centuries. The sacrament of penance has existed with it.
We cannot in legal decorum, suppose the convention to have been
ignorant of that fact: nor were they so in truth. The convention was
composed of some of the ablest men in this or in any other nation.
supra note 27; PRATT, supra note 18.
supra note 2, at 110.
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Their names are known to the court. A few still live, and we revere
the memories of those who are no more. They all knew the Catholic faith, and that auricular confession was a part of it. If they had
intended any exception would they not have made it? If they had
intended that the Catholics should freely enjoy their religion, excepting always, auricular confession, would they not have said so?
By every fair rule of construction we are bound to conclude that
they would have said so:-And as the convention did not make the
exception neither ought we to make it.588
Here, Riker subtly reminded the court that constitutional framer John Jay
was ultimately voted down in his vigorous effort to deny civil rights to Roman Catholics unless they renounce their belief in the "dangerous and damnable" sacrament of confession.
F.

Philips Was Indeed a Political Decision, As Is All Constitutional
Interpretation

Sixth, and last, Professor Bradley argues:
[Olne might suspect, from its solicitude of Catholics, that Phillips
was as much a political phenomenon as it was a legal analysis ....
This does not mean that, in Phillips, Clinton acted cynically or hypocritically. He was undoubtedly a warm friend of Catholic political
interests. It does mean that an aberrant legal analysis-and Phillips
was just that-was jump started by political considerations. It was
89
not generated by the inner resources of legal doctrine.
Justice Scalia echoes this argument in Flores, when he disparages Philips as
"weak authority ...

because it comes from a minor court." 590 Justice Scalia

adds that the New York City Court of General Sessions was subsequently
reconstituted (as of course were most courts from that period). 591 As for the
authority of Mayor Clinton, head of the four-judge court, Justice Scalia remarks that "Clinton had never been a jurist, and indeed had never practiced
law. Some years before Phillips, he was instrumental in removing the politi'592
cal disabilities of Catholics in New York.
This final cry of desperation seems to me entirely inconsistent with the
several previous efforts of Professor Bradley and Justice Scalia to locate
Philips within the no-exemptions judicial tradition. By characterizing Philips
as a political decision-"an aberrant legal analysis"-this argument necessarily concedes that Mayor Clinton's opinion was indeed the earliest instance of
a constitutional free exercise exemption. It is on the substance of this argument, however, that my problems run deepest of all. Because I have no idea
what are "the inner resources of legal doctrine," or how they "generate" a
588 Id. at 26 (Riker). Decades later, without attribution, Judge Meredith pasted Riker's
language into his opinion in Cronin. Commonwealth v. Cronin, 1 Q.L.J. 128, 138-39 (Va. Cir.
Ct. 1855).
589 Bradley, supra note 4, at 292.
590 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 543 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
591

Id. at 543 n.4.

592

Id.; see also supra Part 11.
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correct "legal analysis," I simply do not understand this attempt to exclude
Philips from the constitutional history of free exercise exemptions.
Professor Bradley evidently believes that his characterization of Philips
as "a political phenomenon" serves to marginalize it. 593 But why? Isn't every
case, at its deepest level, "a political phenomenon"? What prompts us to
discard one case as "aberrant," while insisting that another is "generated" by
"the inner resources of legal doctrine"? Why not address each decision on its
own terms, shun such formalistic jurisprudential cant, and try to understand
rather than deny the ultimate political contests that underlie all legal argumentation? In the minority position, we will always find an insurgent
counterprinciple that challenges the dominant legal ideology. The ethnic
politics displayed in the first free exercise case-immigrant Irish Catholics,
represented by their banished, radical United Irish advocate, winning their
test case in the courtroom of an Irish-American judge and career Jeffersonian
politician-may therefore help us discover some of the strongest and richest
historical egalitarian arguments both for and against free exercise
exemptions.
To his great credit, Bradley is one of few constitutional historians who
have even noted the vital ethnic dimension of Philips and he makes several
references to the grinding immigrant history of the Irish Catholics. Elsewhere in his article, Bradley suggests that "it would be helpful to see how the
great Irish and German Catholic immigrations of the late 1840s affected interpretation of Free Exercise. '594 He chastises McConnell for failing to conduct an extended inquiry that would have uncovered "the typically
unsympathetic judicial response to Roman Catholic pleas for relief from Bible reading in public schools. ' 595 He even contrasts Philips to the more common judicial hostility towards Catholics. Yet for Professor Bradley and
Justice Scalia, the remarkable cultural, social, and intellectual dimensions of
Philips somehow diminish rather than enhance the decision's historical
significance.
Bradley presents in the following truncated form the complex history of
Philips that this Article has tried to reconstruct more completely:
Clinton for years had been deeply involved in a factional frolic for
control of New York's Democratic Republican party. Years earlier,
he had forged an alliance with New York's few thousand (mostly
Irish) Catholics. St. Peter's Church had then been the focal point of
Catholic activity in the city, and Clinton had personally quelled a
lethal riot between nativists and Catholics outside St. Peter's
Church. St. Peter's was Fr. Kohlmann's parish. Phillips was decided during a very unpopular war with the arch-enemy of Irish
Catholics. Clinton's explicit repudiation of British precedent on the
593 In his discussion of the clergy evidentiary privilege, without addressing constitutional
issues, Jacob Yellin makes a similar point about Philips:"Indeed, the court appeared to be more
concerned with avoiding the persecution of Catholics than with applying the laws of evidence."
Jacob M. Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 95, 105 n.53 (1983).
594 Bradley, supra note 4, at 286.
595 Id.
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subject helped distinguish 596
the lot of Irish Catholics here from their
lot in the British Empire.
Because of these unique circumstances, he suggests, Philips did not represent
any enduring constitutional principle of free exercise exemptions. It was "as
much a political phenomenon as a legal analysis. ' 597 Even forgiving the lack
of historical texture inherent in such a telegrammatic account, Bradley's conclusion is inconsistent with his own writings.
At the outset of his article, Bradley asserts that a defensible constitutional historiography places little stock in the distinction between law and
politics, which corresponds to the division of labor between courts and legislature.5 98 Professor Bradley professes not to believe in this so-called law/
politics distinction. He points out that "majoritarian" is an ambiguous term
with no intrinsic moral authority. Moreover, it is hardly the animating feature of our Constitution that some originalists suppose it to be. 599 The dichotomy unconvincingly contrasts the idealized neutrality of law with
"politics as the tumultuous process from which majoritarian preferences
emerge out of an array of self-interested proposals. ' 600 The fragile law/politics dichotomy also rests on "a dubious distinction between 'reason' and
'will.' 60 1 Bradley scoffs at the neat division of labor under which legislators,
to secure their political fortunes, obey the commands of self-interested constituents; under this ideal model, a majority of those constituents get their
way because, well, they are the majority: "Their will is their warrant. ' 60 2 Professor Bradley refuses to accept that judges are precisely distinguished by the
tool of their trade: "not willfulness or interest, but reason." 6 3
In Philips,therefore, Professor Bradley should relish the fact that three
of the four judges (Mayor Clinton and the two aldermen, but not the Recorder) combined the roles of judges and politicians in the early republic,
challenging us to rethink our modern assumptions about law and politics.
Yet while Mayor Clinton may have combined political and judicial functions,
his brilliant postcolonial jurisprudential rhetoric in Philips is undeniably distinguished by reason.
Here, perhaps Justice Scalia and his muse Professor Bradley are reluctant to accept that Mayor Clinton so fully embraced William Sampson's
novel legal theory of cultural equality in Philips-atheart, the radical doctrinal legacy of this remarkably early constitutional impact litigation. Philips
was a huge collective victory won by Father Kohlmann; by the trustees of his
Roman Catholic parish bringing a test case for all mankind; by his 15,000
596 Id. at 292. By the same token, one might argue that the judicial opinions of Thurgood
Marshall concerning race should be discounted due to his life-long commitment to the civil rights
of African-Americans.
598
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Id. at 250.
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Id.

Id. at 250-51; see also Gerard V. Bradley, Slaying the Dragon of Politics with the Sword
of Law: Bork's Tempting of America, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 243 (book review).
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mostly Irish Catholic refugee congregation; and by their brilliant advocates
William Sampson and Counsellors Riker and Blake, who won the radical ruling of the four-judge New York court headed by De Witt Clinton. At the
urging of that historically excluded religious, racial, and ethnic minority,
Mayor Clinton's prescient reasoning in Philips was a bold voyage into the
uncharted waters of postcolonial American jurisprudence. Still controversial
at the outset of the third millennium, the implications of William Sampson's
Hibernocentric republican theory are as radical and subversive as ever.
VIII.

The Subversive Power of William Sampson's
PostcolonialJurisprudence

We must now ask, why the urgent need for Justice Scalia and his academic ally Professor Bradley to suppress so completely the first successful
free exercise case? Bradley puts unbearable weight on his claim that no instance of a free exercise exemption occurred prior to Sherbert.60 4 Almost
gratuitously, he makes his entire historical argument rest on a supposedly
unblemished record against free exercise exemptions. 6 5 For some reason,
anything less than unanimity just will not do. Admitting the failure of his
elaborate efforts to reconcile Philips with the no-exemptions constitutional
tradition, Bradley is therefore inconsistently compelled to dismiss the first
free exercise case as "an aberrant legal analysis" that was "jump started by
'60 6
political considerations.
Only thus can Professor Bradley do to Mayor Clinton what McConnell
does to Chief Justice Gibson. Because of Chief Justice Gibson's opposition
to judicial review, McConnell labeled him "idiosyncratic." 6 7 Because of
Mayor Clinton's recognition of a free exercise exemption in Philips, Bradley
labels him "idiosyncratic. ' "60 8 And because McConnell relies on Mayor Clinton inPhilips, Bradley labels him "idiosyncratic. '' 60 9 Bradley continues: "The
function of McConnell's idiosyncratic account of 'early judicial interpretation' is unmistakable: without it, the issue would be settled decisively against
the conduct exemption. '610 In contrast, Professor Tushnet covets this "idiosyncratic" label, proudly claiming that his "idiosyncratic" position on this debate is supported by even more "idiosyncratic" reasoning. 611 With his abject
failure to suppress Philips, Bradley must live with a much more ambivalent
historical record on free exercise exemptions.
Only by characterizing Philips as "an aberrant legal analysis"-despite
his several determined efforts to reconcile it with the no-exemptions tradition!-can Professor Bradley reach this strident conclusion:
See Bradley, supra note 4, at 247.
See generally id.
606 Id. at 292.
607 McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding,supra note 3, at 1509-10, 1513.
608 Bradley, supra note 4, at 292.
609 Id. at 292-93.
610 Id. at 292.
611 Tushnet, supra note 5, at 117.
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Twenty-seven years of precedent (the period from Sherbert to
Smith) are not enough to overcome plain meaning, historically recovered, and one hundred seventy years of faithful construction
(the period from the founding to Sherbert). I submit (though I do
not claim warrants to pronounce conclusively) that any serious account of constitutional construction holds no place for the conduct
612
exemption.
But recall that Bradley began with the more cautious claim that "Smith
rightly jettisoned the conduct exemption because it is manifestly contrary to
the plain meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, historically recovered and
with 150 years of precedent up to Sherbert.'' 613 Thus, the historical shadow of
unbroken legislative supremacy over religious freedom prior to Sherbert mysteriously lengthens by two decades between Bradley's introduction and his
conclusion! A slip of the pen? A casual rounding off of figures? Or yet
another silent, unconscious admission that Philips is indeed a conduct exemption case from the early republic. After all, Bradley's initial claim of a century and a half of unbroken precedent prior to 1963-Sherbert-brings us
squarely back to 1813-Philips!

Unconsciously adopting an imperial stance, Justice Scalia, Professor
Bradley, and Professor Tushnet all completely overlook the powerful United
Irish postcolonial influence on American constitutional law in the early republic. Instead, they believe that Sherbert was a raw product of 1960s thinking, an unprecedented mutation of the American constitutional tradition.
They utterly fail to comprehend the enduring symbol of Philips-missing altogether the radical United Irish, republican, nationalist, postcolonial jurisprudence so successfully urged by William Sampson in the first free exercise
case a century and a half before Sherbert. The essence of Philips was a jurisprudence of struggle, a universal quest for fundamental human rights that
transcend place and time: this radical method resolved that initial judicial
choice between starkly opposed versions of constitutional theory. Accepting
the banished human rights advocate Sampson's postcolonial characterization
of the case, the Philips court recognized the minority ethnic status of the Irish
Catholic immigrants, and welcomed them in freedom and equality into the
early American republic.
In the postcolonial constitutional theory of Philips, an American court
inherently possesses the socially transformative power to enforce to their ultimate extent the constitutional ideals in a democratic republic. By socially
transformative I mean that Philips publicly shifted power from the dominant
majority into the hands of a previously excluded minority community. But in
the competing imperial jurisprudence of Justice Scalia, this historically transformative role of postcolonial constitutionalism is slighted. Under the
skewed historiography of Justice Scalia and Professor Bradley, modern con612 Bradley, supra note 4, at 307. At other points, Professor Bradley says that the free
exercise exemption "started with Sherbert v. Verner twenty-nine years ago, and has apparently
ended with Smith." Id. at 247. Speaking of judicial restraint in the area of free exercise, Bradley
asks: "Are we to think that the 'relic' survived until 1963?" Id. at 269.
613 Id. at 248.

20041

The First Free Exercise Case

stitutional theory may not disturb existing allocations of political power in
favor of minority rights.
The postcolonial interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause is the
postcolonial interpretation true to Philips (1813), Farnandis (1827), and
Cronin (1855), an approach that would constantly reinvent American society
in accord with egalitarian and inclusive republican ideals, grounded on the
infinite possibilities of a new, revolutionary constitutional beginning. The alternative construction? Justice Scalia's imperial interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause, in the historically discredited tradition of Butler (1802),
Ruggles (1811), and Gratz (1833), constructing a world in which the dominant
political majority can extinguish religious minorities without offering any
principled justification for doing so.
Because it is plainly incompatible with their imperial jurisprudence, Justice Scalia and Professor Bradley make several unpersuasive efforts to deny
that Philips recognized a constitutional exemption, but their arguments are
riddled with internal inconsistencies. Rather than confront the merits of
Philips postcolonial reasoning, they endeavor to contract the holding in defiance of the decision itself. At several points, both Justice Scalia and Professor Bradley implicitly and even explicitly concede that Philips was indeed the
first judicial recognition of a religious exemption.
In the end, the only significant question concerning the postcolonial jurisprudential legacy of Philips is whether it was rightly decided. Do free exercise guarantees require a constitutional priest-penitent privilege? Do
tenets of religious liberty and equality require that the secrecy of the confessional be shielded from government intrusion? At that time, in the original
constitutional paradigm of the priest-penitent evidentiary privilege, the question whether a religious exemption was required forced that Jeffersonian judicial tribunal to choose between alternative constitutional futures. In
contrast, we now have the benefit of almost two centuries of constitutional
hindsight as we measure the consequences of the resulting exemptions doctrine. Given constitutional premises and promises of religious liberty, it
seems even more difficult today to maintain the proposition that government
should have unfettered power to break the secrecy of the confessional. Do
Justice Scalia and Professor Bradley mean to suggest that Mayor Clinton and
his four-judge court should have decided Philips differently?
By what standard could they maintain today that Philips was wrongly
decided? With the benefit of almost two centuries of hindsight, it is not easy
to conceive of any empirical measure which would yield such a conclusion.
Danger to the state, one objection raised against the priest-penitent privilege
in 1813 by District Attorney Gardinier? Hardly-no later historical evidence
confirms Gardinier's gloomy prediction. Religious inequality? Again, District Attorney Gardiner's ominous prophesy has not been realized. Instead,
numerous religious sects other than Catholics have generously been extended
the protection of the clergy privilege, even without any equivalent of penance
within their church doctrine. Scholarly or popular disagreement? Not really.
From the outset, the constitutional priest-penitent religious exemption recognized by Mayor Clinton in Philips has gradually won overwhelming judicial
approval. Beginning with New York in 1828, its principle has now been codi-
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fied in every state in the union. Since its popular acceptance by the outset of
the twentieth-century, the postcolonial American priest-penitent privilege
has earned universal scholarly acclaim, despite recent controversy over other
free exercise exemptions. The international hullabaloo over Oregon's taping
of a jailhouse confession to a Catholic priest thus seems to reflect a popular
understanding that William Sampson's postcolonial priest-penitent privilege
reflects a fundamental human right to religious freedom.
Recall that in its original constitutional paradigm of the priest-penitent
privilege, William Sampson's postcolonial jurisprudence has historically prevailed over Justice Scalia's newly recovered imperial jurisprudence. Since the
controversial Philips decision was decided almost two centuries ago, the subsequent universal recognition of its priest-penitent exemption-by courts,
legislatures, scholars, and public opinion-suggests that its subversive principle has won general acceptance as an intrinsic aspect of a fundamental
human right, one appropriately protected by constitutional provisions. This
basic human right of religious freedom and equality is central to William
Sampson's postcolonial legal theory; but it is peripheral to Justice Scalia and
some others who cling to an imperial legal ideology inherited from the colonial regime.
In sum, in the original constitutional paradigm of the priest-penitent
privilege, once familiar with the history of New York's Irish Catholic refugees, it seems difficult to maintain that Philips was wrongly decided. In historical context, the acid test of time reveals little dispute that Mayor Clinton's
postcolonial exemptions theory was the right decision. With hindsight, it is
not easy to defeat William Sampson's United Irish constitutional theory on
its own merits. The banished human rights advocate reduced the case to its
true essence-a republican choice between perpetuating the imperial legacy
of persecuting Irish Catholic refugees or striking out in a new American direction with a postcolonial jurisprudence founded on social equality and inclusion. Which constitutional theory would you favor? In Philips, we can
now see, Sampson's Hibernocentric postcolonial jurisprudence charted a wise
course for the young American republic, one which continues to guide us in
the right direction almost two centuries later.
If I am right-that the constitutional interpretation in Philips cannot retrospectively be refuted-what are the larger jurisprudential implications of
this conclusion? In my view, going far beyond issues of law and religion,
Philips offers a classic text on equality theory and an essential primer on
postcolonial legal method. The simple premise of postcolonial jurisprudence
must be that existing social arrangements deserve no particular deference, as
they are too often mere relics of social inequality in the prior regime. What
seems obvious (the imperial perspective), is not at all so (the postcolonial
perspective)! Claims of minority groups must thus be taken very seriously.
Consistent with democratic republican theory, the hierarchical starting points
of legal analysis are broad constitutional ideals resting on fundamental
human rights, only one of which is the idea of democratic majority rule. Positive law is always vulnerable to group challenge-the common law because it
typically rests on questionable colonial antecedents, and popular legislation
because it can only advance objects that are themselves constitutional.
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Postcolonial jurisprudence rests on the constitutional assumption of fundamental human rights, especially the rights of indigenous peoples and equal
status in place of colonial discrimination based on race, religion and caste, as
well as other artificial social categories.
In its method, most importantly, postcolonial jurisprudence starts with
an idea of infinite possibility. It is certainly deeply historical, but its search is
always to uncover the questionable origins of legal categories constructed in
the colonized past, not to gild their pedigrees. This historical method has
radical legal consequences. Postcolonial legal theory supports minority
rights, in a general sense, and subsumes various schools of identity jurisprudence within its broad contours. It consistently challenges particular patterns
of legal classification inherited from the prior colonial regime.
So understood, the full jurisprudential implications of Philips reverberate far beyond the United States. Philips suggests the elements of a
Hibernocentric postcolonial jurisprudence, a historicist constitutional theory
drawn from United Irish ideology and revolutionary principles. Applied to
the present laws of the relatively young Republic of Ireland, for example,
William Sampson's Hibernocentric postcolonial jurisprudence opens up a
whole new set of radical, destabilizing constitutional ideas. Quite simply, his
early insight was that once the colonial umbilical cord has been cut, everything that rests upon the prerevolutionary social order loses its normative
authority. So too, Sampson's United Irish legal theory threatens to deconstruct and make anew constitutional thinking in the courts and government
of Northern Ireland, still closely tied to a colonial past. In its deepest implication for Sampson's native country, his postcolonial, nationalist, republican,
antisectarian jurisprudence offers a distinct constitutional vision that might
develop and sustain a United Ireland. In that Sampsonian constitutional order, as illustrated by Philips,the hierarchical starting points of legal discourse
would have to rest on certain fundamental egalitarian principles of ethnic,
racial, religious, linguistic, and cultural inclusion.
Even beyond the United States and Ireland, Philips has profound jurisprudential implications for both developed and developing nations. In Europe and other Westernized countries, the current American controversy
over the free exercise exemption offers a timely parable of the constitutional
strains posed by spreading cultural diversity. Philips's postcolonial assertion
of a constitutional priest-penitent privilege was an early recognition of fundamental human rights to racial equality and religious freedom-fundamental
human rights since recognized as binding international norms in such wellknown international legal instruments as the United Nations Declarations of
Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the InterAmerican Convention on Human Rights, and many more volumes of enforceable national, regional, and local human rights legislation. To pose the
question bluntly, for example: in England, the home of the common law challenged in Philips, might failure to recognize the priest-penitent privilege today violate the European Convention on Human Rights or the new national
Human Rights Act?
But in its revolutionary articulation of an authentic postcolonial jurisprudence, the implications of Philips for developing nations are even more radi-
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cal. The arguments of the banished human rights lawyer William Sampson
can serve as a ready template for the construction of any indigenous
postcolonial jurisprudence. Sampson's historicist postcolonial jurisprudential
method strips existing laws of their normative privilege, by exposing them as
the product of questionable colonial antecedents. Because, by definition, the
legal systems of colonized peoples have been constructed upon the needs of
empire, on point after point of legal doctrine or inherited legislation, those
bodies of rules are vulnerable to subversive and destabilizing challenges just
like Philips. All that is required, in place of William Sampson's Hibernocentric employment of the oppressive Irish penal laws, is to substitute another
precise historical context of domination that will simultaneously explain and
discredit the particular legal principle that must be challenged. In a revised
hierarchy of legal interpretation, long -accepted but questionable principles
can then be abandoned in place of a new, normative form of postcolonial
legal theory. Because of the pervasive extent and lingering effects of colonial
jurisprudence across most of the world-those formerly colonized nations
from Ireland to Africa, Asia, and South America, as well as the former Soviet
republics in Eastern Europe and elsewhere-postcolonial legal method unsettles all the foundations supporting positive legal canons. In short, everywhere, the subversive Sampsonian legal method displayed in Philips suggests
a radically altered constitutional politics.

